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ABSTRACT 
 
This thesis explores the impact of the cuts to civil legal aid introduced by the Legal 
Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act (2012) (“LASPO”) on the ability 
of those who are vulnerable to access justice. In doing so it focuses on the 
experience of UK Law Centres, a network of not-for-profit  providers of legal 
advice and representation. Law Centres were established in the 1970’s as a response 
to acnowledged deficiencies in the legal aid scheme that existed at this time. 
Principal amongst these deficiencies was the failure of the scheme to provide legal 
assistance to those individuals who were most in need of it. Since their inception Law 
Centres have developed a reputation for specialising in the delivery of legal services 
to marginalised communities, making them an ideal lens through which to observe 
the impact of cuts to legal aid on the vulnerable. This thesis explores the 
relationship between the Law Centres movement and the legal aid scheme; 
characterising this as one of reluctant yet increasing dependency. By the time 
LASPO was introduced, contracts for the delivery of  legal aid comprised 46% of 
the funding for Law Centres in England and Wales, leaving Law Centres highly 
exposed to the swingeing cuts brought about by this legislation.   
 
The thesis seeks to understand the impact of LASPO on Law Centres as a 
movement, and in particular on their ability to deliver services to those individuals 
who are most vulnerable. In the absence of a consensus definition of what a Law 
Centre is, the thesis reviews the extant literature on the Law Centres movement to 
propose an “ideal type” framework of Law Centre values, which can be used as a 
tool against which to evaluate the impact of different strategies for surviving the 
cuts. It proposes a novel definition of vulnerability, to assist in assessing whether 
the strategies adopted by Law Centres in response to LASPO are likely to prove 
more or less effective in enabling the movement to prioritise delivering their 
services to those who are in greatest need. The thesis then uses these analytical tools 
to evaluate the three most popular funding models adopted by Law Centres in 
response to the cuts, drawing on original empirical research. The thesis concludes 
that if Law Centres wish to retain both their unique position within the landscape of 
legal service providers and their ability to support those in greatest need, their 
response to LASPO must by driven by cognisance of and fidelity to the values that 
render them distinctive.  
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1 INTRODUCTION TO THE THESIS  
1.1 Introduction 
This thesis is based on a study of UK Law Centres, a network of not-for-profit 
providers of legal services established in the early 1970s who specialise in the 
delivery of legal advice and representation in areas of civil law. Law Centres are 
recognised as having particular expertise in the areas of law commonly referred to 
collectively as “social welfare law”:  asylum, immigration, community care, debt, 
employment, housing and welfare benefits. Some also offer (or offered) advice and 
representation in consumer, family and public law matters. Law Centres emerged 
from the politics of the New Left, and the founders of the movement were 
concerned that structural and operational deficiencies in the legal aid scheme at the 
time were resulting in individuals in poorer communities being left unable to access 
legal advice and representation. For the founders of the Law Centres movement, 
the ability to access legal advice and representation was intimately linked to the 
ability to bring about social change in favour of those who were poor, marginalised 
and vulnerable: the founders of the movement believed that legal rights were a 
critical tool that could be marshalled to address poverty and disadvantage 
(Committee of the Society of Labour Lawyers, 1968:3). Further to this, the founders 
of the Law Centres movement believed that, in the context of the common law 
system of England and Wales, there was a moral imperative to ensure that 
individuals from all sections of society were able to pursue their problems through 
the legal system, to ensure that the law was developed in a manner that reflected the 
interests of society as a whole, rather than serving the interests of a privileged elite 
(Committee of the Society of Labour Lawyers, 1968:37). As such, they proposed a 
new model of legal services delivery, situating lawyers in poor communities, training 
them in the areas of law most likely to affect those communities, and encouraging 
residents of these communities to access legal services.  
 
Unlike other not-for-profit providers of legal advice, such as the Citizens Advice 
Bureau, the Law Centres movement was not a centrally planned service with 
“articulated common goals” (Goriely, 1996:232). As such, there was, from their 
inception, considerable diversity within the Law Centres movement, with Law 
Centres differing from each other in terms of size, structure, functions and 
activities. Struggles with accessing sustainable, dedicated funding exacerbated this 
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diversity, as different Law Centres emphasised different functions depending on 
their ability to access funding, and the conditions imposed on the funding they 
received. Crucially, the founders of the Law Centre movement originally envisaged 
that Law Centres would be supplementary to the network of providers funded 
through the legal aid scheme, arguing that the cost of Law Centres should be 
funded by the government and provided with their own discrete, long-term funding 
stream (Committee of the Society of Labour Lawyers, 1968:47). As is described in 
Chapter 2 of this thesis, this funding failed to materialise, and as such Law Centres 
became increasingly reliant on funding from the legal aid scheme to support their 
work.  
 
The research on which this thesis is based was conducted at a critical moment in the 
history of the Law Centres movement: shortly after cuts to public funding for legal 
services introduced by the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 
2012 (“LASPO”) dramatically reduced the support available for the types of legal 
work that have historically been undertaken by Law Centres. These cuts threatened 
(and continue to threaten) the survival of Law Centres: prior to the introduction of 
LASPO, 46% of the funding for Law Centres in England and Wales was derived 
from the civil legal aid scheme (Randall and Smerdon, 2014:7). As a consequence of 
LASPO, by 2015, one-in-six Law Centres had been forced to close (Justice Select 
Committee, 2015:33). Those that remain face numerous challenges the most 
pressing of which is to develop new funding models to ensure their survival. This 
thesis presents a detailed study of the three most popular funding models adopted 
by Law Centres in the wake of the cuts, and explores their implications for Law 
Centres.  
 
Section 1.2 below describes how the research approach was developed, and sets out 
the aims and objectives for the following study.  
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1.2 Approach to the research: the aims and objectives for the project 
and approach to addressing them 
1.2.1 Project Aims and Objectives 
This research was funded by the Economic and Social Research Council (“ESRC”) 
through the University of Warwick Doctoral Training Centre as part of their 
collaborative studentships scheme. ESRC Collaborative Studentships are designed 
to give students the opportunity to undertake research in collaboration with the 
private, public or voluntary sector. Coventry Law Centre and the Law Centres 
Network were the voluntary sector partners selected for this project. The 
studentship was advertised (for text of advert please see Appendix A) and 
prospective candidates invited to submit an application before being asked to attend 
an interview. The overall topic of the PhD and some parameters for the research 
had already been set prior to the award of the studentship. The task I undertook 
was to design a research project that: 
i.) Addressed the need for research that examines the actual impact of cuts 
to funding for legal advice services introduced by the Legal Aid, 
Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act [2012], particularly on the 
most vulnerable and disadvantaged. 
ii.) Examined how legal advice providers are responding to these cuts to 
funding and the different models that are being developed to deal with 
these changes – with a focus on Law Centres.  
iii.) Produced findings that would assist Law Centres as they continued to 
develop and refine their responses to the cuts introduced by LASPO. 
These criteria may be considered the overarching aims and objectives for the 
research presented in the following thesis.  
1.2.2 Approach to addressing the research aims and objectives  
In designing a research project that met the above aims and objectives within the 
time and resources specified, a number of decisions had to be taken, both practical 
and conceptual, in order to limit the scope of the project. These included:  
i.) Defining the object of study, namely, Law Centres, and developing a 
conceptual framework for understanding what a Law Centre is, in order 
to facilitate the drawing of conclusions regarding the impact of different 
funding models on Law Centres,   
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ii.) Developing a context specific definition of “vulnerability”: Given the 
emphasis within the project aims on understanding the impact of the 
cuts on the vulnerable, it was decided that an important task was to 
develop a definition for understanding vulnerability within the context 
of the experience of civil law problems 
iii.) Identifying and selecting models for responding to the cuts introduced 
by LASPO   
 
The following discussion outlines the approach to undertaking these decisions, and 
sets out some of the key concepts that will be deployed throughout the thesis.  
1.2.3 Defining the object of study: What is a Law Centre?   
Given the nature of the studentship and the privileged access to Law Centres that 
the funding arrangement afforded, it was decided that the focus of the thesis should 
be on Law Centres rather than looking more broadly at the wider advice sector1. As 
such, an immediate priority was to develop a working definition of what a Law 
Centre is. A review of the literature on Law Centres immediately revealed the lack of 
a unitary definition and highlighted considerable diversity within the Law Centres 
movement, with Law Centres differing from each other in terms of size, structure, 
activities and practices. Previous studies of Law Centres have identified the lack of 
a: “comprehensive description of the Law Centres movement” (Lancaster, 2002: 52) 
and the relative scarcity of conceptual and theoretical literature on the movement 
(Burdett, 2004:69). As described in the introduction to this chapter, unlike other 
not-for-profit providers of legal advice, such as the Citizens Advice Bureau, the Law 
Centres movement was not a centrally planned service with “articulated common 
goals” (Goriely, 1996a:232). As stated above, one of the aims of the research was to 
deliver findings that would assist Law Centres as they continued to develop and 
refine their responses to the funding cuts introduced by LASPO. Given the 
                                                
11 Valuable wider context for the project was provided by the findings of a survey I conducted in early 2013 in 
conjunction with ilegal, the largest online community of individuals working in social welfare law and civil legal 
aid in the UK (www.ilegal.org.uk). In total, 674 individuals working in the advice sector in England and Wales 
responded to the survey. Whilst the sampling method used in the design of the survey meant that the sample of 
respondents was not representative and as such, the findings were not generalisable across the sector, the 
information provided by respondents was helpful in developing an understanding of the issues that 
professionals working in the sector were particularly concerned with in the run up to the cuts. The full report is 
available here: 
https://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/law/research/centres/chrp/spendingcuts/153064_statesector_report-
final.pdf 
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resource and time constraints of the project, it would be impossible to research the 
impact of LASPO on all 52 Law Centres. The heterogeneity of the movement, and 
lack of information on individual Law Centres from which to construct a sample 
frame meant that it would be difficult to select a smaller sample of “typical” Law 
Centres as representative of the movement and from which findings could be 
generalised. As such, it became imperative to develop a conceptual framework that 
could be used to draw out lessons that would have resonance for the Law Centres 
movement as a whole.  
 
In constructing a framework for describing and understanding the object of study 
(Law Centres) it was decided that the focus should be on developing an “ideal type” 
of Law Centre. Following Coser (1977): “An ideal type is an analytical construct that 
serves the investigator as a measuring rod to ascertain similarities as well as 
deviations in concrete cases. It provides the basic method for comparative study”. 
(Coser, 1977:223). An ideal type presents a composite picture of the components 
and characteristics of the phenomena under investigation. The ideal type as a 
methodological tool for the conduct of social research was developed by Weber, 
who stated that: “An ideal type is formed by the one-sided accentuation of one or 
more points of view and by the synthesis of a great many diffuse, discrete, more or 
less present and occasionally absent concrete individual phenomena, which are 
arranged according to those one-sidedly emphasized viewpoints into a unified 
analytical construct." (Weber, 1904:90).  The decision to adopt this methodological 
approach still left open the question as to what type of individual phenomena 
should be captured within the ideal type. It was important that the ideal type 
included those phenomena that could be asserted and defended as the defining 
characteristics of a Law Centre. Given this, should the ideal type seek to 
comprehensively record the range of functions undertaken by Law Centres, and the 
way in which the literature indicates they perform them (e.g. Law Centres provide 
legal advice in an informal manner) or focus on developing an interpretive 
framework that captured their underlying values and ethos? In taking this decision, I 
was inspired by primary research I conducted in Australia2, interviewing managers 
                                                
2 In the second year of my PhD studies I applied for and was awarded funding from the Warwick-Monash 
alliance to convene two workshops on comparative issues in Access to Justice, one in the UK and one in 
Melbourne, Victoria. Further details of the workshops can be accessed here: 
http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/law/research/centres/accesstojustice/ 
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and staff across the network of Community Law Centres established across 
Victoria, and management within the Victorian Legal Aid Board. I was struck by the 
strength of the Community Law Centre movement in Victoria, the level of impact 
they were able to achieve and the way in which they had established a prominent 
position for themselves within the wider landscape of providers of legal services. It 
seemed to me that the one plausible explanation for the strength of the Community 
Law Centres movement, and the source of their distinctiveness, was not what they 
did (delivering legal advice in a variety of community settings) but why and how they 
delivered these services- in other words, their distinctive values and ethos and the 
way in which these were expressed through their work. As such, it was decided that 
the process for developing the ideal type should focus on analysing and interpreting 
the existing literature on Law Centres with a view to compiling a set of 
organisational values that, it could be asserted, plausibly encapsulate what a Law 
Centre is.  
 
The academic literature on organisations uses the language of “values” to describe 
the core, irreducible components of organisational culture; beliefs that drive 
practices, functions, structures, behaviour and strategy (Hofstede et al. 1990:291). 
Hofstede et al. writing in 1990 argued that: “the core of [organisational] culture is 
formed by values” (Hofstede et al.1990:291). Organisational values may also be 
understood as a set of beliefs and aims that guide the behaviour of an organisation 
and individuals within it (Hyde et al. 2000: 10, Padaki, 2001). It has been remarked 
that values: “are often unconscious and rarely discussable, [they] cannot be observed 
as such but are manifested in alternatives of behaviour” (Hofstede et al. 1990:291). 
As such, any attempt to identify the values of a given organisation requires a degree 
of interpretation. In developing the ideal type Law Centre I reviewed and analysed 
the existing academic and grey literature on Law Centres, their history and 
development. Following Padaki (2001 and Rokeach, 1970, 1973) I structured my 
findings into “terminal” and “instrumental” values. “Terminal values” consist of 
overall aims, goals or outcomes such as “Law Centres change the law in favour of 
poor and marginalised groups”. “Instrumental values” are best defined as sets of 
beliefs regarding the way in which the organisation should conduct itself in 
achieving the end states described by the terminal values e.g.  “Law Centres do this 
through establishing themselves within communities with high levels of economic 
 20 
deprivation, making it easier for people who are poor and marginalised to access 
legal services”.      
 
A further factor that mitigated in favour of developing an ideal type Law Centre 
based on values, rather than functions, was the desire to deliver a conceptual tool 
that would be of benefit to the Law Centres Network (addressing project aim iii 
above). There are compelling reasons for identifying and codifying a clear 
organisational values framework. In the late 1990s and early 2000s, researchers 
identified a positive relationship between the effectiveness and sustainability of 
organisations and the clarity of their organisational values (Collins and Porras, 1994; 
Ackoff 1994; Padaki 2001). In the context of NGOs, it has been observed that 
articulating and adhering to a clear values framework can be critical to securing 
funding: Hailey, writing in 2001 observed that: “If NGOs, of various types, are to 
distinguish themselves from other recipients of…funding, they need not only to be seen to have 
sufficient organisational capacity and to use such funds effectively, but also to identify, articulate, 
and nurture their own core values and identity” (Hailey, 2001:164). The Esmee Fairbairn 
Foundation, a UK philanthropic funder, supported the convening of an Inquiry 
investigating the role of values in the on-going sustainability of the voluntary sector, 
which established the importance of identifying, nurturing and adhering to 
organisational values in uncertain funding climates (Blake, Robinson and Smerdon, 
2006). As such, it was hoped that researching, identifying and codifying an ideal type 
Law Centre based on values would confer practical benefits for the Law Centres 
Network, beyond the context of the PhD3.  
1.2.4 Defining “vulnerability”  
As stated above, a critical aim of the PhD project was to address a gap in empirical 
research that: “examines the actual impact of cuts to funding for legal advice 
services introduced by the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 
[2012], particularly on the most vulnerable and disadvantaged”. In order to address 
this aim, it was decided that it was first important to define who “the most 
vulnerable and disadvantaged” are in the context of the experience of civil, 
administrative and family justiciable issues. The importance of advancing a 
definition of vulnerability specific to the context of the experience of civil, 
                                                
3 The Law Centre “ideal type” at Chapter 3 was presented to the Chief Executive of the Law Centres Network 
and has been used to inform the development of a new “theory of change” model for the Network as a whole.  
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administrative and family justiciable problems was emphasised by research 
conducted in order to arrive at the ideal type Law Centre- it became apparent that 
one of the “terminal values” or goals of the ideal type Law Centre was to deliver 
legal services to those in “greatest need”. Whilst the broad focus on using the law to 
bring about social change in favour of those experiencing material deprivation was 
clear, within this category, the founders of the Law Centre movement had proposed 
an approach to identify those in “greatest need” which focussed on: “examining the 
types of situations in which legal services provide important advantages to the 
public and then… measure the extent to which real need in such situations is left 
unmet” (Committee of the Society of Labour Lawyers, 1968:4). The committee then 
listed six situations where they considered legal advice and representation to provide 
an important advantage: when facing criminal prosecution, when in the midst of a 
marriage breakdown, in the context of a civil dispute between two private 
individuals, when an individual may be entitled to claim a benefit under welfare 
legislation, when an individual wishes to make some use of his property and finally 
when a number of individuals wish to operate together for purposes beneficial to 
them as a group (Committee of the Society of Labour Lawyers, 1968:4-5). A further 
criterion to be considered was whether the situation was one in which: “the more 
affluent and the commercial and industrial sections of the community habitually 
seek the services of their family or company solicitor” (Committee of the Society of 
Labour Lawyers, 1968:5). Critics of this approach argued that:  “…these arguments 
are only elaborations of the main argument that those who have a legal problem 
need a lawyer and one should be provided” (Lewis, 1973: 74). As such, it was 
argued, the Law Centres movement argued for a: “reconfiguration of organisation 
of the legal profession, not a radical reconceptualization of the legal system and its 
role in society” (White, 1973:6). Furthermore, basing a definition of “greatest need” 
or “vulnerability” on the notion that all individuals who experience legal problems 
and cannot afford to secure legal services are vulnerable and should be provided 
with a legal advice and representation, is of limited assistance to Law Centres in the 
immediate context of limited resources, and successive empirical studies that 
suggest the experience of justiciable problems greatly outstrips the supply of legal 
services (Genn, 1999, Pleasence et al. 2015).  
This thesis argues that in order to develop a definition of “greatest 
need/vulnerability” that can be used by Law Centres to assess whether they are 
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achieving their aim of delivering their services to those who are in greatest 
need/most vulnerable, it is necessary to move beyond the conventional wisdom, 
espoused by the founders of the Law Centres movement, that those experiencing 
justiciable problems benefit from legal services, to explore why it is that this might 
be the case. What are the specific benefits that legal advice and representation are 
said to confer? This thesis argues, following the work of Professor Hazel Genn, that 
access to legal services is valuable to the extent that access to legal services facilitates 
individuals to secure just outcomes in relation to their justiciable problems.  Writing 
in 1995, Genn observed: “The ability or willingness to secure legal or para-legal 
advice in order to initiate or defend a claim in court does not, of itself, ensure 
effective access to justice; it is only the beginning of the process. Effective access to 
just outcomes requires that litigants be able to make full use of the law and legal 
institutions and that the outcome of disputes and claims should be determined by 
the merits of the arguments of the parties” (Genn, 1995:394). As such, in Chapter 3, 
I review the existing theoretical arguments and empirical evidence detailing the 
specific mechanisms through which access to legal advice and representation is 
considered to render it more likely that an individual will secure a just outcome in 
relation to their justiciable problem. By identifying the specific skills, knowledge, 
attributes and experiences that research indicates are necessary or desirable in 
helping individuals to secure just outcomes within the framework of an adversarial 
legal system it is possible to work backwards to identify individual and situational 
characteristics that would make it less likely that a given individual is able to secure a 
just outcome. For example, research indicates that the ability to clearly articulate a 
claim is a critical factor in achieving a just outcome in the context of an adversarial 
legal system; as such, individuals with low levels of literacy, or who have difficulty 
processing, organising and articulating information (for example as a result of 
mental illness, drug addiction or cognitive impairment), or those who have English 
as a foreign language, are likely to be more vulnerable in the context of being able to 
secure a just outcome. The thesis argues that identifying these features in this way 
provides Law Centres with a set of principled criteria on which to base decisions 
about who should be prioritised for assistance, addressing aims i.) and iii.) of the 
project. 
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1.2.5 Identifying and selecting the different funding models for responding 
to LASPO  
 
As stated above- a key objective for the research was to examine how Law Centres 
were responding to the cuts introduced by LASPO and gather descriptive and 
analytical data on the different models Law Centres had adopted to deal with the 
changes. In recognition of the fact that time and research constraints for the project 
mitigated against examining all of the different approaches adopted across the 
network of Law Centres, it was decided to focus attention on the most popular 
models adopted by Law Centres, in order to deliver findings that would be of most 
use to Law Centres. In order to identify these models, in November 2012 I attended 
the Law Centres Network AGM, where I gave a presentation on the aims of my 
research and distributed a questionnaire to attendees (see Appendix B). The 
questionnaire was also circulated electronically to all Law Centres via the Law 
Centres Network mailing list. The aim of this questionnaire was threefold: firstly, to 
gain a better understanding of the range of functions delivered by Law Centres 
across the network, secondly, to gain an overview of the likely implications of 
LASPO for individual Law Centres, and thirdly to explore the range of responses 
Law Centres were considering in the context of the funding crisis created by the 
cuts. A further aim of both my attendance at the conference and circulating the 
questionnaire was to gauge interest in participating in the research. The response 
rate was fairly low, at 33%, however, amongst this small sample the most common 
responses to the cuts being considered were charging for advice (under existing 
branding or through establishing a separate charging arm), bidding for funding from 
other sources/maximising grant income, and merging with other organisations. In 
light of the low response rate to the questionnaire I liaised with senior staff at the 
Law Centres Network in order to check that these models were indeed the most 
commonly adopted across the network. Law Centres Network were able to confirm 
that these strategies were those most commonly adopted in responding to LASPO, 
and assist in identifying Law Centres pursuing these strategies who might be willing 
to take part in the research.    
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1.3 Research questions, relationship to existing literature, research 
strategy and methodology 
Section 1.2 above explains the aims and objectives for the research and sets out 
some of the key concepts that will be utilised throughout the remainder of the 
thesis.  The following discussion begins by stating the research questions that will be 
addressed in the thesis, before moving to discuss the research strategy and 
methodology adopted to answer them.  
1.3.1 Main research questions  
1. What is a Law Centre? What are the organisational values that together constitute 
the ideal type Law Centre?  
 
2. What was the relationship between Law Centres and the legal aid scheme prior to 
the introduction of LASPO?  
 
3. What are the most common funding models adopted by Law Centres in 
responding to the cuts, why were they adopted and how do they operate in practice?  
 
4. How have the different models chosen impacted on Law Centres? How do the 
different funding models impact on the ability of Law Centres to deliver the values 
set out in the ideal type Law Centre?  
 
Subsidiary question 
5. What factors should Law Centres consider when assessing who is most 
vulnerable/in greatest need?  
 
1.3.2 Relationship to existing literatures  
Given the complexity of the topic, this thesis draws on a number of literatures to 
provide answers to the research questions identified above. In order to answer 
question 1, “What is a Law Centre” I developed an ideal type Law Centre through 
reviewing and analysing the extant historical, conceptual and empirical literature on 
Law Centres from their inception to the present day- this is presented in Chapter 3 
of the thesis. In order to understand the impact of the cuts to civil legal aid 
introduced by LASPO on Law Centres, it was important to first understand the 
 25 
relationship between Law Centres and the legal aid scheme prior to the 2013 cuts 
(question 2 above). As such, I reviewed the literature on the operation of the legal 
aid scheme and charted Law Centres’ increasing reliance on legal aid funding for 
their work through the academic literature on the history of the legal aid scheme 
and the history of Law Centres. Where there appeared to be important gaps I 
augmented this literature with expert interviews undertaken with Lord Carter of 
Coles and Steve Hynes, former Chief Executive of the Law Centres Network4. This 
material is presented in Chapter 2 of the thesis. In order to address subsidiary 
question 5, and arrive at a definition of vulnerability specific to the context of the 
ability to secure just outcomes in relation to civil, family and administrative law 
problems, I reviewed the extensive literature on the role and value of legal advice 
and representation in an adversarial legal system. In particular, I focussed on 
identifying the benefits legal advice and representation are purported to confer in 
terms of promoting access to just outcomes, and the theoretical literature 
underpinning arguments for the provision of publicly funded legal advice. In doing 
so, I drew on literature both from the UK and overseas, primarily the USA and 
Australia. I also reviewed existing relevant statute and case law, as well as 
publications reporting the findings of successive surveys of legal need in England 
and Wales. This is presented at Chapter 4.   
 
In addition to the reviews of literatures presented in Chapters 1-3 I also sought to 
augment my empirical findings through reference to existing literature relevant to 
the most common models adopted by Law Centres in response to the cuts 
introduced by LASPO. In Chapter 5 I explore the history of charging for advice as a 
Law Centre and reference the wider literature on the impact of LASPO on 
providers of immigration advice and their clients. I also explore the literature on the 
ethics and motivations of public sector workers, and how they are impacted by the 
                                                
4 Lord Carter of Coles presided over the Carter Review of Legal Aid Procurement, which considered the means 
by which to deliver the Government’s vision for procuring publicly funded legal services. The aim of this review 
was to recommend a procurement system that achieved maximum value for money and control over spending 
whilst ensuring quality and the fairness of the justice system. The reforms instantiated by the review were 
controversial, and largely recognised as having a detrimental impact on not-for-profit providers of legal aid, 
including Law Centres. He was selected for interview in order to better understand the rationale for the 
approach taken in the course of the reforms. Steve Hynes was Chief Executive of the Law Centres Network 
from 2002-2007 and presided over the creation of Kirklees Law Centre: he was therefore able to provide insight 
into the establishment of the Law Centre and the early stages of its operation. He has written several books on 
legal aid and austerity, and as such, was able to provide incisive and authoritative commentary on issues 
pertinent to this thesis.  
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introduction of strategies and techniques more commonly associated with profit-
driven organisations.  In Chapter 6 I draw on the wider literature on mergers in the 
not-for-profit sector in order to contextualise the experience of the Law Centre 
selected as a case study. In Chapter 7, I describe the existing limited literature on 
attempts by Law Centres to expand and diversify their funding base with project 
income from non-legal specialist funders, in addition to providing an overview of 
the operation of the Troubled Families Programme, a policy designed to improve 
outcomes for families experiencing complex and intractable problems, at a local and 
national level, through summarising the grey literature on this policy programme.   
1.3.3 Research strategy and methodology  
The following section sets out the approach to addressing the research questions set 
out above, and describes and explains the research strategy and methodology 
selected for the empirical stages of the project.  The research began in October 
2012 and the main-stage fieldwork for the project was completed in 2014. 
1.3.4 Research Strategy: Case study approach  
The case study approach has a considerable pedigree within both organisational 
research in general, and research into Law Centres in particular (Byles and Morris: 
1977, Lancaster: 2002, Burdett: 2004). The case study approach has been described 
as: “a strategy for doing research which involves an empirical investigation of a 
particular contemporary phenomenon within its real life context using multiple sources of 
evidence” (Burdett, 2004:75 citing Robson, 1993:52). In this thesis, the model 
adopted in response to the cuts (e.g. charging for advice) is the “contemporary 
phenomenon” (the case) the Law Centre adopting the model is the “real life” 
context, and the ideal type Law Centre the methodological construct used to 
explore the implications of the model for Law Centres. The following discussion 
explains the selection of the case study approach as a strategy for answering the 
research questions identified above at 1.3.1. and argues that the case study approach 
is particularly suited to: the nature of the research questions, the context of the 
study, the need to gather data at a sufficient level of depth to meet the exploratory 
and explanatory aims of the project, and the desire to develop hypotheses regarding 
the relationship between the adoption of different funding models and Law Centre 
values.   
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1.3.4.1 The case study approach is particularly suited to both the research aims and questions 
and the context of the study 
Yin (1994) writing in what may be considered the seminal text on undertaking case 
study research, states that the case study approach is particularly useful when the 
research questions focus on contemporary events and the researcher has little or no 
control over behavioural events (Yin, 1994:location 641). As such, the conditions 
under which this study was conducted reflect those that have been identified as 
mitigating in favour of the adoption of a case study approach. The adoption of a 
case study approach is held to be particularly appropriate when the research 
questions are “how” and “why” questions- such as questions contained within 
questions 3 and 4 listed above at 1.3.1. (Yin, 1994: location 788). Further to this, 
Burdett (2004) who adopted a case study approach for her thesis which explored 
the concepts of professional accountability and community control in the context of 
Law Centres, asserted that: “case studies have been used in organisational studies to 
explore organisational relationships, especially those involving professionals; to 
examine the effects of environmental factors including public policy initiatives, and 
to explain organisational… dilemmas” (Burdett, 2004:77). The case study approach 
has also been adopted extensively to explore the mechanisms of organisational 
change in professionalised organisations (McNulty and Ferlie, 2002; Pettigrew Ferlie 
and McKie 1992; Weick, 1979) and the impact of new organisational forms, such as 
public-private partnerships on public sector values (Klijn and Teisman, 2003, 
Davies and Hentschke, 2006, Reynaers, 2013:44, McCarty and Molina, 2015 and 
Reynaers and Paanakar 2016). As such, the case study approach is ideally suited to 
the aims, questions and context of the present study.  
 
1.3.4.2 The case study approach facilitates the capture of data at a volume and depth capable of 
supporting the exploratory and explanatory aims of the project 
The use of a case study approach has been held to be particularly appropriate when 
the research questions are of both an “exploratory” and “explanatory” nature 
(Bresnen: 1988, Yin: 1994, Burdett: 2004) In the academic literature, there is a 
degree of consensus supporting Yin’s contention that: “…the distinctive need for 
case study research arises out of the desire to understand complex social 
phenomena” (Yin, 1994:location 688, Flyvbjerg, 2006:220). Case studies are thought 
to be both useful and appropriate when the issues under investigation are: 
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“complex, multifaceted, nonrepetitive and highly contextual” (Powell and Freidkin, 
1987:183 cited in Burdett, 2004:76) as in the present study. The case study approach 
has been held to be particularly useful in facilitating the capture of data of sufficient 
depth and richness to support: “an analysis of the context and processes involved in 
the phenomenon under study” (Hartley, 1994:208-209, cited in Burdett, 2004). As 
stated above, a key aim of the research was to gather sufficient data to both: 
i.) Provide a detailed description of the operation of the three most 
common funding models adopted by Law Centres in response to 
the cuts, in order to guide other Law Centres who might consider 
adopting these approaches (addressing question 3 and aim 3), and;  
ii.) Analyse and explore the implications of the adoption of these 
models with reference to the ideal type Law Centre, in order to 
highlight potential implications of the adoption of the model for 
Law Centre values.  
The adoption of the case study approach combined with limiting the scope of the 
empirical study to three cases facilitated the gathering of data at the depth and 
quality necessary to address these two aims within the resource and time constraints 
of the project.   
 
1.3.5 The selection of the case studies 
In deciding which Law Centres to include in the study, a number of inclusion 
criteria were applied. These were:  
 
1.3.5.1 Exposure to the cuts introduced by LASPO 
Law Centres had to self-report that they were exposed or highly exposed to the cuts 
introduced by LASPO. In the case of all the Law Centres selected for inclusion, 
income from legal aid was either their largest or the second largest source of 
funding prior to the cuts (see Appendix C for further information).  
 
1.3.5.2 Adoption of one of the three most popular models for responding to the cuts  
Law Centres included in the study had to state that they had adopted one of the 
three most popular models for responding to the cuts, in order that the research 
deliver findings that would have wider application for the Law Centres Network.  
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1.3.5.3 Located in England but outside of London  
At an early stage it was agreed that all the Law Centres included in the study should 
be located in England, because, following Mayo, who completed a study of Law 
Centres in 2012: “of the potential complexities involved in studying Law Centres 
that were operating within…varying social policy frameworks (Mayo, 2013: 686). It 
was also decided to exclude Law Centres from London as, on reviewing financial 
information provided by the Law Centres Network, it was found that London Law 
Centres differ from their regional counterparts in a number of important ways. 
Firstly, London Law Centres tended to have a more diverse funding base than that 
of their regional counterparts: data collected by the Law Centres Network in 2012 
for the period 2010/2011 demonstrated that the average number of funders per 
Law Centre in London (excluding the Legal Services Commission) was 8, compared 
to 5 funders per Law Centre for Law Centres located outside of London. Secondly, 
the absolute amount of non-legal aid funding secured by London Law Centres in 
2010/2011 was higher than that secured by their regional counterparts: in 2010/11 
Law Centres located in London secured £7,436,394 of funding from sources other 
than the Legal Services Commission, compared with the £4,700,629 of non Legal 
Services Commission funding secured by regional Law Centres. As such, London 
Law Centres tended to be wealthier than their regional counterparts: seven out of 
the ten Law Centres with the highest income levels in 2010/2011 were located in 
London. Thirdly, and critically for this study, London Law Centres tended, on 
average, to be less exposed to the impact of the cuts introduced by LASPO. For the 
period 2010/2011, on average London based Law Centres secured 63% of their 
funding from sources other than the Legal Services Commission, whilst non-
London based Law Centres on average secured 40% of their funding from sources 
other than the Legal Services Commission. Additionally, data collected in 
2010/2011 revealed that of those Law Centres who were reliant on legal aid funding 
for over half of their total income, 80% were located outside of London. 
 
 
1.3.5.4 Agreement to participate in the study  
A further (crucial) criteria for inclusion in the study was agreement to participate in 
the research. The Chief Executives of all three Law Centres included in the study 
confirmed their consent to participate in the study via email.  
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1.3.6 Information not available during the selection phase 
As stated above, the project began in 2012 and the main phase of the empirical 
research took place during 2014. When the Law Centres included in the study were 
approached to take part in the research in 2012/2013, whilst they had confirmed 
their overall strategy for responding to the cuts, they were still in the process of 
designing and confirming the details of the models they were intending to adopt. 
Accordingly, at the time of selection, no information was available regarding the 
relative success of the models in terms of generating income for the Law Centres. 
As a result of this, the outcome of the strategy adopted in terms of generating 
income could not and did not form part of the selection criteria.  
 
1.3.7 A single case study approach  
As stated above, the aim of the empirical phase of the research was to collect 
detailed information on the operation of the three most popular funding models 
developed by Law Centres in response to LASPO, and to explore the implications 
of these models for the ideal type Law Centre. As such, it was decided that an 
inductive single case study approach (Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007) would be 
adopted- this would facilitate the development of theoretical propositions regarding 
the implications of the different funding models for the ideal type Law Centre by 
facilitating the identification of: “patterns of relationships among constructs within 
cases and their underlying logical arguments” (Reynaers, 2014:44 citing Eisenhardt 
and Graebner, 2007:25). The complete absence of academic literature on both the 
development of the funding models studied in this project, and the impact of their 
adoption on the ideal type Law Centre, justified the adoption of an inductive single 
case study approach (Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007).  Initially it was intended that 
two examples of each model for responding to LASPO would be included in the 
study, however, at an early stage in the project it was decided that in order to gather 
data of sufficient depth and quality to answer the research questions within the 
financial and time constraints of the PhD project, the number of Law Centres 
studied should be limited to one per funding model. The limited number of Law 
Centres included in the study made it possible for multiple visits to be conducted 
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over a period of a year, as well as facilitating longer periods being spent based in 
each Law Centre (between 3-4 weeks per case study).  
1.3.8 Generalisability of findings   
As discussed above, one perceived strength of the case study approach is that it 
facilitates the development of: “theoretical constructs, propositions and/or 
midrange theory from case based, empirical evidence” (Eisenhardt and Graebner, 
2007:25). Middle-range theories refer to limited classes of social phenomenon 
(Merton, 1949:39) and aim to integrate theory and empirical research. Merton 
(1949) described middle-range theories as: “theories that lie between the minor but 
necessary working hypotheses that evolve in abundance during day-to-day research 
and the all-inclusive systematic efforts to develop a unified theory that will explain 
all the observed uniformities of social behaviour, social organization, and social 
change” (Merton, 1949:39). The aim of this project, to identify and explore the 
relationship between the adoption of different funding models and the values of the 
ideal type Law Centre, may be considered an attempt to develop middle range 
theory, in the sense of: “developing constructs, measures and testable theoretical 
propositions” (Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007:25) regarding the implications of 
adopting different funding models for the ideal type Law Centre. This project may 
be considered to present a series of three inductive case studies, aimed at identifying 
generalizable patterns or hypothesise that can be applied, refined, and tested in 
further research. The conclusions derived from the research are intended to be 
understood as hypotheses for the relationship between variables (the funding 
models) and constructs (the ideal type Law Centre) that are generalizable to the 
population of Law Centres who choose to adopt these approaches in response to 
LASPO. The observations derived from this set of three single case studies form 
the basis for studying the same phenomena in other cases (see Dooley, 2002 and 
Reynaers, 2014).  
1.3.9 A qualitative approach to data collection  
Qualitative research, broadly defined has been described as: “any kind of research 
that produces findings not arrived at by means of statistical procedures or other 
means of quantification” (Strauss and Cobin, 1990:17 cited in Golafshani, 
2003:600). It has been stated that qualitative research aims to understand 
phenomena in context specific settings (Golafshani, 2003:600) and further that the 
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aim of qualitative research is to draw conclusions that can be “extrapolated to other 
settings” (Hoepfl, 1997).  Qualitative research is associated both with thick 
description (Geertz, 1973) and detailed observational evidence. The aims of this 
project and the underlying assumption that it is possible to develop testable 
hypotheses and generalizable theory across settings, situate the study within a 
positivist philosophical orientation (Welch et al. 2011:745). The data gathered for 
this thesis is primarily qualitative in nature, derived from semi-structured interviews 
conducted with key stakeholders in the funding models developed by the Law 
Centres. This data was augmented by documentary and case file analysis, as well as 
additional interviews with experts who were in a position to contextualise the 
approaches adopted (see 1.3.9.3 below). Details of the number of interviews 
conducted, the roles of interviewees within their organisations and the interview 
guides developed for this project are listed below at Appendix D.   
 
1.3.9.1 Why a predominantly qualitative approach?  
The aims of this research, to gather detailed information on the operation of the 
three most common funding models developed in response to LASPO, and to 
explore the implications of their adoption for the values constitutive of the ideal 
type Law Centre, mitigated strongly in favour of a qualitative approach.  
Organisational values may be understood as a set of beliefs and aims that guide the 
behaviour of an organisation and individuals within it (Hyde et al. 2000: 9, Padaki, 
2001). As such, it has been remarked that values: “are often unconscious and rarely 
discussable, [they] cannot be observed as such but are manifested in alternatives of 
behaviour” (Hofstede et al. 1990:291). Further to this, it has been stated that:  
“values are hard to locate and interpret because they are neither visible nor 
quantifiable, instead they are expressed through actions, decisions, preferences and 
attitudes (De Graaf, 2003, Reynaers 2014:44). As such, the nature of the object of 
study mitigated in favour of an approach to data collection that facilitated the 
gathering of ‘thick' description and detailed observational evidence, from which the 
impact of the move to different funding models on the values proposed in the ideal 
type Law Centre might be evaluated. The following discussion describes the data 
collection techniques adopted, before moving to articulate the measures put in place 
to improve the validity and reliability of the findings, manage retrospective sense-
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making and impression management, and to limit the impact of researcher bias on 
the findings.  
 
 
1.3.9.2 Data collection techniques 
Yin (1994) in his influential text on the case study approach, advised that case study 
evidence may come from six sources: documents, archival records, interviews, direct 
observation, participant observation and physical artefacts (Yin, 1994:location 
2787/36%). The primary data collection technique utilised throughout this study 
was the semi-structured interview, augmented by observation, documentary analysis, 
archival records and case-file review. In designing the project, it was initially planned 
to adopt a mixed methods approach drawing extensively on case file analysis in 
order to measure changes in the vulnerability of clients seen by the Law Centres. 
The original intention was to review a representative sample of case files closed in 
the six months prior to the introduction of LASPO, and a representative sample of 
cases opened in the six months post the introduction of LASPO in order to derive 
quantitative data regarding the impact of the withdrawal of legal aid funding on the 
vulnerability of clients seen. This approach was piloted in two out of the three case 
studies. Unfortunately, the timing of the fieldwork and arrangements for “winding 
down” legal aid contracts meant that in the six months post LASPO Law Centres 
were still working on cases under their legal aid funding, limiting the ability to derive 
an adequate sample of cases. An additional issue was that the level of detail 
recorded in the case files was variable, making it difficult to apply the vulnerability 
framework consistently. Given the issues in both securing an adequate sample and 
the quality of the available data, this approach was abandoned.  
As such, the primary data collection technique applied in this study was that of the 
semi-structured interview. Semi-structured interviewing is often used as the primary 
data collection strategy in research exploring organisational change and 
organisational values (Reynaers, 2013). It has been argued that: “as 
research…moves to… strategic phenomena…and strategic decision making, 
interviews often become the primary data source. Interviews are a highly efficient 
way to gather rich, empirical data”  (Eisenhardt 2007:28). The semi-structured 
approach was favoured, as it provided more scope to explore the actions, decisions, 
preferences and attitudes of interviewees, in order to understand how the funding 
models adopted might impact on the ideal type Law Centre framework. Given the 
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novelty of the focus of the study, a semi-structured interview approach also suited 
the exploratory nature of the project. Semi-structured interviewing has been 
credited as enabling the researcher to:  ‘keep more of an open mind about the 
contours of what he or she needs to know about, so that concepts and theories can 
emerge out of the data’. (Seidman, 2006:12). In total, 42 interviews were conducted. 
All interviews were audio-recorded and fully transcribed. The transcriptions were 
then uploaded to NVIVO to facilitate thematic analysis. Also stored in NVIVO 
were relevant documents and field notes.  
The approach to data collection varied between the three case studies. The detailed 
data collection strategy for each case study is presented below at Appendix E.  
1.3.9.3 Improving the reliability and validity of findings  
The chief strategy adopted to improve the reliability and validity of the findings 
presented in chapters 3-6 was that of triangulation- the notion of combining 
methods, data and sources in order to improve the validity and reliability the 
findings. This strategy has been cited to be of critical importance in qualitative 
research (Mathison, 1988, Healy and Perry 2000, Patton, 2002). In each of the case 
studies I combined interview data with data from other sources including direct 
observation and documentation. I also interviewed multiple informants, both 
internal and external to the Law Centres studied, in order to cross-reference 
accounts and sense-check findings. Where appropriate I sought out expert 
informants who were in a position to provide contextual information and comment 
on emerging conclusions. To ensure transparency, I used an audio-recorder to 
record every interview I undertook as part of the project. Each of the 42  interviews 
I conducted was fully transcribed and coded using NVIVO software, to ensure that 
other researchers might be able to follow and scrutinise my analysis.   
 
1.3.9.4 Limiting bias 
In qualitative research, bias can be introduced in a number of ways, including: (i.) 
researcher and instrumentation bias, and (ii.) the lack of ability to manage 
retrospective sensemaking and impression management. The following section 
describes the strategies adopted to limit the impact of these two forms of bias on 
the study.  
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1.3.9.4.1 Managing researcher and instrumentation bias   
In qualitative research it has been stated that as: “…the researcher is intimately 
involved in both the process and product of the research enterprise, it is necessary 
for the reader to evaluate the extent to which an author identifies and explicates 
their involvement and its potential or actual effect upon the findings. (Horsburgh 
2003:309). To this end, a full rationale for reflexivity statement is included at 
Appendix F. The goal of this statement is to enable the reader to assess the 
credibility of the findings through gaining a better understanding of the: “values, 
beliefs, knowledge, and biases” (Cutcliffe, 2003: 137) I brought to the project and 
the strategies I adopted for managing these throughout the research process.   
 
In terms of managing instrumentation bias, my supervisor played a key role in 
approving draft interview schedules and assisting in the piloting of these research 
instruments. The methodology for the fieldwork was reviewed at my first year 
upgrade and approved by the chair of the departmental Research Ethics Committee.  
 
1.3.9.4.2 Managing retrospective sensemaking and impression management in the 
research  
One of the key issues in a study of this kind that is heavily reliant on interview data 
from participants is managing both retrospective sensemaking of events and the 
understandable desire of participants to manage the impression they make on the 
researcher and any future readers of the study. Interviewing participants in the 
research on multiple occasions, and timing the fieldwork to take place during or 
shortly after the funding strategies had been developed, was key to managing 
retrospective sensemaking. With regard to impression management, the Law Centre 
staff who agreed to take part were understandably keen for their work to be seen in 
a positive light. Those participants in management positions may have had concerns 
about the implications of taking part in a study of this kind for both their 
relationships with funders, and reputation amongst their peers across the Law 
Centres Network. Whilst all efforts have been made to anonymise individuals within 
the case studies, it was impossible to remove all identifying features of the individual 
Law Centres, without undermining the research aims and objectives. As such, it was 
important that participants in the three case studies understood that whilst they 
would not be named within the study, it might be possible to identify them from 
 36 
details provided in the analysis. In this context, it became important to develop 
robust strategies for minimizing the effect of impression management on the 
research. As such, strategies for mitigating the impact of impression management 
on the study included: (i.) carefully explaining the aims of the research and clarifying 
the goals of the project, so that participants understood that evaluating their ability 
to develop successful income generation models was not an aim of the study; (ii.) 
establishing rapport and trust with interviewees, in order that they felt they could be 
honest in the interviews (iii.) combining interview data with observational research 
and documentary analysis and (iv.) in selecting interviewees, making sure that efforts 
were made to include interviewees who viewed the focal events from different 
perspectives. With regards to the latter, the strategy for selecting interviews was 
informed by the best practice approach identified by Eisenhardt and Graebner 
(2007) who state that a key approach to managing both retrospective sensemaking 
and impression management is:  
“…using numerous and highly knowledgeable informants who view the focal phenomena from 
diverse perspectives. These informants can include organizational actors from different hierarchical 
levels, functional areas, groups, and geographies, as well as actors from other relevant organizations 
and outside observers such as market analysts. It is unlikely that these varied informants 
informants will engage in convergent retrospective sensemaking and/or impression management.”  
(Eisenhardt & Graebner 2007:28) 
In order to ensure transparency in the approach adopted, and as stated above, 
information on the number of interviewees and their roles within the individual case 
are included at Appendix D. The following section provides a summary of the 
remaining chapters of the thesis, before moving to discuss the contribution to 
knowledge made by this research.  
 
1.4 Summary of Chapters  
 
Chapter 2 of the thesis describes the relationship between Law Centres and the legal 
aid scheme, tracing this relationship from the inception of the Law Centres 
movement to the present day. Drawing on the extant literature regarding the history 
of Law Centres and the legal aid scheme, the chapter argues that it was never 
intended that Law Centres should depend on legal aid funding for their income, and 
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that their later reliance on this form of funding was borne of financial necessity. As 
approaches to the administration of the legal aid scheme became more 
managerialist, driven by the ethos of New Public Management that came to 
dominate social policy in the late 1980s and 1990s (Moorhead 2001:552, Sanderson 
et al. 2011:184, Mayo et al. 2014:80) there was a greater emphasis first on containing 
and then on reducing the cost of legal aid to the public purse. Through their 
reliance on legal aid, Law Centres were increasingly affected by the need to deliver 
individual casework at scale in order to survive.  The introduction of the Legal Aid, 
Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012 (“LASPO”), in ushering in 
extensive cuts to public funding for whole areas of civil and family law, represented 
an existential challenge for the Law Centres movement: research published in 2014 
confirmed that in the period immediately prior to LASPO, legal aid funding 
accounted for 46% of the total funding received by Law Centres (Randall and 
Smerdon, 2014:7). The immediate impact of the dramatic reduction in public 
funding available to Law Centres through legal aid was to force Law Centres to 
reconfigure their services and devise new funding models in order to ensure their 
survival (LCN, 2014:4).  
 
Chapter 3 presents the ideal type Law Centre that will be used throughout the thesis 
as a heuristic device to evaluate the different funding models developed by Law 
Centres in response to the cuts.  Chapter 3 proposes a framework of five “terminal” 
and eight “instrumental” organisational values that are presented as constitutive of 
the ideal type Law Centre. “Terminal values” consist of overall aims, goals or 
outcomes, such as achieving social justice (Padaki, 2001: 195 citing Rokeach) whilst 
“instrumental values” consist of sets of beliefs about how best the organisation 
should conduct itself in achieving the end states described by the terminal values. 
The values framework proposed is derived from an analysis of the extant literature 
on the history and development of Law Centres, and the discussion in Chapter 2 
seeks to justify the selection of these values for inclusion in the framework with 
reference to this literature. The five terminal values presented are as follows: 
Terminal Value 1: Law Centres improve the position of economically disadvantaged 
individuals and groups within the extant legal framework, Terminal Value 2: Law 
Centres deliver their services to those in greatest need, Terminal Value 3: Law 
Centres are staffed by specialist, expert, legal professionals, Terminal Value 4: Law 
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Centres are empathic allies of their clients and Terminal Value 5: The communities 
in which Law Centres are based and the clients they work with have higher levels of 
legal knowledge. Of these Terminal Values, it is argued that Terminal Value 2: Law 
Centres deliver their services to those in greatest need, requires further explication if 
it is to function effectively as a tool for evaluating the different funding models 
adopted by Law Centres in response to LASPO.  
 
Chapter 3 takes as its starting point the approach to identifying those in “greatest 
need” proposed by the founders of the Law Centre movement, namely, that, in 
order to identify those who are in “greatest need”, one should: “first examine(s) the 
type of situations in which legal services provide important advantages to the public 
and then… measure(s) the extent to which real need in such situations is left 
unmet” (Committee of the Society of Labour Lawyers, 1968:4). This approach can 
be crudely summarised as: “anyone who has a problem that could be resolved with 
recourse to the law should have access to legal services to assist them”.  Chapter 4 
argues that the proliferation of laws (Genn, 2012:2) affecting individuals in their 
day-to-day lives has multiplied the scenarios in which legal services might be said to 
provide important advantages, to such an extent that a definition of “greatest need” 
based on this criteria is insufficiently nuanced to assist Law Centres to evaluate 
which individuals they should prioritise. In order to arrive at a principled basis for 
targeting services at those in greatest need, it is argued that it is important to review 
the existing empirical and theoretical literature detailing the benefits legal advice and 
representation bestows on individuals within the context of an adversarial legal 
system. Through identifying the exact nature of the benefit legal advice and 
representation is said to confer in terms of helping individuals to secure just 
outcomes, it is possible to deduce which individuals are most likely to be in greatest 
need of this form of assistance. For example, one of the benefits of legal 
representation reported in the literature, linked to the ability to achieve a just 
outcome in relation to a particular civil law claim, is improved articulation of the 
problem at hand (Engler, 2010a:75). As such, it may be hypothesised that 
individuals with lower levels of oralcy, who have English as a foreign language or 
who are cognitively impaired, might be said to be in greatest need of legal 
representation if they are to be able to successfully secure their rights.  Following 
this approach, Chapter 4 reviews the extant empirical and theoretical literature and 
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from this derives a framework of factors that may be said to increase an individual’s 
vulnerability or need for advice in the context of their ability to secure a just 
outcome in relation to their civil law problem. It argues that by targeting their 
services at individuals where one or more of these factors are present, Law Centres 
can deliver their Terminal Value of delivering their services to those in greatest 
need. This framework is used in the following chapters to explore the implications 
of the funding models adopted by Law Centres in response to LASPO for their 
ability to deliver this Terminal Value.  
 
Chapters 5-8 report on the findings of the empirical research conducted for this 
project. The chapters follow a common format, with each chapter opening by 
situating the funding model adopted in the case study within its national context. 
The funding models adopted in each of the  three case studies are then described in 
detail. The final section of each chapter is dedicated to analysing the implications of 
each funding model for the ideal type Law Centre value framework set out in 
Chapter 3. Chapter 5 describes a charging model developed by Avon and Bristol 
Law Centre, which focuses on offering legal advice and representation at below 
market rate for individuals with immigration law problems. Unlike other charging 
models, Avon and Bristol Law Centre opted to charge for advice under their 
existing branding, rather than setting up a separate community interest company. 
Chapter 6 presents a case study of a strategy of “merging to survive” as a response 
to the cuts. It details the experience of Kirklees Law Centre, who chose to merge 
with a local Citizens Advice Bureau in order to survive the cuts to funding 
introduced by LASPO. Chapter 7 reports on the experience of Coventry Law 
Centre, who chose to respond to the cuts by seeking to expand and diversify their 
funding base through attracting new, project-based funding from generalist and 
issue based funders, who may not have historically considered supporting legal 
services. In order to achieve this, the Law Centre changed the focus, delivery model 
and messaging around their service, shifting from: “the main focus being one of 
solving legal problems” (Bent, 2017:3) to making explicit the links between access to 
the services provided by the Law Centre and a range of outcomes in the areas of 
health, wellbeing, integration and deprivation.  
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1.5 Conclusion and contribution to knowledge 
This research constitutes an original contribution to knowledge in a number of 
respects. Chapter 3 proposes a novel heuristic device for describing what a Law 
Centre is- what its core values are, and why it is distinct from other providers of 
legal services. As well as providing a lens through which to analyse the impact of the 
cuts introduced by LASPO on Law Centres, it is hoped that this framework will be 
of practical use in helping the Law Centres movement to identify and focus on 
those features that render them distinctive within the landscape of legal service 
providers, and to design funding and delivery models that support and enhance 
their distinctiveness. In addition, the framework presented in Chapter 4 is an 
original attempt to use the extant empirical and theoretical research detailing the 
benefits conferred by legal advice and representation in an adversarial legal system 
to develop a definition of vulnerability that is contextually sensitive and capable of 
being operationalised. Importantly, this framework defines an individual as more or 
less vulnerable to the extent that she is more or less capable of securing a just outcome 
in relation to her civil law problem without legal advice and representation (Genn, 
1995:394). As such, it proposes a set of evidence-based criteria for prioritising the 
legal services delivered by Law Centres in the context of overwhelming demand and 
limited supply. The process of developing this framework also highlights gaps in the 
extant evidence base which future empirical research must explore: there is a lacuna 
of evidence relating to the factors that render an individual more or less likely to 
secure a just outcome in relation to their civil law problem- this stymies attempts to 
design effective approaches to help individuals to secure their rights. Finally, 
Chapters 5-8 of the thesis present original empirical research detailing the impact of 
cuts to funding introduced by LASPO on Law Centres. Law Centres themselves are 
an under-researched phenomenon  (Burdett, 2002, Mayo 2014) and this thesis 
provides new insights into the challenges facing Law Centres as they seek to 
navigate a climate of chronic financial instability created by the cuts to public 
funding for legal advice and representation. To recognise why these cuts were so 
profoundly destabilising for Law Centres, it is important to understand the 
relationship between Law Centres and legal aid funding prior to 2013: this is 
outlined below in Chapter 2.  
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2 CHAPTER 2: THE HISTORY OF LAW CENTRES AND THEIR 
RELATIONSHIP TO LEGAL AID 
 
2.1 Introduction  
The following chapter outlines the relationship between the Law Centres movement 
and the Legal Aid scheme, from the founding of the movement to the introduction 
of the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012.   
 
The first Law Centre, North Kensington Law Centre was founded in 1970, twenty-
one years after the passing of the Legal Advice and Assistance Act 1949 and twenty-
six years after the Report of the Committee on Legal Aid and Legal Advice in 
England and Wales (“the Rushcliffe Report”) was presented to parliament. The first 
articulation of the Law Centre model can be traced to a pamphlet published by the 
Fabian Society on behalf of the Society of Labour Lawyers in 1968 entitled “Justice 
for All”. The authors of this document proposed Law Centres as a solution to 
acknowledged deficiencies in the existing provision of Legal Aid.  As such, Law 
Centres were intended to be supplementary to, not reliant on, the Legal Aid scheme 
(Committee of the Society of Labour Lawyers, 1968:41). The vision for Law 
Centres was that they should exist as publicly funded organisations providing a 
mixture of casework, legal education and community organising within the 
communities in which they were based. However, a sustainable funding strategy for 
Law Centres based on central government provision failed to emerge. The 
following discussion charts the development of the Law Centres movement and in 
doing so describes Law Centres’ increasing reliance on legal aid despite its 
questionable suitability as a source of funding for many of the activities Law Centres 
were intended to deliver. The chapter concludes by describing the impact of the 
cuts introduced by LASPO on Law Centres, and in doing so, establishes the context 
for the remainder of the thesis.  
 
2.2 The emergence of Law Centres as a response to the deficiencies 
of the legal aid scheme 
The legal aid scheme that existed in 1968 was created through the enactment of The 
Legal Aid and Advice Act 1949 (“The Legal Aid Act 1949”). The Legal Aid Act 
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1949 was based largely on the recommendations of the Rushcliffe Committee, 
which was appointed in 1944 to investigate deficiencies in the existing provision of 
legal services to individuals of limited means. The committee’s conclusions were 
translated into legislation with few exceptions (Morgan, 1994:70) partly as a result of 
the cross party consensus achieved by the committee. The legislation which was to 
become the 1949 Act created a: “formally comprehensive system of state-funded 
litigation available to 80 per cent of the adult population, a system which at its 
inception was at least as comprehensive as any in the developed world and arguably 
the most advanced then in existence” (Morgan, 1994:73). However, concerns on the 
part of the government about “swamping” the legal profession and protracted 
negotiations with the Law Society regarding the function and administration of the 
scheme had delayed the enactment of the recommendations of the Rushcliffe 
Committee, by nearly five years. As a consequence, the enactment of the legislation 
coincided with a Treasury veto on spending following the sterling crisis of 1949-
1950. Many of the most radical proposals, which related to the availability of 
funding for proceedings in the county and magistrates courts, were not brought into 
effect until 1956 (Morgan, 1994:73) and the scheme was not extended to the House 
of Lords or Privy Council until 1960 (Morgan, 1994:73). In addition, the section of 
the 1949 Act that concerned the provision of legal advice, and mandated the 
creation of state-funded legal centres in each centre of population, staffed by 
salaried solicitors, was not enacted (Paterson, 1972: 14). When, in 1959 the 
provisions relating to the legal advice scheme finally were enacted, the model 
adopted was very different from that envisaged by the Rushcliffe Committee. All 
mention of state-funded, lawyer-staffed legal advice centres had been removed, and 
instead, advice was to be provided by solicitors in private practice in their own 
offices. It was available only to the very poorest members of society. As a result, the 
numbers of people advised through the scheme remained low (Paterson, 1972:22) 
Outside of the scheme, legal advice, where it was provided, was delivered on a 
piecemeal basis: by charitably funded “Poor Man’s Lawyers”, Trade Unions, 
Newspaper Advice Bureaux and Citizens Advice Bureaux. (Paterson, 1972:24).   
 
In January 1967, The Society of Labour Lawyers held a conference with the aim of 
discussing the state of the legal profession. At this conference, delegates expressed 
widespread concern that the system of Legal Aid and Advice as it was constructed 
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at this time, was failing to achieve the aims of the 1949 Act. Agreement was reached 
that a committee should be appointed, chaired by Maurice Finer QC, to investigate 
the issues and propose solutions. The report of the committee, entitled “Justice for 
All” was published in 1968, and provides a forensic analysis of the defects of the 
contemporary legal aid scheme. The committee concluded that: “Poverty, 
ignorance, fatalism and fear in combination with the present structure of the legal 
profession, result in the denial of legal services to many people and especially those 
living on low incomes in parts of our largest cities” (Committee of the Society of 
Labour Lawyers 1968, 60). The seventy-six page pamphlet produced by the 
committee identifies a number of areas of particular concern, including: (i.) the 
extent of unmet need amongst the poorest members of society, particularly those 
located in urban areas, (ii.) the scope of the scheme, particularly in relation to 
representation (iii.) the complexity of the rules regarding both coverage of and 
eligibility for the scheme (iv.) the way in which the structure of the scheme 
mitigated against early intervention in civil legal problems and incentivised the 
“cherry picking” of cases (v.) the lack of ability of alternative agencies operating 
outside the legal aid scheme to compensate for these deficiencies and (vi) the lack of 
research into the operation of the scheme hampering abilities to assess its efficacy. 
Much of the analysis present in “Justice for All” focuses on examining the barriers 
to accessing the legal system that disproportionately affect those from poorer 
backgrounds, particularly in urban areas. The authors of Justice for All identified a 
marked disparity between the recorded data on the numbers of people experiencing 
problems such as personal injury arising from road traffic accidents, issues with 
consumer transactions and rented housing and the number of people claiming legal 
aid for these matters, and cited this as evidence of unmet legal need (Committee of 
the Society of Labour Lawyers, 1968:59). This issue was, the committee argued, 
exacerbated by the emphasis given within the Legal Aid and Advice scheme to 
litigation arising from marital problems. Figures derived from so called Poor Man’s 
Lawyer services, who provided free legal advice to individuals living in deprived 
areas, often through settlement projects, indicated that those living in poor urban 
areas had different legal needs from those of the general population. The committee 
reported: “While more than 80 per cent of all grants for civil legal aid are made for 
matrimonial proceedings, the experience of the three principal poor man’s lawyer 
centres in London is that only some 15-25% of the matters referred to them involve 
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matrimonial problems. The legal aid statistics thus in themselves provide indirect 
evidence of unmet need in civil law situations and in particular under-represent the 
need for lawyers assistance in the county courts” (Committee of the Society of 
Labour Lawyers 1968: 59). 
 
In addition to presenting an analysis of the problem, the report proposed a solution: 
the establishment of a network of independent legal advice centres, based on a 
model of community based legal service provision pioneered in the United States of 
America: Neighbourhood Law Firms. Neighbourhood Law Firms were developed 
and funded by the federal government in recognition of the importance of access to 
legal services in facilitating the achievement of the goals of the Economic 
Opportunity Act 1964. The experience of the development of Neighbourhood Law 
Firms provided justification for the beliefs of Law Centres founders in the 
importance of the law in delivering broader social goals such as economic 
empowerment and a more equitable society. Michael Zander, writing in the 
appendix of Justice for All states that whilst the Economic Opportunity Act: “made 
no specific references to Neighbourhood Law Firms or even to legal services for 
the poor… it soon became apparent that lawyers would be useful in the poverty 
programme and several such offices were founded by the Office for Economic 
Opportunity under section 205 of the Act” (Committee of the Society of Labour 
Lawyers, 1968: 63). The US experience demonstrated that through a combination of 
selecting and bringing test cases and the initiation of legislative action, significant 
law reform could be achieved, resulting in the transformation of substantive and 
procedural law, and the reform of administrative processes (Committee of the 
Society of Labour Lawyers, 1968:63). Additionally, through engaging in systematic 
study of the law as it related to the poor, the Neighbourhood Lawyer was expected 
to: “make suggestions for its improvement in the form of draft legislative proposals 
and even then to engage actively in winning support for the proposed reforms” 
(Committee of the Society of Labour Lawyers, 1968:63). 
 
The original proposal for Law Centres articulated by the Committee of the Society 
of Labour Lawyers advocated the role of Law Centres as supplementary to the 
provision of legal advice and representation through the Legal Aid scheme. Law 
Centres were envisaged as: “a public service to operate alongside and in supplement 
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to the private profession (Committee of the Society of Labour Lawyers, 1968:41). 
Law Centres were not intended to rely on Legal Aid as a source of funding, as the 
authors of Justice For All felt that the means test and bureaucratic requirements of 
the scheme would impede the ability of Law Centres to target their services at need, 
as well as bringing Law Centres into unnecessary and unhelpful competition with 
the private sector. Further to this, the authors of Justice for All stated that: “it is 
central to the proposal for local legal centres that they should operate by way of 
extension, not incursion upon, the existing arrangements for legal aid” (Committee 
of the Society of Labour Lawyers, 1968: 41). Instead it was argued that a network of 
up to fifty Law Centres should receive funding from central government to enable 
them to carry out their work. This funding should be administered independently 
through a similar mechanism to that adopted to fund the BBC and the University 
Grants Committee (Committee of the Society of Labour Lawyers, 1968:46). The 
authors of justice for all argued that: “The cost should, in principle and in the long 
run, be borne by the government” (Committee of the Society of Labour Lawyers, 
1968:47) although some funding from Foundations was thought to be acceptable in 
the “experimental stages” of the scheme (Committee of the Society of Labour 
Lawyers 1968:47).  A national funding policy however, failed to materialise.  
2.3 Law Centres and Funding: The Early Years: 1970-1987 
In the absence of a national funding policy the first Law Centres were reliant on 
charitable funding (LCF, 1983:4). In 1973, Law Centres received public funding via 
the Urban Aid Fund distributed by the Department of the Environment and in 
1974 the first grants from Local Authorities were made available (LCF, 1983:4) In 
the early years of the Law Centres movement, Law Centres were subject to 
significant criticism from The Law Society, concerned about the threat that Law 
Centres might pose to solicitors in private practice. The Law Society sought to use 
their power to refuse to waive the professional rules that prevented Law Centres 
from advertising and sharing fees to impose conditions on the way in which Law 
Centres operated (Smith, 1997:904). In a 1974 report on the legal aid scheme, the 
Law Society castigated Law Centres for: “stirring up political and quasi political 
confrontation far removed from ensuring equal access to the protection of the law” 
(The Law Society, cited in Smith, 1997:905). The then Lord Chancellor, Lord Elwyn 
Jones, was forced to intervene to compel negotiations between The Law Society 
and the Law Centres. Following negotiations, the necessary waivers were eventually 
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granted in 1977 on the proviso that Law Centres did not seek to compete with 
private practice in areas such as adult crime, matrimonial work, personal injury, 
probate or conveyancing (Royal Commission on Legal Services, 1979:79, Smith, 
1997:905). The lack of a discrete funding stream for Law Centres led to issues with 
sustainable funding as early as 1974. By 1974 the Law Centre Working Group 
reported that Law Centres were financed partly through the Legal Aid Scheme on 
cases undertaken by them, and partly from other sources, including Local Authority 
grants, charitable grants, private donations and Urban Aid grants. Additionally, 
under the Labour government of 1974-1979, the Lord Chancellor instituted central 
government funding for eight law centres who were experiencing financial 
difficulties (Smith, 1997:905). The Lord Chancellor’s Department however were at 
pains to state that this funding would not be available for any new Law Centres 
(LCF, 1983:3), and the Law Centres who were in receipt of this emergency funding 
were not provided with any guarantee of its long-term continuation (Prior, 1984:6).  
 
In discussing the merits and demerits of the funding streams available to them, the 
working group argued that Local Authority grants are the most unsatisfactory 
because: “they are made by the very body which Law Centres most often find 
themselves opposing both in and out of court. Further a grant to a Law Centre 
from a Local Authority may be only as secure as the life expectancy of the political 
party in charge at the time when the grant is made” (LCWG, 1974:23). Charitable 
grants and donations were also thought to be inferior sources of funding as they 
only covered set up costs and come with restrictions.  The Law Centres working 
group argued that: “Of the various forms of finance for Law Centres so far tried the 
urban aid grant has been by far the most satisfactory in that it is secure for a fixed 
period of time, it cannot be used by a local authority to threaten the independence 
of the Law Centre and gives those running the centre a high degree of control over 
its finances” (LCWG, 1974:24). The urban aid programmes run by the Department 
of Environment were instituted in 1968, with the aim of alleviating the special needs 
of urban areas and encouraging experimentation, supporting new approaches to 
tackling deprivation. Urban aid programmes were designed to provide a kind of 
“proof-of-concept” funding: “its rationale was that (the funds)…should serve a 
pump priming purpose and encourage the undertaking of new projects which would 
not otherwise have been undertaken with the hope that these projects…in due 
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course would be taken into the local authorities’ main programmes” (Prior, 1984:5). 
Funding was provided in the form of an initial time-limited grant, after which point 
funding was reviewed annually, with no guarantee of continuation (Prior, 1984:6). 
 
In light of the instability created by the uncertain funding climate, in 1979 the Royal 
Commission on Legal Services led by Lord Benson recommended that: "the time 
has come to move forward from a period of experiment to one of consolidation, 
characterised by continuity, orderly development, adequate resources and proper 
administrative and financial control." (Royal Commission on Legal Services, 
1979:81). The committee proposed the subsuming of the extant network of Law 
Centres into a new national network of Citizens Law Centres, (Per Royal 
Commission on Legal Services, 1979:83 para 8.19,) on the proviso that Law Centres 
undertook to remove their political and community activist functions (Smith 
1997:907) attempting to divest the movement of its relationship with left wing 
politics.  
 
These proposals, resisted strongly by Law Centres, were never implemented due to 
the election of a Conservative government in 1979. The incoming Conservative 
administration did not take an: “overtly hostile view of the allegedly political role of 
the Law Centre” (Smith, 1997:908), but it did deny that Law Centres should be 
centrally funded, insisting instead that the responsibility for funding Law Centres 
should sit at local authority level. Labour-led local authorities were more likely to 
fund Law Centres than their Conservative counterparts (Smith, 1997:908), leading 
to uneven patterning of provision. Writing in 1984, Richard Prior, researching Law 
Centres on behalf of the Society of Conservative Lawyers, reported that: “Many 
Law Centres receive funds from their local authorities and are therefore always open 
to the risk of those funds being reduced or withdrawn altogether out of what may 
be parochial considerations. Four Law Centres were closed in London between 
1978 and 1980 as a result of changes in political control at local authority level” 
(Prior, 1984:5). Despite the precariousness of the financial position many Law 
Centres found themselves in, Legal Aid was still not seen as viable source of 
ongoing income for Law Centres, a publication produced by the Law Centres 
Federation in 1983 entitled “The Case for Law Centres” stated that: “ Law Centres 
are complementary to the legal aid system, not a substitute” (LCF, 1983:7). By the 
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early-mid 1980s, despite calls from across the political spectrum (Prior, 1984:23) for 
responsibility for Law Centres to be located in one government department and 
funding to be put on a permanent footing subject to conditions around 
accountability and control  (Burdett, 2004:61), sustainable central government 
funding failed to materialise. Between 1981 and March 1987, all 24 Law Centres 
who were in receipt of funding through the urban programme found the on-going 
nature of that funding threatened. By 1984, it was reported that applications for 
funding for seven new Law Centres made to the Department of Environment had 
been frozen, pending a government decision on the future funding of Law Centres 
(Prior, 1984:6).  
 
As a consequence, Law Centres began to experiment with Legal Aid as a source of 
funding. By the late 1980s the specialist literature on CLCs indicates that Law 
Centres were increasingly reliant on Legal Aid, a source of funding that tended to 
distort Law Centres work in favour of individualised casework and away from 
community development and education (Stephens, 1990:123, Burdett, 2004:61). 
Despite this, the rationale for securing funding through Legal Aid was expressed as: 
“in times of severe financial hardship, Law Centres must raise income wherever 
they can” (Stephens, 1990:125). In the context of restricted national and local 
government funding, and the pressure to secure income to survive, the changes 
made to the Legal Aid scheme by The Legal Aid Act 1988, and the franchising 
system developed thereafter further increased Law Centres reliance on Legal Aid as 
a source of funding.  
2.4 The Legal Aid Act 1988 and the rise of legal aid funding for Law 
Centres 
 
The Legal Aid Act 1988 transferred control of the Legal Aid Scheme from the Law 
Society to a newly created government quango, the Legal Aid Board (Goriely, 
1996a: 238) and section 4 of the Act granted the Legal Aid Board wide powers to: 
“provide advice, assistance or representation ‘by means of contracts with or grants 
or loans to other persons in England and Wales” (Goriely, 1996a: 239). The 
franchising devised by the Legal Aid Board in 1989 enabled them to issue franchises 
to applicants, who might be advice agencies or solicitors in private practice, 
providing that the applicants met certain quality controls. Franchises gave recipients 
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the powers to grant their own extensions and emergency certificates, and enabled 
them to receive faster payments (Goriely, 1996a: 240, Smith, 1996:574). Franchise 
contracts specified a five year term, generating an expectation that franchisees will 
continue to be involved in the work over the medium to long term (Goriely, 1996a: 
241). The quality controls created by the scheme consisted in practice of checklists 
for transaction criteria, and the arrangement as a whole aped the model of 
“preferred supplier” often adopted in the private sector (Sommerlad, 2004:360). 
This followed the delinking, in 1987, of levels of legal aid fees from those charged 
to private clients. The 1988 Act introduced standard fees for legal aid work and 
sought reductions in spending on legal aid through instituting a direct reduction in 
eligibility (Sommerlad, 2004:360). The first franchises were created in 1995, and the 
Legal Aid Board experimented with awarding franchises to 42 not-for-profit 
providers of advice in the same year (Smith, 1996:575). The pilot programmes 
enabled non-lawyer providers of legal services to deliver advice through the scheme 
for the first time since its inception (Moorhead et al. 2003a: 774). The policy 
justifications for these changes centred on arguments around rectifying the lack of 
supply of legal services in social welfare law areas, providing better value for money 
through reducing bureaucratic oversight for non-lawyer agencies, supporting 
agencies to work with clients in a more holistic way and improving consumer choice 
(Moorhead et al. 2003a: 767). However, for the legal profession, these changes 
raised concerns that lawyers would be: “undercut by the not-for-profit sector in 
state-sponsored unfair competition”. Some practitioners also raised concerns about 
the quality of services provided by not-for-profits (Moorhead et al. 2003a, 767). 
Importantly, these changes brought advice agencies into direct competition with 
private practice for the same work (Goriely, 1996a: 241) for the first time eroding 
the culture of cooperation between advice agencies and private practice that had 
been noted by researchers in the late 1980s. A study of legal advice and assistance 
published in 1989 observed that: “sophisticated patterns of advice and provision 
have evolved…advice and law centres and practice solicitors have developed their 
work so that there is a minimum of overlap” (Kempson, 1989 cited in Goriely, 
1996a: 237). Through limiting funding and enabling providers of different kinds to 
apply for funding that had previously been restricted to lawyers on the basis of 
parity of quality, these measures pitted lawyers in private practice and law centre 
lawyers against non-lawyer led legal services for the first time.  
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2.5 New Labour, Legal Aid Funding and Law Centres  
Whilst in opposition, the Labour Party had been critical of the introduction of a cap 
to the legal aid budget arguing that this approach: “signified the abandonment of an 
entitlement basis for the grant of legal aid based on merits” (Irvine, 1996: 5 cited by 
Sommerlad, 2004:360). However, once in office, the approach adopted to legal aid 
provision was characterised by a commitment to efficiency and cost reduction, 
which was to be brought about through three mechanisms- contracting, reducing 
the number of suppliers and prioritisation (charity sector wide). In 1997, the then 
Lord Chancellor Lord Irvine announced radical reforms to the civil legal aid 
scheme, including excluding claims for personal injury and most other claims for 
money and damages from the scope of the scheme. In addition, Irvine announced 
new contracts for fixed blocks of work, a tightening of the merits test, a cap on 
overall expenditure on legal aid and the creation of a Community Legal Service to 
“facilitate the refocusing of the legal aid scheme as a tool to help poor people solve 
social welfare problems by gaining access to the justice system” (Hynes and Robins. 
2009:37). In order to bring this about, Lord Irvine sought to engage the not-for-
profit sector, and under his chancellorship the number of franchises awarded to 
not-for-profits grew from 42 to over 400 by 2002-03 (Hynes and Robins. 2009:37) 
including many Law Centres. A leaflet published by the Law Centres Federation in 
2000 reported that Law Centres were: “central to the new Community Legal Service 
being developed by the Legal Services Commission” (LCF, 2000:1). The aim of this 
activity was to rectify perceived deficiencies in the legal aid system, which it was felt, 
had led to a scheme characterised by “private lawyers ‘ripping off’ a system which 
simply paid bills for services” (Stein, 2001:3) and in doing so “restore accountability 
and legitimacy to a 50 year old programme that was, correctly or not, viewed as 
having run adrift” (Stein, 2001:3). In giving oral evidence before the Home Affairs 
Select Committee in November 1999, Lord Irvine stated:  
I would be the first to admit that legal aid has not been the most popular public social 
service. What my party won the general election on was the proposition and the pledge that 
we put schools and hospitals first, not legal aid first. What I want to be is brutally frank 
with the Committee. Legal aid is synonymous in the public's mind with lawyers' bank 
balances and the public have a vision of restrictive practices, overmanning, overcharging, 
and, in high cost criminal cases, fees which appear to be grossly high. The big picture about 
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the Access to Justice Act is that it will wipe out restrictive practices once and for all. 
Second, it will allow legal aid work, where it can be efficiently done in the public interest 
by the private sector at no cost to the taxpayer, to be done under conditional fee agreements 
and that of itself will bring millions of people into access to justice for the first time. By this 
means we intend to free up resources so they can be directed at the real needs of ordinary 
people in their daily lives. That is where the Community Legal Service comes in. The 
whole spirit of the Community Legal Service is partnership and it will be partnership 
arrangements operated locally, underpinned by concordats. (02 Nov 1999, HC 882-I 
1998-1999: q1) 
 
The Access to Justice Act 1999 abolished the Legal Aid Board, replacing it with the 
Legal Services Commission and critically, introduced a hard cap on overall 
expenditure, an action which constituted formally: “ending an entitlement to legal 
aid” (Stein, 2001:2). This conceptual change in the scheme signalled a “replacement 
of entitlement with a scheme of prioritising cases and resources (rationing) as a way 
of meeting the needs of the general public within a limited budget” (Moorhead, 
2001:550).  The Act also changed the rules on conditional fee agreements, to 
facilitate their use by those who were now unable to access legal aid due to changes 
in the scope and eligibility of the scheme (Hynes and Robins 2009:39). The Legal 
Services Commission was tasked with establishing a new Community Legal Service 
for all civil legal advice and representation services. The 1998 White Paper, 
“Modernising Justice” described the Community Legal Service as: “the cornerstone 
of the government’s pledge to protect everyone’s basic rights” (16 Sept. 2003, HC 
391-I) and argued for a focus on the issues that affect the day-to-day lives of the 
“disadvantaged and socially excluded” (LCD, 1998:3). The Legal Services 
Commission’s corporate plan referred to the Community Legal Service as being a 
“component of a wider government programme aimed at creating a fair and 
inclusive society” (LSC, 2002: 9). The Law Centre’s Federation, in partnership with 
the Department for Constitutional Affairs, published a paper that aimed to make 
explicit the links between social exclusion and the experience of civil legal problems 
(DCA, 2001). From the inception of the scheme, the CLS was criticised for its lack 
of clarity in setting out a strategy for the way in which community legal service 
partnerships would impact on social exclusion. In addition, successive reports 
produced by the Prime Minister’s Social Exclusion Unit: “entirely ignore(d) the 
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roles of legal aid advocacy and independent advice agencies, as well as the 
Community Legal Service, in its comprehensive review of social exclusion problems 
and remedies for community regeneration and empowerment (Stein, 2001:9). There 
were concerns that the CLS was a scheme more concerned with cost control and 
efficiency than developing legal services as tool to combat poverty and inequality. 
(Stein, 2001:9).  
 
The Community Legal Service was proposed as a means of: “integrating civil, 
general and legal advice services which had developed in parallel to the legal aid 
system into a seamless service” (Hynes and Robins, 2009:42) and matching the 
supply of legal services to need, by creating geographical “bid areas” along local 
authority boundaries and apportioning funding for different legal services on the 
basis of need in these geographical areas. As such, the Community Legal Service 
aimed at reducing fragmentation, coordinating services and funding and identifying 
and tracking local levels of legal need, facilitating a better fit between supply and 
demand (Hynes, 2009:65). The Community Legal Service Fund, established by the 
Access to Justice Act 1999, was the fund for all civil work administered by the Legal 
Services Commission, the successor body to the Legal Aid Board. This fund was to 
be one of the main sources of funding for legal services in each authority, although 
it was anticipated that other funders such as local authorities and charitable funders 
would contribute. Crucially, no new government money was to be made available to 
achieve a better match between advice needs and advice provision. Local authorities 
were not compelled to contribute additional funds to pay for the provision of 
advice under the scheme, instead, the Lord Chancellor hoped to enthuse local 
government as part of: “a crusade to persuade local authorities to do more” (02 
Nov 1999, HC 882-I 1998-1999: q17) In the consultation paper announcing the 
new scheme the Lord Chancellors Department stated: “we are making better use of 
public money, by changing the legal aid system so that aid is targeted on the cases 
that really need it, not just on those which lawyers want to do” (LCD, 1999:1) 
before asserting that: “total public funding (of CABx and Law Centres) is difficult 
to estimate accurately but is probably about £250 million a year. On the face of it, 
this provision should be adequate to meet priority need.” (LCD, 1999:2).   
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In 1999-2000 a group of six Pioneer Community Legal Service Partnerships were 
set up. These consisted of six local authorities spread across rural and urban areas 
who agreed to work with the Lord Chancellors Department and the Legal Aid 
Board to develop a best practice blueprint for Community Legal Service 
partnerships (Owers, 2000:152). The areas selected were Cornwall, Kirklees, 
Liverpool, Norwich, Nottinghamshire and Southwark (LCD, 1999:3). These 
“pioneer areas” were selected on the basis that their local authorities had 
demonstrated: “commitment to developing quality legal and advice services 
responsive to the needs of their local communities, and willingness to work with 
others to achieve this” (LCD, 1999:15). In these areas, partnerships brought 
together the local authority, the Legal Aid Board, other local and national funders 
and, where appropriate, local providers in order to coordinate services and funding 
(LCD, 1999:3).  The aim of these pioneer partnerships was to discover the most 
successful models for: i.) assessing local need and priorities for information, advice 
and assistance ii.) establishing networks of local providers and designing effective 
referral pathways and iii.) coordinating the plans of the different funders of these 
organisations (Owers, 2000:152). It was argued that a Community Legal Service 
network should include services at three levels: i) information, targeted at a 
particular legal problem or category of problem, ii) advice, defined as “information 
about rights and obligations which is directly applicable to a person’s individual 
circumstances, including suggestions for action and interpretation of the actions- or 
potential actions- of others” (LCD, 1999: 15) and iii) assistance, defined as support 
in taking action or an adviser acting on a customer’s behalf through formal legal 
processes or informal channels (LCD, 1999:14). The initial evaluation of the 
Pioneer Partnerships identified a number of problems with the development of the 
partnerships, including: rivalry and distrust between suppliers, tensions between the 
centrally developed funding priorities set out by the LSC and locally identified need, 
difficulties in mapping both local need and local suppliers, the reluctance of other 
funders to adjust their aims and priorities and difficulties in establishing effective 
referral pathways (Owers, 2000:152).   
 
Parallel to this, a Quality Task Force was established to develop a Quality Mark for 
each of three levels of service provision: information, general help, and specialist 
help. This project built on the Legal Aid Franchising Quality Assurance Mark 
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developed to augment the franchising arrangements pioneered by the previous 
government. All organisations providing legal advice and assistance under the 
Community Legal Service were required to meet the minimum Quality Mark 
Standard for the services they provided (Owers, 2000:154). The aim of this quality 
mark was partly to reduce the time spent by agencies demonstrating their ability to 
meet the quality criteria of different funders (LCD, 1999: 8) and partly to ensure 
that only agencies with appropriate levels of competence undertook cases under the 
legal aid scheme (Hynes et al. 2009:65). The contract also limited the number of 
cases that could be started by providers and consequently, the budget for legal aid. 
The principal effect of these changes was to reduce the supplier base for legal aid 
from 12,000 organisations to 5,000 by 2001 (Stein, 2001:26).  The net effect of these 
changes was to extend what have been described as new public management 
controls over legal aid, and increase government control over the market for legal 
aid (Moorhead, 2001:552, Sommerlad 2004, Sanderson et al. 2011:184).  
 
Hood, writing in 1991 identified seven doctrinal components present in most 
definitions and discussions of New Public Management. (Hood 1994:4). These are: 
i.) direct, professional management in the public sector, ii.) explicit standards and 
measures of performance, iii.) increased emphasis on output controls, iv.) shift to 
disaggregation of units in the public sector, operating on decentralised one-line 
budgets, v.) increasing competition between providers of public services, vi.) private 
sector styles of management practice and finally, vii.) an emphasis on discipline and 
parsimony in resource use, accompanied by rhetoric such as “doing more with less. 
(Hood, 1994:4-5). Crucially, New Public Management involves the repositioning of 
“citizens” as “consumers” (Brinkerhoff: 2002: 20) Critics of New Public 
Management techniques have implicated these practices as: “a gratuitous and 
philistine destruction of more than a century’s work in developing a distinctive 
public service ethic and culture (Hood, 1994:4 citing Martin, 1988 and Nethercote, 
1989). In the application of these techniques to the provision of legal aid, 
commentators have criticised both: “their capacity to erode trust and their 
incapacity to deal with ‘soft’ values crucial to the success of public services” 
(Moorhead, 2001:545, cf. Mayo, 2014).  
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By 2004, the findings of an independent evaluation of the Community Legal Service 
indicated that the scheme was failing in its aims. Implicated at the heart of this 
failure was the lack of a coherent vision for the programme, beyond simply 
providing people with legal services. The Community Legal Service was described 
by commentators as being: “bereft of a social justice mission” (Stein, 2001:1) and 
more preoccupied with efficiency than equality and ideals   (Moorhead and 
Pleasence, 2003:2). The evaluators reported on the paucity of evidence that the 
Community Legal Service was contributing to a reduction in social exclusion, 
(Balmer et al. 2005:304) lack of coherent agenda for the service, and a vacuum of 
leadership at the top of the organisation (Hynes et al. 2009:66). There was evidence 
that the budget for criminal legal aid was impinging on funds for the Community 
Legal Service and further, that the contracting and quality assurance schemes were 
overly complex, burdensome, costly and bureaucratic (Hynes et al. 2009:66). With 
no additional funding available to support the working of the Community Legal 
Services Partnerships5, providers were withdrawing. Legal need, once identified 
locally, had to be met from existing budgets or not at all. This led to increased 
pressure on providers, including Law Centres, who reported demand outstripping 
supply, and desperation amongst clients leading to rising tensions between advisors 
and clients (Hynes and Robins, 2009: 68). Sector representatives, Advice Services 
Alliance, raised concerns that by requiring the Community Legal Service 
Partnerships to make decisions about priorities and rationing of resources, the 
partnership structure risked pitting: “funders against providers and providers against 
each other” threatening any trust and partnership that had developed (Hynes et al. 
2009:66). The Legal Services Commission Annual Report of 2004 registered a drop 
in the number of advice contracts awarded in the areas of law commonly considered 
to impinge upon social exclusion, such as welfare benefits, employment and 
housing. This data endorsed the findings of the independent review of the scheme 
which concluded that the legal aid contract changes had failed to refocus legal aid 
funding by directing it toward social exclusion (Balmer et al. 2005:305).  
2.6 CLACs, CLANs and The Carter Review of Legal Aid 
Against this backdrop, the Community Legal Service was rebranded and a new 
flagship policy proposed- Community Legal Advice Centres (CLACs) and 
                                                
5 With the exception of a £15million “Partnership Innovation Budget” allocated over three years, which awarded grants 
to organisations submitting successful bids for the “delivery of innovative advice and information services” (ASA guidance 
downloaded at: http://asauk.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2003/09/CLS-partnerships-introduction.pdf)  
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Community Legal Advice Networks (CLANs). LSC support for Community Legal 
Service Partnerships was abandoned in 2006. CLACs and CLANs were described as 
the: “latest in a series of attempts in England and Wales to join up the 
commissioning and delivery of legal advice services in social welfare and family law” 
(Fox et al. 2011:204).  Their aim was to provide an integrated, face-to-face advice 
service for individuals experiencing social welfare and family law issues. Service 
providers in specific geographical areas were required to join together in a single 
entity with a single physical location (if forming a CLAC) or create a consortium 
providing complementary services (if forming a CLAN) to be eligible for funding. 
CLACs and CLANs were funded through the pooling together of funding from the 
Legal Service Commission and Local Authorities (Fox et al. 2011:204). Evaluators 
of the first five CLACs to be commissioned found that the joining up of LSC and 
local authority funding streams: “posed profound challenges, both to the competing 
interests of funders and to the existing supplier base, who faced the need to expand 
and/or form consortia in order to compete for contracts, or risk effectively being 
forced to abandon mainstream social welfare law due to withdrawal of funding” 
(Fox et al. 2011:204). Several Law Centres applied to become part of a CLAN. 
Gateshead Law Centre partnered with a CAB to form the first Community Legal 
Advice Centre in the country in May 2007 (LCF: 2007:11). Timelines for submitting 
bids for the scheme were short, and some councils who decided not to pursue the 
CLAC/N route implicated the tight timescales in their decision not to develop a 
CLAC/N in their area. Others felt that doing so would undermine their existing 
attempts to build the capacity of the voluntary sector. (Tribal, 2010: 45). 
 
A further challenge to providers such as Law Centres was presented by changes to 
the procurement of legal aid brought about by a review conducted by Lord Carter 
of Coles, entitled: “Legal Aid: A market based approach to reform.” In the letter 
accompanying the report Lord Carter stated:  
“I was surprised to discover at the outset that the relationship between the various legal aid 
stakeholders was often adversarial and sometimes hostile. This has resulted in a 
fragmented system that has not historically recognised a duty to deliver justice and an 
acceptable overall public cost…There must be a better understanding of the finite nature of 
resources, and the need for the taxpayer and government to secure better value for money 
from the funds it spends” (Carter, 2007:iii)  
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Whilst the original focus was on criminal legal aid and containing, rather than 
cutting public expenditure, the reforms recommended were applied across the civil 
legal aid sector. The principal changes proposed by the review were a shift from 
payment by the hour to fixed fees for advice and representation and consolidation 
of the supplier base (Zander, 2007). The aim of these changes was to facilitate an 
eventual shift to best value tendering for legal aid work. (HC, Constitutional Affairs 
Committee, 2007:47). Reflecting on the recommendations, and their application to 
civil legal aid, Lord Carter stated:  
 
“We didn't really have a lot to do with that to be honest, we just knew that the same rules 
should apply i.e. that you wanted to get people to start to focus. What was really 
interesting was when you talked to firms like Bindmans who did a lot of family and stuff 
it was clear, how the market tiered so, rather like a hospital, you've got the top end folk 
who do the complicated [work] who are going to stand a good chance and you've got what 
you might call just routine, and the interesting question was how you squeezed the routine 
and just made it more effective against all of that… what we offered was a very 
straightforward thing - alter the pricing, squeeze them together, make sure they really 
become efficient” (Lord Carter, 2015).  
 
The review also recommended a shift in the way not-for-profit organisations 
holding civil legal help contracts were funded. Up until 2006, civil legal help 
provided by not-for-profits had been remunerated on a “funded post model 
according to which the LSC funds fractional or one or more posts within a Not-for-
Profit organisation for legal aid work” (HC, Constitutional Affairs Committee, 
2007: 30). In his final report Lord Carter stated that the not-for-profit funding 
model: “since it pays the same regardless of the number of cases started, does not 
always incentivise effective working” (Carter, 2006:29). When reflecting on the 
review in 2015, and asked about the best strategy for incentivising effective working 
in the not-for-profit sector, Lord Carter stated: 
 
“I think it's quite interesting I think it's called "sore tooth" Let me go back and answer 
that a slightly different way, if we had asked criminal legal aid solicitors practitioner 
whether they could actually suffer the level of cuts that have been imposed on them now 
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they'd have said no. So the only way we got anywhere was just to take the money away, 
and I think, government calls it sore tooth, you keep cutting until it falls to bits, because 
it's quite hard otherwise, and then you refund it again I mean, and so, there it is- last 
man standing. At its crudest, we did not have a model for not-for-profits at all because we 
could never see anybody in criminal legal aid apart from the Citizens Advice Bureau 
obviously, being key players in the advice chain” (Lord Carter, 2015) 
 
The Constitutional Affairs Committee report concluded that the changes to funding 
would result in lower incomes for 44% of not-for-profit providers of advice, whilst 
the shift to payment in arrears for work completed could lead to not-for-profits 
spending down their reserves at the end of the transitional period (Zander, 2007). 
This element of the policy had a disastrous impact on Law Centres, who did indeed 
spend down their reserves: a study completed by the New Economics Foundation 
on behalf of the Law Centres Federation showed that at one point unrestricted cash 
reserves were reduced by 70% in twelve months (Randall, 2013:15 citing NEF, 
2009).   Combining a policy that heralded reductions in funding in the short to 
medium term, with plans that forced collaboration between organisations through 
the CLAC/CLAN model mitigated against the success of collaborative working. 
Academics have commented that: “the common notion that collaboration is a good 
way of reducing costs and making effective use of resources seems particularly 
questionable; rather, experience suggests that effective collaboration is highly 
resource intensive” (Huxham, 1996, 241, see also Fulop et al. 2002, Kail and 
Abercrombie, 2013).  Milbourne, writing in 2009 argues that: “local commissioning 
arrangements, underpinned by competitive contracts and national planning and 
performance frameworks are damaging to collaborative work, sustaining mistrust of 
state strategies and obscuring the diverse approaches which could valuably be 
shared more widely” (Milbourne, 2009: 278). A report commissioned by the Local 
Government Association (2010) which aimed to record early lessons from councils 
who had decided to commission a CLAC/N stated that: “Jointly commissioning 
CLAC/Ns with the LSC can become a divisive issue” and further that: “voluntary 
and community organisations often find it difficult to collaborate within short 
timeframes as they face specific barriers such as separate funding streams and a lack 
of available capital to implement changes” (Tribal Group, 2010:iv).  
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Mayo and colleagues, in their 2014 study of Law Centres, explore the impact of over 
a decade of initiatives aimed at encouraging collaboration between advice agencies 
with the aim of reducing the overall number of suppliers. The study suggests that 
Law Centres, as they are normally smaller organisations: “tended to feel particularly 
vulnerable, fearful of being swamped by more powerful partners, afraid that 
partnerships would undermine their distinctive ethos” (Mayo et al. 2014: 76). The 
cumulative impact of CLAC/Ns and the Carter reforms was to create an 
environment where not-for-profit advice agencies were: “both competing and being 
encouraged to collaborate, while recognising that collaboration might turn out to be 
tokenistic or… undermining the weaker partner’s distinctive identity and values 
along the line” (Mayo et al. 2014:77). The Carter reforms in particular are implicated 
in exacerbating existing tensions between agencies, as competitive tendering for 
diminishing resources generated mistrust between staff in different organisations, 
particularly: “in cases where larger advice agencies were seen as predatory” (Mayo et 
al. 2014:77). A former Chief Executive of the Law Centres Federation stated that 
the introduction of fixed fees for legal aid funded advice and representation created 
a situation that favoured the working practices of larger providers, who benefitted 
from better management systems, and the capacity to “triage” or “vet” larger 
volumes of clients in order to identify and work with those who were eligible for 
support through legal aid (Interview with Steve Hynes). According to his account, 
the Law Centres who survived this period were the organisations willing to adopt 
increasingly managerial practices to ensure they were able to maximise the number 
of cases they were able to complete. His remarks are echoed in Mayo’s 2014 study, 
where it is suggested that: “The push to become more managerial, more 
entrepreneurial, and ultimately more business-like was not only in danger of 
radically changing the rationale of Law Centres. It was also fracturing the Law 
Centres movement” (Mayo et al. 2014:80). It was in this context of an already fragile 
movement, heavily reliant on legal aid and local authority funding that the Legal 
Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act was introduced, with potentially 
disastrous implications for Law Centres.  
2.7 Law Centres and The Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of 
Offenders Act 2012: The consequences of the reforms  
The Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012 (“LASPO”). On 
1 April 2013, the cuts imposed by LASPO came into effect with the aim of cutting 
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the legal aid budget. Despite widespread opposition from many in the legal 
profession and Parliament, including the Law Society and the House of Lords, the 
cuts focused mainly on the areas of family law, immigration, welfare benefits, 
employment and clinical negligence. The reductions in spending were created 
through a combination of limiting the scope of the legal aid scheme by reducing the 
areas of law for which legal aid is available and implementing a more stringent 
means test—to qualify for legal aid a person’s income and capital must be within 
specified and strictly enforced limits (Higgins 2014: 15).  
 
Prior to the introduction of LASPO, all areas of civil law were within the scope of 
the legal aid scheme, unless specifically excluded under Schedule 2 of the Access to 
Justice Act 19996. Since the cuts were implemented, the only areas that remain in 
scope are family law cases involving child protection and domestic violence, cases 
involving an application for asylum, cases relating to the treatment of patients with 
mental health problems, discrimination cases, and some cases relating to debt, 
welfare benefits and housing7 (Comptroller and Auditor-General 2014: 10). In 
addition to these measures, some people who receive legal aid are required to make 
increased contributions to the cost of their case. In an attempt to reduce costs 
further, the Ministry of Justice implemented a telephone gateway for accessing 
advice and representation in some areas of law, thereby changing the way in which 
individuals with civil law problems access advice and representation (Comptroller 
and Auditor-General 2014: 10). 
  
Compounding the measures introduced by LASPO were changes introduced in July 
2013 that restricted access to judicial review and introduced fees of between £160 
and £950 for bringing a claim before an employment tribunal. Shortly after the 
introduction of LASPO, further reforms to the sector were announced by the 
Justice Secretary. For example, in January 2014, the government altered the merits 
test to restrict legal aid for those cases where the prospects of success are 
                                                
6 Schedule 2 of the Access to Justice Act 1999 excluded certain types of cases including personal injury (apart from in respect 
of clinical negligence), conveyancing, and boundary disputes, amongst others, from the scope of the legal aid scheme. 
7 For example, under LASPO, it is possible to get legal help and representation for housing issues such as unlawful eviction 
and rent possessions. Advice is available both face-to-face and via a telephone line and through a Housing Duty Solicitor 
scheme. However, this advice is only accessible when the situation has reached crisis point i.e. a notice for possession has 
been issued. Importantly, no funding is available to provide legal advice in resolving issues with welfare benefits or 
employment that are often implicated in eviction proceedings.  
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‘borderline’—this was met with objections from the legal profession, who claimed 
that cases with the potential to change existing law will likely be denied funding. 
From April 2014, legal aid in respect of Judicial Review cases was reformed, with 
lawyers being denied payment for work carried out on cases where courts decided 
not to grant permission for the case to proceed to a full hearing. Concerns have 
been raised that this decision will substantially reduce the capacity and willingness of 
lawyers to proceed with even low risk cases. These measures compounded 
reductions in the level of fees paid to civil legal aid lawyers that had been 
implemented in October 2011 and February 2012.  
 
LASPO directly impacted on Law Centres by drastically reducing the amount of 
funding available to them. In their 2009-2010 Annual Review, the Law Centres 
Federation8 (the membership body for the national network of Law Centres) stated 
that: “Law Centres’ sustainability relies mainly on two different areas of funding: 
Legal Services Commission contracts for the provision of legal aid and Local 
Authority funding…” (LCF, 2010:4). Research published by the Baring Foundation 
confirmed this, stating that prior to LASPO, 46% of all Law Centres’ funding came 
from legal aid (Randall and Smerdon, 2014:7). As such, Law Centres were highly 
exposed to the cuts introduced by LASPO. In evidence presented to the Justice 
Select Committee, the Chief Executive of the Law Centres Network Julie Bishop 
stated that one in six Law Centres had been forced to close as a result of the cuts 
introduced by LASPO- those that closed were reliant on Legal Aid for up to 80% of 
their income (Justice Select Committee, 2015:33).  
 
In written evidence provided to the Justice Select Committee in 2014, the Law 
Centres Network outlined the immediate impact of the cuts introduced by LASPO 
on Law Centres, beyond the closure of a number of centres. Law Centres Network 
Chief Executive Julie Bishop reported that the cuts had threatened Law Centres 
ability to deliver specialist legal advice, resulted in sharp increases in demand for 
their services and threatened the ability to retain expertise in the areas of law 
formerly funded by legal aid, expertise that would be: “difficult to rebuild” (LCN, 
2014:4). Further, Law Centres Network reported that: “all Law Centres have 
reconfigured services in light of the funding shortfall, however, the LASPO cuts 
                                                
8 (now renamed Law Centres Network) 
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have destabilised them” (LCN, 2014:4). It is this widespread service reconfiguration 
that forms the context for the remainder of the thesis.  
 
2.8 Conclusion 
This chapter has detailed the relationship between Law Centres and the legal aid 
scheme, arguing that Law Centres reliance on legal aid as a source of funding was a 
decision borne of financial expediency, driven by the lack of a coherent, sustainable 
and discrete public funding policy for Law Centres, rather than the fitness of 
purpose of the scheme for Law Centres intended activities. As the administration 
and ethos of the scheme became more focussed on cost containment and was 
increasingly underpinned by new public management controls (Moorhead, 
2001:552, Sommerlad 2004, Sanderson et al. 2011:184), legal aid funding 
increasingly drove Law Centres towards a focus on delivering individual casework at 
scale and away from community development and education (Stephens, 1990:123, 
Burdett, 2004:61). The withdrawal of income from the legal aid scheme brought 
about by LASPO, has forced Law Centres to develop new funding models in order 
to continue their work. The following chapter proposes an ideal type Law Centre- a 
framework for understanding the values that render Law Centres distinctive: this 
framework will be used to evaluate the case studies of the most popular funding 
models adopted by Law Centres in response to the cuts.  
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3 CHAPTER 3: THE IDEAL TYPE LAW CENTRE- DEVELOPING A 
FRAMEWORK FOR EVALUATING THE IMPACT OF LASPO ON 
LAW CENTRES 
 
3.1 Introduction  
As was argued in Chapter 1, Law Centres were originally developed as a response to 
deficiencies in the operation of the legal aid scheme. The intention of their founders 
was that Law Centres should be publicly funded, salaried services with their own 
discrete source of finance. When this failed to materialise, Law Centres increasingly 
turned to legal aid funding to ensure their survival. However, as the administration 
of the legal aid scheme became increasingly focussed on cost containment, requiring 
contract holders to deliver individual casework at scale in order to render the 
possession of a legal aid contract economically viable, the suitability of this form of 
funding for many of the activities Law Centres were originally designed to deliver 
was brought into question. Evidence from successive studies of Law Centres 
indicated that a reliance on legal aid funding had distorted Law Centre priorities and 
values, with one academic study of Law Centres published in 2014 stating that: 
“The push to become more managerial, more entrepreneurial, and ultimately more 
business like was…in danger of radically changing the rationale of Law Centres.” 
(Mayo et al. 2014:80). As such, it is evident that decisions made in relation to which 
sources of funding to pursue can have a radical impact on the ability of 
organisations to deliver their values.  
 
The withdrawal of legal aid funding brought about by LASPO, has forced Law 
Centres to consider new options for funding their work. In doing so, it is argued, 
Law Centres should have a principled framework outlining those values that are 
constitutive of their distinctiveness, against which to assess the merits and demerits 
of potential funding models. The following chapter reviews the existing academic 
and grey literature on Law Centres and proposes a framework of five values that 
together constitute the ideal type Law Centre (see Figure 3.1 below). The ideal type 
Law Centre is both novel and open to debate- this is the first time the material on 
Law Centres has been marshalled in this manner. This framework will be used as a 
tool to evaluate the income generation strategies adopted in response to LASPO 
discussed in chapters 5-7 of the thesis.  
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3.2 The approach to deriving the ideal type Law Centre 
Whilst “Justice for All”, the pamphlet published by the Committee of the Society of 
Labour Lawyers in 1968 may be understood to be the founding statement of Law 
Centres: “unlike the CAB service, Law Centres were never a centrally planned 
service, with articulated common goals” (Goriely, 1996a:232). As such, there existed 
a considerable diversity in the models adopted by Law Centres from the earliest 
days of the movement (Byles and Morris, 1977, Goriely, 1996:232). The Law 
Centres movement has been described as “evolving organically” (Goriely, 1996:232) 
over the 46 years since the first Law Centre was opened. This lack of central 
planning, and consequent diversity in Law Centre models, structure, activities and 
goals, means that there is no one definitive statement that provides an answer to the 
question: “what is a Law Centre?” However, in order to understand the impact of 
LASPO on Law Centres, and evaluate the different funding models adopted in 
response to LASPO, it is important to develop a working conception of the object 
of study.  This chapter reviews the extant literature on Law Centres with a view to 
developing an evidence-based set of statements that capture those features of Law 
Centres that might be said to define them. The chapter uses the language of 
“values” in an attempt to reach beyond the diversity of models and activities 
adopted by Law Centres, to understand those aims, goals and beliefs that together 
distinguish Law Centres from the wider landscape of legal service providers.  
 
This chapter constructs an ideal type in the Weberian sense9, it presents a selection 
of features or elements that have been considered significant, essential or exemplary  
(Psathas, 2005:147) of Law Centres. Like all ideal types, the framework developed in 
this chapter is a heuristic construct developed for a particular purpose. It does not 
claim to be a fully complete depiction of all Law Centres, rather it is a 
methodological tool for organising, systematising and prioritising the “discrete 
particularities” (Psathas, 2005:147) of a network of up to sixty organisations. The 
term “organisational values” refers to a composite set of values that are both 
internally consistent and drive organisational behaviour (Padaki, 2001; Rokeach, 
                                                
9 Weber’s focus on substantive empirical historical and comparative problems led him to select the ideal type as 
a methodology suited for making comparisons between the type and empirical reality. 
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1970,1973). Each of the organisational values presented here may be considered a 
spectrum, with individual Law Centres embodying and operationalizing each of 
these values to a greater or lesser extent. Padaki, following the psychologist Milton 
Rokeach argues that organisational values can be divided into “terminal” and 
“instrumental” values. “Terminal values” consist of overall aims, goals or outcomes, 
such as achieving social justice (Padaki, 2001: 195 citing Rokeach) whilst 
“instrumental values” consist of sets of beliefs about how best the organisation 
should conduct itself in achieving the end states described by the terminal values. 
The remainder of this chapter argues that five terminal values, each supported by a 
number of instrumental values, may be considered to be constitutive of Law 
Centres distinctiveness (see Figure 3.1 below). The following discussion presents the 
case for each of these values, based on the extant literature on Law Centres. 
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Figure 3-1: The Ideal Type Law Centre: A Framework of Law Centre Values  
Terminal 
Value 1 
Law Centres improve the position of economically disadvantaged individuals 
and groups within the extant legal framework 
Instrumental 
value(s)  
(i) Law Centres deliver legal services to those who are economically disadvantaged 
with particular reference to those who are in greatest need (see Value 2 below) 
helping them to secure their rights under the existing law and working to 
extend and reform the law where their existing rights are inadequate.  
(ii) Law Centres undertake strategic litigation that has the potential to reform the 
law in favour of the economically disadvantaged   
(iii) Law Centres identify and unite groups of individuals around the experience of 
particular justiciable issues and use these groups as vehicles for engaging in law 
reform activities e.g. research, campaigning, responding to consultations etc. 
Terminal 
Value 2 
Law Centres deliver their services to those in greatest need   
Instrumental 
value(s) 
Within the broad category of individuals and groups who are economically 
disadvantaged, Law Centres operate a two part definition of need, with individuals and 
groups being identified as needy to the extent that: 
(i) The extant legal framework does not serve their interests or extend to their 
protection (“Need Type 1”), or, 
(ii) The extant legal framework does in theory serve their interests and/or extend 
to their protection but they are vulnerable in the context of being able to 
successfully secure their rights, protection and fair treatment under the legal 
system as it stands. (“Need Type 2”)  
Terminal 
Value 3  
Law Centres are staffed by specialist, expert legal professionals 
Instrumental 
values(s) 
(i) Law Centres recruit, develop, and retain staff with specialist expertise in the 
areas of law most relevant to their clients 
(ii) Law Centres recruit, develop and retain staff with the skills and knowledge 
necessary to engage in the full spectrum of law reform related activities  
Terminal 
Value 4 
Law Centres are empathic allies of their clients 
Terminal 
Value 5 
Law Centres imbue both clients and local communities with high levels of legal 
knowledge 
Instrumental 
value(s)  
(i) Law Centres provide legal education to individuals and groups with the aim of 
improving their ability to identify and understand their rights, protection and 
fair treatment.  
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3.3 The case for Terminal Value 1: Law Centres improve the position 
of economically disadvantaged individuals and groups within the 
extant legal framework 
The following discussion argues that a defining value of Law Centres, constitutive 
of their distinctiveness, is their aim to use the law as a tool to improve the position 
of economically disadvantaged individuals and groups within the legal framework. 
This belief, that law can be harnessed as a tool to bring about social change, can be 
traced to the foundations of the movement. The lawyers who first proposed the 
establishment of the Law Centres evinced a belief in the centrality of law within 
society, its importance and its inherent malleability. The literature on Law Centres is 
replete with references to the Law Centre movement’s commitment to using the law 
to bring about social change in favour of economically disadvantaged individuals 
and groups: this value can be traced back to the publication “Justice For All” 
(Committee of the Society of Labour Lawyers, 1968) which first proposed the 
development of Law Centres. The authors of “Justice for All”, who may be 
considered the founders of the Law Centre movement have been described as 
radical lawyers who were disappointed in the failure of the welfare state to eradicate 
poverty and deliver a more equal society (Leask, 1985, Smith, 1997). As such, Law 
Centres may be properly understood as a practical expression of the politics of the 
New Left. (Leask, 1985:61, Smith 1997: 902).  
 
“Justice for All” adopts the language of the New Left, describing law as an: 
“instrument both of social order and reorganisation, including the distribution of 
wealth and other advantages” (Society of Labour Lawyers, 1968:3). The New Left 
rejected traditional structuralist-Marxist thought which: (i.) neglected law as a 
discrete object of study (Hunt, 1991:104), (ii.) promoted an understanding of the 
law as an ideological cloak whose function was to mystify and conceal the dominant 
power relation of class and economic inequality (Lloyd, 1979:734, Engels, 2004:79) 
and (iii.) posited the law as the direct instrumental expression of the interests of a 
dominant class (Hunt, 1990:111). In contrast to structural-Marxists, writers of the 
New Left argued that the law had the potential to be malleable, responsive to 
changing: “contexts and pressures” (Hunt, 1990:111) and could therefore be 
properly understood as a site of struggle. As such law and legal process had the 
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potential to: “change the relative positions of legal subjects within social relations: in 
this basic sense law is a distributive mechanism” (Hunt, 1990:110). Whilst it is 
relatively uncontroversial (Hunt, 1990:125) to state that the aggregate effect of the 
law in modern democratic societies operates to the systematic disadvantage of the 
least advantaged class: “the content, procedures and practice of law constitute an 
arena of struggle within which the relative positions and advantages of social classes 
is changed over time” (Hunt, 1990:125). The extensive emphasis in “Justice for All” 
on encouraging a wider range of individuals, particularly those living in poverty, to 
pursue claims through legal processes may be understood as arising from a belief in 
law as a site of struggle within which meaningful gains might be made on behalf of 
the marginalised. Practical encouragement was provided by the example, referenced 
in “Justice for All” of community based legal service provision pioneered in the 
United States of America: Neighbourhood Law Firms. Neighbourhood Law Firms 
were developed and funded by the federal government in recognition of the 
importance of access to legal services in facilitating the achievement of the goals of 
the Economic Opportunity Act 1964. The experience of the development of 
Neighbourhood Law Firms provided justification for the beliefs of Law Centre 
founders in the importance of the law in delivering broader social goals such as 
economic empowerment and a more equitable society. (Committee of the Society of 
Labour Lawyers, 1968: 63). 
 
The continuing focus of Law Centres on using the law to assert the interests of 
economically disadvantaged individuals and groups with the aim of bringing about 
social change is repeatedly referenced in the literature (LCWG, 1974, Royal 
Commission on Legal Services, 1979; Prior, 1984; Stephens, 1990; Burdett, 2002). 
The Law Centres Working Group, in a report published in 1974 asserted that the 
object of Law Centres was to: “combat the deprivation of certain communities by 
means of the provision of legal services” (LCWG, 1974:26). The role of Law 
Centres in challenging policies they perceived as promoting inequality and arguing 
for social change was repeatedly implicated as a barrier to securing sustainable 
funding from central and local government (LCWG, 1974, Royal Commission on 
Legal Services 1979, Prior, 1984:15). Prior, writing in 1984, cites an article published 
in “The First Voice”, the official newspaper of the National Federation of Self 
Employed and Small Businesses Ltd, in which the following statement of policy by 
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Law Centres is quoted: “We recognise that the problems brought to us are symptoms of an 
unacceptable social and economic system. In a system of massive unemployment, poor housing etc., 
we define the Law Centre’s role as a practical one: To obtain for people their rights, which may be 
enshrined in law or laid down by public policy and to work for changes in public policy where they 
seem wrong or inadequate” (Prior, 1984:14).  
 
In a publication printed in 1983 entitled “The Case for Law Centres”, the Law 
Centres Federation characterised the work of Law Centres as: “negotiate(ing) with 
bureaucracies on behalf of the individual, groups of individuals and small 
organisations, and often thereby achieve(ing) not only remedy for those immediately 
concerned, but also reforms which extend the benefit to more people” (LCF, 
1983:4).  This view of Law Centres, as a “new breed of community lawyer, 
work(ing) with the law to secure community goals” was confirmed in a study 
published by Harlow and Rawlings in 1992 (Harlow and Rawlings, 1992:6). Burdett, 
in a thesis on Law Centres submitted in 2002 argued that Law Centres cannot 
properly be understood without reference to their commitment to using the law to 
bring about social change in favour of the economically disadvantaged, arguing that 
understanding this is: “fundamental to understanding…the approach which Law Centres have 
to their work…the types of cases they originate and defend…the kinds of arguments they deploy in 
challenging established legal opinion; and… the legal processes they utilize….in representing the 
interests of weaker members of society, Law Centres challenge dominant social and legal norms” 
(Burdett, 2002:36). Mayo, writing in 2013, argues that Law Centres are 
“characterised by (a) commitment to social justice…and equalities agendas” (Mayo, 
2013:682).  In order to deliver this “terminal value” of using the law to bring about 
social change, Law Centres developed a set of instrumental values or modes of 
working: i); Law Centres deliver legal services to those who are economically 
disadvantaged with particular reference to those who are in greatest need (see 
discussion of Terminal Value 2 below) helping them to secure their rights under the 
existing law and working to extend and reform the law where their existing rights 
are inadequate. ii.) undertaking strategic casework that has the potential to reform 
the law in favour of  those who are economically disadvantaged and iii.) identifying 
and uniting groups of individuals around particular justiciable issues and using these 
groups as vehicles for engaging in law reform activities. The following sections 
present the evidence for characterising these approaches as instrumental values.  
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3.3.1  The case for instrumental value 1.1:  Law Centres deliver legal services 
to those who are economically disadvantaged with particular 
reference to those who are most vulnerable/in greatest need (see 
Terminal Value 2 below) helping them to secure their rights under the 
existing law and working to extend and reform the law where their 
existing rights are inadequate. 
 
As is argued above, the founders of the Law Centre movement believed in both the 
centrality of law to the social order and its power as a tool to advance the interests 
of marginalised members of society and deliver social change. For this reason, they 
were greatly concerned that the mechanism established to deliver equality of access 
to the law and legal services - the legal aid scheme enshrined in The Legal Aid and 
Advice Act 1949 - was failing to live up to its promise to make: “the theory, that the 
doors of the courts are open to everyone, rich and poor alike, a greater reality than it 
has been in the past” (HC Deb (1949) 465 col. 1369). On the account of the New 
Left, Law offers the possibility of change, through its power to transform social 
interests into rights-claims. Interests that have the greatest prospect of being 
transformed into rights claims are those that are capable of being translated into a 
language of individual rights and those that are compatible with existing rights 
categories (Hunt, 1990: 126). The founders of Law Centres believed that by 
encouraging individuals from a wider range of backgrounds to resolve their 
problems through formal legal processes (White, 1973:54-55) they could both shape 
the law to be more representative of a range of interests and illuminate oppressive 
structures or instances where the law as it stood was failing to protect a wide range 
of interests. Once illuminated, these oppressive structures and failings could be 
challenged. As Lewis, writing on legal services for marginalised groups observed in 
1973: “the extension of the activities of lawyers and the increased use of lawyers as a 
means of solving problems and asserting claims would be, if it came about, 
intimately connected with the possibilities of institutional changes”(Lewis, 1973:96). 
Through encouraging individuals to resolve a wider range of social issues through 
legal processes, Law Centres can address the problem that: “generally speaking the 
dispriviliged themselves tend to recognise as legal problems only the traditional 
ones… a vicious circle emerges, where the law does not do much about social 
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change unless it is in the interests of its own class, nor do the poor make demands 
in this direction” (Morris, 1973:54). Through this lens, the proposal for the 
establishment of Law Centres can be understood as directly linked to the desire to 
harness the democratic potential of law through encouraging and assisting those 
who are economically disadvantaged to transform their social interests into rights 
claims.  
 
The model of Law Centres proposed in “Justice for All” (1968) emphasises the 
importance of designing Law Centres in such a way as to make them accessible to 
people who would not ordinarily access Law Centres. The authors argued that: “we 
must do more to reach out to the least fortunate members of the community who, 
because of economic, educational and social disadvantages are the least able to 
make use of the rights and remedies afforded by the legal system. Unless we make 
some more positive effort to help those who cannot…help themselves many must 
be effectively deprived of the benefit and protection of the law. This we believe to 
be fundamentally unjust” (Committee of the Society of Labour Lawyers, 1968:37). 
It is the desire to extend legal services to the economically disadvantaged that drives 
a number of the recommendations around the location of law centres and the 
working practices of Law Centres- the authors identified a number of barriers that 
they felt impeded people from a wider range of backgrounds accessing legal services 
and designed proposals to ameliorate them, these include the geographical 
distribution of legal services away from poorer areas, extended opening hours, and 
delivering services in a client centred fashion (see further Terminal Value 4 below) 
(Committee of the Society of Labour Lawyers, 1968:38-39). It has been observed 
that the main goal of the first Law Centre (North Kensington Neighbourhood Law 
Centre) was to: “open up access to the law for individuals” (Stephens, 1990:33). 
Four years into the operation of the first Law Centres, the Law Centres Working 
Group further emphasised the importance of extending legal services to a wider 
range of individuals, albeit through promoting a different way of working, and in 
doing so critiquing the traditional tenets of legal professionalism that acted as a 
barrier to undertaking the types of class action seen in the US context (LCWG, 
1974:6). By 1983, a publication produced by the Law Centres Federation declared 
that: “Law Centres are unique…in the way in which they extend the benefits of 
their legal skills to the greatest number possible” (LCF, 1983:4). This emphasis, on 
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extending legal services to the economically disadvantaged (LCN, 2016:19) persists 
to the present day. As such, it is argued that there is ample evidence to support the 
argument that the extension of legal services to individuals and groups who are 
economically disadvantaged, with an emphasis on reaching those who are most in 
need (see Terminal Value 2 below) is an instrumental value adhered to by Law 
Centres to facilitate the delivery of their terminal value: bringing about social change 
in favour of marginalised individuals and groups.  
 
3.3.2 The case for instrumental value 1.2: Law Centres undertake strategic 
casework that has the potential to reform the law in favour of the 
economically disadvantaged 
In addition to extending legal services to a wider range of individuals and groups, a 
key instrumental value developed by Law Centres is the use of strategic litigation as 
a tool to bring about social change in favour of the economically marginalised. The 
Committee of the Society of Labour Lawyers argued that: “it is fundamental to our 
concept that local legal centres must be staffed by lawyers of energy, imagination 
and competence and the work offered must be such as to attract men of that 
calibre” (Committee of the Society of Labour Lawyers, 1968:42). In researching the 
operation of the first Law Centres, Byles and Morris (1977) reiterated the 
importance of “creative lawyering” to the delivery of the Law Centre vision and 
mission. Byles and Morris (1977) argue that the benefits of creative approaches to 
law were twofold as: “By using law to assert rights in their contexts which at first 
sight appear to be non-legal, there is likely to be a growing awareness amongst those 
helped that the law can indeed be used for their benefit, and that it does not act 
exclusively to the advantage of the rich.” They continue: “equally importantly, law 
reform and the opening up of new areas of law and new techniques for applying it 
may all bring about important changes in the training of lawyers and in the attitudes 
of the legal profession” (Byles and Morris: 1977:59), creating a virtuous circle 
whereby new members of the legal profession could be encouraged to develop skills 
essential to delivering the mission of advancing social change. One such skill, 
repeatedly referenced in the literature on Law Centres is the ability to successfully 
conduct strategic litigation.  
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The emphasis on strategic litigation partly arose from the influence of the 
experience of the US Neighbourhood Law Firms on the development of Law 
Centres. Law Reform was considered a primary aim of the Neighbourhood Law 
Firms. Reporting on the US experience, Zander observes that: “The American 
system, like the English, is based on the adversary process…(which) has been too 
frequently limping for want of the representation of the economically weaker 
party.” (Committee of the Society of Labour Lawyers, 1968:64). A consequence of 
this was the paucity of decisional law in many areas affecting the poor- Zander 
reports that where this law did exist it tended to mitigate against the individual of 
limited means. As such emphasis was based on developing skills in identifying test 
cases, which had proved successful in: “improving the lot not merely of the 
individual litigant but of the whole community of the poor.” (Committee of the 
Society of Labour Lawyers, 1968:65) 
 
By 1974 the Law Centres working group had developed a clear priority for the 
movement around strategic litigation and casework, stating that: “Casework 
together with the other work of the Centre is increasingly being applied to areas 
where maximum leverage can be achieved either in terms of obtaining rights under 
existing legislation for classes of clients, or exposing instances of poor quality 
service from Local Authorities and agencies” (LCWG, 1974:11). Writing in 1985, 
Grace and LeFevre emphasise the strategic approach taken by their Law Centre to 
maximise the impact of their work. In an article entitled “Draining the Swamp”, in 
reference to the importance of retaining a focus on tackling the underlying causes of 
social problems, they report on their decision to: “accept cases that would have an 
impact beyond the individual client, first in the areas of housing and employment 
and more recently in the field of immigration and nationality” (Grace & LeFevre, 
1985:103). A leaflet published by the Law Centre Federation in 2000 emphasised 
their involvement in strategic and group litigation, citing an action for 
underpayment of wages against Aberdeen Steak Houses undertaken by Central 
London Law Centre (LCF, 2000:1). In respect of a case brought by Tow Law 
Centres which established that Local Authorities have a duty to provide basic 
services to asylum seekers with no other means of support, LCF stated that: “Law 
Centres are well-placed both to develop a strategic approach and to embark on test 
cases as they are not subject to the same limitations of the need to make a profit as 
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private practice is” (LCF, 2000:2). Mayo’s 2014 study of both internal and external 
stakeholders in the Law Centre movement found that that the ability to conduct 
strategic litigation remained a key point of difference, differentiating Law Centres 
from other Legal Service providers and advice agencies (Mayo, 2014:45).  
 
3.3.3 The case for instrumental value 1.3: Law Centres identify and unite 
groups of individuals around the experience of particular justiciable 
issues and use these groups as vehicles for engaging in law reform 
activities 
 
The emergence of a role for Law Centres in identifying and uniting groups of 
individuals experiencing similar issues as a tool to bring about social change can be 
traced to a report published by the Law Centres Working Group in 1974 entitled 
“Community Law Centres - Towards Equal Justice”. The report reflected the 
experience of the working group who, reflecting on the first four years of work 
undertaken by Law Centres felt that solely focusing on servicing individual 
casework at scale was insufficient to bring about social change. The Law Centres 
Working Group were concerned that basing the activities of Law Centres on the 
traditional model of legal services was a barrier to achieving the goals of the Law 
Centre movement, stating that:  
 
“There is in our view a…fundamental barrier preventing…Law Centres from fully meeting the 
needs for legal services in poorer and working class communities…it is a barrier which will not be 
removed by setting up numbers of solicitors offices… which are free, accessible and sympathetic and 
energetic in the way in which they work. This barrier was not fully recognised until the first few 
Law Centres had found that from the moment they opened their doors they were flooded with 
individuals seeking help with their cases, and the doubling and trebling of staffs did nothing to eases 
the burden of pressing casework…The difficulty arises out of the structure of the legal profession 
and its traditional style of operation which is deeply rooted in the solicitor client relationship” 
(LCWG, 1974:6). 
 
The Law Centres Working Group were concerned that the traditional model of 
legal professionalism, which mitigated against the ability of solicitors to work for 
multiple clients experiencing similar problems, would fail to bring about the goals of 
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the movement. The Working Group argued that: “the involvement of lawyers and 
the provision of legal services in areas of concern to the poor and working class 
involves not merely a quantitative change in legal services but also a qualitative one” 
(LCWG, 1974:7). The Law Centres Working Group cited with approval the 
experience of the Director of the San Francisco Neighbourhood Legal Assistance 
Foundation J. Carlin who stated: “The legal problems of the poor… 
characteristically arise from systemic abuses embedded in the operation of various 
public and private agencies affecting large numbers of similarly situated individuals. 
Effective solution of the problems may require the lawyer to direct his attention 
away from the particular claim or grievance to the broader interests and policies at 
stake and away from the individual client to a class of clients in order to challenge 
more directly and with greater impact certain structural sources of injustice” 
(LCWG, 1974:7). The Working Group argued further that Law Centres should 
focus their efforts on helping to bring together individuals experiencing similar 
issues and assist them in forming organisations: “which enable them to settle 
amongst themselves any minor conflict of interest” (LCWG, 1974:87) before 
providing them with legal services in a similar fashion to those provided to 
organisations. The working group asserted that Law Centres should provide legal 
services to community groups in the same manner that: “landlords, the DHSS and 
employers have needed access to lawyers and have obtained it for their own 
benefit” (LCWG, 1974:8). Law Centres embraced this approach to varying extents: 
The Royal Commission on Legal Services (the Benson Commission), writing in 
1979 stated that:  
 
“At present, some law centres concentrate on community work and for this purpose, employ one or 
more community workers without legal training or qualifications. These centres like to work for the 
community at large or sections of it, rather than for individuals. They often seek to attack the roots 
of problems by organising groups to bring pressure to bear on landlords, local authorities, and 
central government, either to improve working, housing or living conditions or to urge changes in 
priorities of public expenditure so as to meet urgent needs or to promote changes of a similar 
character. They become a focus in the neighbourhood for campaigns on behalf of the community” 
(Royal Commission on Legal Services, 1979:83) 
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Grace and LeFevre, managers at Brent Law Centre writing in 1985 argued that: “ 
The lawyer, qua Law Centre worker, should not be an activist, but an instrument for 
community activists…providing the essential skills by which unorganised groups of 
people can come together and generate instructions sufficiently clear and stable to 
be implemented” (Grace and LeFevre, 1985:100). The academic literature on Law 
Centres repeatedly references the adoption of group working strategies such as 
community organising. Burdett (2002) has argued that the specialist literature on 
Law Centres, community work and community development: “characterise (the) 
community as heterogeneous, powerless and pauperised and suggest that the object 
of professional work within this framework is to create and strengthen groups, and 
solidarity between them, for action and social change.” (Burdett, 2002:43). Stephens 
has asserted that the literature on CLCs suggests three distinct definitions for “client 
community”, the latter of which is intimately connected with the adoption of a 
group working ethos- “a sense of belonging (affective, intrinsically-valued social 
relationships), locality (as in neighbourhood) and a particular target group that 
might serve as a vehicle for social change” (Stephens, 1990:80). In 2000, a leaflet 
published by the Law Centre Federation reported that: “Helping groups to organise 
and supporting them in their work is a much more efficient use of Law Centre time 
than doing individual casework. Groups may come to the Centre already formed 
and simply requiring clerical or company secretary skills from the Centre, or they 
may be set up by the Centre in response to a particular problem in the area, in 
which case the Centre will play a nurturing role” (LCF, 2000:2).  
 
In comparison to instrumental value 1.1 (extending legal services to the 
economically disadvantaged) and value 1.2 (undertaking strategic litigation), 
community organising and group working appears to be less consistently embraced 
across the Law Centre movement. Byles and Morris, who conducted the first 
evaluation of Law Centres funded by the Nuffield Foundation, reported that group 
working was a feature of two of the three models of Law Centres that had emerged 
by 1977, arguing that: “At present we have three ‘models’ of a Law Centre: ‘A’ A traditional 
service similar in structure to that provided to middle class clients by private practitioners. Needs 
are defined by the clients, in response to what they see as the type of service offered. Management 
and control are vested in the “predominantly” legal staff, jointly with representatives of community 
agencies. ‘B’ A multidisciplinary service in which the skills of the lawyers are made available to the 
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community either on an individual or a group basis. Needs are defined partly by the clients and 
partly by the staff of the Centre. Management and control are vested in the staff, jointly with 
representatives of community organisations. ‘C’ A comprehensive service in which the skills of a 
wide variety of professional workers are placed at the disposal of the community. The community is 
encouraged to articulate its own needs by the development of co-operative self-help, to act to meet 
these needs. Management and control are vested in the local residents.” (Byles and Morris, 
1977)   
 
In a study published in 1990 Mike Stephens reported on a division in the Law 
Centre movement between “reactive” and “proactive” Law Centres. According to 
Stephens, “reactive” Law Centres: “have an open door policy, which allows citizens 
to pursue in an effective manner their awareness that they may have a legal 
complaint. Each individual citizen coming into the Law Centre will be seen on a 
one-to-one basis by a member of the Law Centre staff” (Stephens, 1990:13). In 
contrast, following Black (1973) proactive Law Centres engage in community based 
research to identify “patterns of illegality” and explore the legal options for pursuing 
a wider range of interests without the initiation of an individual citizen (Stephens, 
1990:15). Stephens observed that Law Centres were organisations under strain, 
suffering under: “excessive individual casework” (Stephens, 1990:139). Stephens 
reported that the strain of excessive individual casework had affected the ability of 
Law Centres to deliver on the community development activities (such as public 
legal education, strategic litigation, movement building and advocacy) that are 
thought to be essential to bringing about social change. Further to this, Stephens 
stated: “The British Law Centre movement has only ever contained a small number 
of Law Centres with a significantly proactive style of operation” (Stephens, 
1990:70). Writing in 2002 Burdett observes in the Law Centre literature suggestions 
of an “inherent incompatibility” (Burdett, 2002:57) between individual casework 
and community research, education, development, organising and campaigning 
work. Nevertheless, it is argued that the type of community organising 
circumscribed by instrumental value 1.3 is referenced sufficiently to merit its 
inclusion in the values framework and further, that it is a mode of operating that 
distinguishes Law Centres from other legal service providers.  
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3.4 The case for Terminal Value 2: Law Centres prioritise the 
provision of their services on the basis of need 
Central to the rationale for the development of Law Centres was the aim to 
prioritise the provision of their services on the basis of need, rather than ability to 
pay, arguing that: “…the object of the scheme is to help the underprivileged and 
those who at present fail to help themselves” (Committee of the Society of Labour 
Lawyers, 1968:41). Whilst there is little doubt that the founders of the movement 
felt that poverty was a basis for determining whether an individual was in need of a 
Law Centre’s assistance, they eschewed the imposition of a formal means test, 
arguing that: “the existence of a means test…could exclude too many who should 
be able to benefit from the service” (Committee of the Society of Labour Lawyers, 
1968:41) arguing instead for the imposition of the somewhat more ambiguous: 
“working rule that anyone who can obtain the help he needs from the ordinary 
facilities ought to be referred on” (Committee of the Society of Labour Lawyers, 
1967:41). From the earliest days of the movement, Law Centres reported being 
“swamped” with demand for their services (LCWG, 1974, Byles and Morris 1977, 
Stephens, 1990), necessitating the development of a principled means of prioritising 
their services.  As such, it is argued, that the literature reveals two distinct criterion 
that Law Centres developed and applied in order to prioritise the provision of their 
services based on the principle of devoting their resources to those individuals and 
groups who might be considered most “in need” with individuals and groups being 
identified as “in need” to the extent that either (i.) the extant legal framework does 
not serve their interests or extend to their protection (henceforth referred to as 
“Need Type 1”), or, (ii.) the extant legal framework does in theory serve their 
interests and/or extend to their protection but they are vulnerable in the context of 
being able to successfully secure their rights, protection and fair treatment under the 
legal system as it stands (“Need Type 2”). The following discussion presents the 
evidence for the application of this two-part conception of need by Law Centres.  
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3.4.1 The case for instrumental value 2.1: Law Centres consider individuals 
or groups to be “in need” to the extent that the extant legal 
framework does not serve their interests or extend to their protection 
(Need Type 1)  
One of the arguments underpinning the development of Law Centres in the 1970s 
was that the existing legal framework inadequately reflected the interests of the poor 
and marginalised, and that in order to remedy this, poor and marginalised 
individuals and groups needed to be provided with the opportunity to access legal 
services. Implicit in the language used by the authors of Justice for All was a set of 
beliefs regarding the way in which the law could be altered to better reflect the 
interests of economically marginalised individuals and groups- namely, through 
highlighting deficiencies in the law as it stood through encouraging people to try to 
address their problems through legal means. Some of the early commentators on 
the Law Centre movement argued that: “On the whole those who advocate 
neighbourhood Law Centres are concerned that people who have legal problems 
and need lawyers but would not go to a solicitor in private practice should have a 
lawyer nearby that they will recognise as one to whom they can go. They also have it 
in mind that the legal problems of the poor require different knowledge from that 
possessed by lawyers who usually act for middle class clients, so a form of 
specialisation is desirable. Essentially however, these arguments are only 
elaborations of the main argument that those who have a legal problem need a 
lawyer and one should be provided” (Lewis, 1973: 74). As such, it was argued, the 
Law Centres movement represented a: “reconfiguration of organisation of the legal 
profession, not a radical reconceptualization of the legal system and its role in 
society” (White, 1973:63).  However, as the movement evolved there was increasing 
evidence of a shift in the way in which Law Centres prioritised their services, 
increasingly targeting those individuals whose interests were not reflected in the 
extant legal framework, with the aim of securing and developing new rights on their 
behalf. Some examples include: the development of a new remedy for tenants 
suffering from ill health due to housing disrepair and damp under section 99 of the 
Public Health Act 1936 (LCF, 1983:9), extending the legal aid scheme to parents in 
care proceedings: “a step which would not have been taken if Law Centres had not 
pioneered work in this field” (LCF, 1983:10), extending the rights of tenants to be 
given the same rights of security as private tenants in Brent (Grace and Lefevre, 
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1985:99), pioneering representation before administrative tribunals (Smith, 
1997:901) and “pioneering” the development of whole areas of welfare law (Smith, 
1997:904). The Royal Commission on Legal Services (the Benson Commission), 
reporting in 1979 stated that: “Law Centres have become clearly identified as a 
source of help for those at any kind of disadvantage as being willing to side with 
citizens against authority” (Royal Commission on Legal Services, 1979:82)  
 
A report published by the Law Centres Federation in 2000 references the role of 
Law Centres in “opening up new areas of law” (LCF, 2000:6) including disability, 
education and environmental law, as well as human rights law. Recent evidence 
suggests this approach has persisted, in her 2014 study of Law Centres Mayo 
reports: “Law Centres are able to use legal remedies to enforce rights- and to test 
and further develop rights- in ways which were beyond the scope of other advice 
agencies, a unique selling point in terms of their abilities to contribute to social 
justice agendas more widely” (Mayo et. al. (2014:44). As such, it is argued that there 
is sufficient evidence to suggest that Law Centres consider the extent to which 
client’s interests are reflected in the extant legal framework as part of the criteria for 
allocating their services on the basis of need. 
 
3.4.2 The case for instrumental value 2.2: Law Centres consider individuals 
or groups to be “in need” to the extent that the extant legal 
framework does in theory serve their interests and/or extend to their 
protection but they are vulnerable in the context of being able to 
successfully secure their rights, protection and fair treatment under 
the legal system as it stands (Need Type 2)  
 
In arguing for the development of a national network of Law Centres the authors of 
“Justice for All” framed the argument in terms which accorded with the definition 
of need described here as “Need Type 2”, contending that society has: “a duty to 
ensure that its members are enabled to conduct their lives within the law, receive 
justice when the law is enforced against them, and take advantages of the benefits 
which the law confers upon them”(Committee of the Society of Labour Lawyers, 
1968:3). In defining those who were in need of assistance from Law Centres, the 
committee proposed a definition of legal need that started from the extant law and 
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scheme for provision of legal services and worked backwards. They argued that the 
correct approach to identifying legal need was one which: “first examine(s) the type 
of situations in which legal services provide important advantages to the public and 
then… measure(s) the extent to which real need in such situations is left unmet” 
(Committee of the Society of Labour Lawyers, 1968:4). The Committee put forward 
a list of six situations in which legal advice and assistance may prove advantageous, 
when facing criminal prosecution, when in the midst of a marriage breakdown, in 
the context of a civil dispute between two private individuals, when an individual 
may be entitled to claim a benefit under welfare legislation, when an individual 
wishes to make some use of his property and finally when a number of individuals 
wish to operate together for purposes beneficial to them as a group (Committee of 
the Society of Labour Lawyers, 1968:4-5). A further criterion to be considered was 
whether the situation was one in which: “the more affluent and the commercial and 
industrial sections of the community habitually seek the services of their family or 
company solicitor” (Committee of the Society of Labour Lawyers, 1968:5). Whilst 
framed in different language, this final criterion may be seen to embody elements of 
the “equality of arms” arguments deployed by contemporary Law Centres in 
explanation of the value of the service they offer.  
 
The committee argued that integral to the delivery of legal services to those in need 
was the location of legal services - Law Centres should be based within easy reach 
of the individuals they aimed to help. The committee argued that Law Centres 
should be based in deprived inner city areas; on the basis that it was the poorest 
sections of the community in densely populated urban areas that were failing to 
access legal advice and representation under the existing Legal Aid scheme. The 
cause of this, they argued, was the fact that the Legal Aid scheme: “relies too heavily 
on the individual’s capacity to perceive his own best interests and to take the 
initiative in seeking professional legal assistance” (Committee of the Society of 
Labour Lawyers 1968:59). The committee asserted that this defect had become 
more pronounced due the proliferation in laws that had been characteristic of the 
post-war period. They added: “We do not wish to suggest that the problem affects 
only the poorest section of the community: in some respects it affects consumers 
generally. But it is most widespread and most damaging to those who are in the 
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greatest material need” (Committee of the Society of Labour Lawyers 1968:23). As 
such, material need was both an indicator of and a proxy for legal need.   
 
The reliance of Law Centres on funding from the Legal Aid scheme to support their 
work further increased the emphasis on material need as a catchall proxy for the 
type of need described above as Need Type 2. The removal of legal aid has 
removed the means test as a proxy for identifying those individuals who may be 
considered most vulnerable in the context of being able to secure their rights, 
protection and fair treatment. It is argued that a new framework is needed to ensure 
that Law Centres meet the needs of those who are most vulnerable in this context. 
Chapter 4 takes as its starting point the procedure for identifying need proposed in 
Justice for All in 1968, where the Committee of the Society of Labour Lawyers 
argued that in defining need Law Centres should  “first examine(s) the type of 
situations in which legal services provide important advantages to the public and 
then… measure(s) the extent to which real need in such situations is left unmet” 
(Committee of the Society of Labour Lawyers, 1968:4) and reviews the academic 
literature published since 1968 to arrive at an updated framework indicating the 
criteria that should be taken into account when assessing the relative need of clients 
and groups. The complexity of this issue, the extent of the theoretical and empirical 
literature that has been developed on this subject and the novelty of combining and 
arranging the literature in this manner, justify the devotion of a separate chapter to 
this topic. Additionally, and in contrast to the material presented in this chapter, 
which derives the values constitutive of the ideal type Law Centre from existing 
material on the history of Law Centres, the framework presented in Chapter 4 is 
future oriented, in the sense of being developed to assist Law Centres to make 
difficult decisions about how to ensure they direct their services at the most 
vulnerable going forward.  
 
3.5 The case for Terminal Value 3: Law Centres provide specialist, 
expert legal advice 
Central to the case for Law Centres made by the authors of Justice For All was that 
the current structure of the legal profession and legal aid scheme was failing to 
create lawyers with the expertise and specialism necessary to deliver their mission of 
using the law to bring about social change in favour of the marginalised. From the 
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literature it is clear that a Terminal Value of Law Centres, and a feature that 
distinguishes them from the wider advice sector, is their ability to provide specialist, 
expert, legal advice. Prior, writing on the Law Centres movement in 1984 argues 
that: “Although Law Centres can take many forms, their speciality is the provision 
of legal advice and assistance. Prior to 1970 there had been numerous part time 
legal advice centres spread throughout the country but the distinguishing mark of 
the new Law Centres was their employment of full-time and fully committed legal 
and ancillary staff” Prior (1984:4). In order to deliver this Terminal Value, Law 
Centres developed two instrumental values: (i.) Law Centres recruit, develop, and 
retain staff with specialist legal expertise in the areas of law most relevant to their 
clients, and (ii.) Law Centres recruit, develop and retain staff with the skills and 
knowledge necessary to engage in the full spectrum of law reform related activities 
3.5.1 The case for instrumental value 3.1: Law Centres recruit, develop, and 
retain staff with specialist legal expertise in the areas of law most 
relevant to their clients 
 
The initial vision for Law Centres emphasised that these new organisations should 
seek to attract and retain lawyers with considerable expertise in the areas of law that 
traditionally impacted on those whose interests were under-represented. As such, 
Law Centres should, through their recruitment and training seek to promote 
specialisation in dealing with: “legal problems which most directly affect the lower 
income groups” (Committee of the Society of Labour Lawyers, 1968:61). The early 
Law Centres were keen to attract staff with a range of abilities beyond those 
possessed by lawyers in private practice. The Law Centres Working Group, writing 
in 1974, stated that: “Many solicitors in private practice are unfamiliar with those 
parts of the law which most affect working class people. The profession has never 
devoted itself to acquiring skills for which the people who need them are unable to 
pay, so the result is a lower quality of service for those working class people that do 
consult solicitors. This helps to create and reinforce (and indeed justifies) the low 
opinion which many have of the profession when they do seek advice”. (LCWG, 
1974:3). Writing in 1985, Leask, observes that a defining feature of Law Centres is 
that they privilege: “specialist, legal advice” (see Leask 1985: 62) From the late 1970s 
and early 1980s onwards the literature on Law Centres reports increasing 
specialisation within the Law Centres network emphasising the expertise of Law 
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Centres in the areas of housing tenancy and repair, employment and welfare 
entitlements (Stephens, 1990:17). Smith, writing in 1997, credits the Law Centre 
movement with pioneering the development of social welfare law, asserting that: 
“until the early 1980s, Law Centres were the only major providers of advice, 
assistance and representation in the fields of social welfare law” (Smith, 1997:897). 
This observation is borne out by Mayo, who in 2014 reported that the majority of 
casework conducted by Law Centres is in the area of social welfare law (housing, 
employment, debt, welfare benefits and immigration).  
 
3.5.2 The case for instrumental value 3.3: Law Centres recruit staff with the 
skills and knowledge necessary to engage in the full spectrum of law 
reform related activities 
 
Given the Terminal Values identified above, to use the law to bring about social 
change and to target services on the basis of need, it is vital that Law Centres 
develop and retain lawyers with a range of related expertise, and the skills and 
knowledge necessary to engage in the full spectrum of law reform related activities: 
strategic litigation, individual casework and community development (LCWG, 
1974:14). The Committee of the Society of Labour Lawyers argued that: “it is 
fundamental to our concept that local legal centres must be staffed by lawyers of 
energy, imagination and competence and the work offered must be such as to 
attract men of that calibre” (Committee of the Society of Labour Lawyers1968: 42). 
As stated above, Law Centre lawyers must be expert in the areas of law that affect 
those whose interests are marginalised within the extant legal framework. In order 
to identify opportunities to develop the law in the interests of the vulnerable, Law 
Centre lawyers must be dynamic, enthusiastic, creative and possess skills in 
identifying wider social problems and developing legal responses to address these- 
the Law Centres Working Group argued that Law Centres: “are and should be 
employing personnel with a wider range of skills than is traditional than in the case 
of lawyers’ offices” (LCWG, 1974:14). In 1983, the Law Centres Federation 
published a report which argued that Law Centres: “…can offer more than a 
traditional lawyer, by negotiating with bureaucracies…publishing injustice, pursue 
(ing) legal rights for which legal aid is not available: they experiment with new legal 
remedies and extend old remedies to new problems” (LCF, 1983:8) Law Centre 
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lawyers must be capable of working in a manner that encourages individuals who 
may have multiple and complex needs to seek their services- they must possess a 
particular kind of expertise in working with clients (see Terminal Value 4 below). 
Retention and development of specialist expertise is vital in order that Law Centres 
are able to provide expert advice and representation in these areas of law that most 
affect the members of their communities whose interests are under-represented by 
the law as it stands. Law Centres lawyers must be able to effectively diagnose, 
campaign and litigate to win cases in the areas of law that most affect those who 
interests are underrepresented. The possession of expertise in a range of legal skills 
and techniques such as litigation, batch casework, law reform and campaigning 
(LCF, 2000:2) is repeatedly referenced as vital, in order that Law Centres are able to 
deliver the range of Terminal and Instrumental values presented above.  
 
3.5.3 The Case for Terminal Value 4: Law Centres work with clients in a 
manner that expresses empathy and solidarity 
 
As is discussed above at Terminal Value 1, from their inception, Law Centres were 
designed to pioneer working with clients in a different manner than that which had 
been dictated by the tenets of traditional legal professionalism. For the authors of 
Justice for All, working in a client centred manner, locating in areas convenient for 
marginalised and vulnerable individuals to access, dressing informally, were a means 
of overcoming the reticence to consult lawyers that the Committee argued stemmed 
from: “a vague fear of lawyers or of looking foolish in the surroundings of a 
professional man’s office, especially in working clothes” (Committee of the Society 
of Labour Lawyers, 1968:22). The earliest articulation of the Law Centre model 
argued that Law Centres should provide parity of service in the spirit of the best 
tradition of private practice. Clients should be able to seek out the lawyer of their 
choice within the centre and maintain a continuing personal relationship with him in 
the English tradition of the “family solicitor” as: “it is a professional man in such a 
position of trust who is best placed to assist the individual to deal with his 
problems, whether or not they are likely to lead to litigation” (Committee of the 
Society of Labour Lawyers 1968:39) Whilst representatives of the first Law Centres 
agreed that Law Centres and their workers should be focused on clients’ needs, they 
argued against the paternalistic, individualistic model of service provision proposed 
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by the Committee members in “Justice for All” (1968). The Law Centres Working 
Group were highly sceptical of those who argued that the needs of the poor and 
working class could ever be met by centres providing free advice staffed by 
“accessible, sympathetic and energetic” advisers. (LCWG, 1974:6). However, a 
reputation for working with clients in a non-stigmatising, empathic and partisan 
manner quickly became emblematic of the distinctiveness of Law Centres within the 
landscape of legal service providers.   
 
The Committee of the Society of Labour Lawyers argued that Law Centres should 
move away from the traditional model of professional services to proactively seek 
out unmet legal need in the communities in which they operate. They should 
provide a client centred service, accessible outside of normal working hours to 
enable people to attend (Committee of the Society of Labour Lawyers 1968:39). 
This service should be both free and de-stigmatising. Stephens (1990), in his book 
“Community Law Centres: A Critical Appraisal” reports that a defining feature of 
Law Centres is that they deliver a client centred service in relaxed and informal 
surroundings. He notes the continuing emphasis placed on employing staff with 
people working skills- that is staff who “through the communication of information 
and the sharing of insights attempt to help the client help himself…” (Stephens, 
1990:23 citing Bennett and Hokenstad, 1973:23). This emphasis on delivering a 
client focussed, empowering service was also observed by Mayo in 2014 who 
typifies the Law Centre client care model being driven by approachability, 
informality, unashamed partisanship (Mayo et al. 2014:42). Mayo reports that Law 
Centre lawyers work in a holistic fashion, both in terms of addressing the totality of 
the clients’ needs and addressing underlying problems, referring clients to specialist 
support agencies where necessary. (Mayo, 2014:43). Mayo argues that patience and a 
specialism in dealing with the most vulnerable clients are central to the client care 
ethos of contemporary Law Centres. Providing a positive experience is critical to 
the goal of encouraging individuals who traditionally may have felt intimidated by or 
alienated from the law and legal processes to access legal services. Prior, writing in 
1984 stated that: “It should also be said that Law Centre staff have proved to be 
very empathetic towards their clientele and their relaxed, informal and even 
sympathetic political disposition has secured them an acceptance, particularly 
among young blacks, that otherwise they would not have had” (Prior, 1984, 10).   
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Law Centres challenged traditional models of legal professionalism by holding 
themselves accountable to a management committee comprised of lay members 
drawn from the local community (LCWG, 1974:15). Law Centres adopted a 
deliberate policy of recruiting individuals from their client communities to their staff 
and management committee. The Committee of the Society of Labour Lawyers 
repeatedly emphasised the importance of the relationship between Law Centres and 
the communities they serve, this was seen as critical to ensuring that Law Centres 
were able to meet the needs of the community effectively.  The committee argued 
that: “effective means, both institutional and personal for ensuring that the centres 
respond to the real needs of the community are vital and their establishment and 
maintenance must be a first principle of the service” (Committee of the Society of 
Labour Lawyers 1968:47). In 1974, a report of the Law Centres Working Group 
emphasised the importance of employing people who live or who have lived in the 
area of operation of the Law Centre. The original structure of Law Centres 
mandated that Law Centres should be managed by and accountable to a committee 
of representatives from the local and client community. This desire, to be managed 
by individuals who are not lawyers, may be considered as a rejection of one of the 
tenets of traditional professionalism and the surrender of a source of professional 
power. In discussing the elements of professional power, Freidson argues that: 
professional power lies in the ability of professionals to control their work, to 
exercise autonomy in contrast to their work being controlled by outside sources 
(Freidson, 1994:31). According to his definition, professions with total power to 
control their own work are: “organised by associations that are independent both of the state 
and of capital, [who themselves] organise and administer the practice of an unambiguously 
demarcated body of knowledge and skill or jurisdiction which their members monopolise…the 
professions serve as the ultimate authorities on those personal, social, economic, cultural and 
political affairs which their body of knowledge and skill addresses. Their modes of formulating and 
interpreting events permeate both popular consciousness and official policy” (Freidson, 1994: 32).  
 
The history of the Law Centre movement is replete with references to tension 
between Law Centres and the Law Society, and Law Centres and successive 
governments (Smith, 1997, Goriely 1996). A thesis completed by Lancaster (2004) 
was focussed on analysing the role of professional power in limiting the 
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development of Law Centres. Law Centres’ refutation of the tenet of traditional 
professionalism that requires lawyers to “monopolise” an unambiguously 
demarcated body of esoteric knowledge and skill, through upskilling and training 
individuals in their local and client communities, promoting self-help (LCF, 1983:2) 
and assisting them to form into groups (LCF, 2000:2- see further Terminal Value 5 
and Instrumental Value 1.3) and the partial surrender of autonomy implied by their 
decision to be managed by and accountable to lay members of their client 
community, situates them as directly opposed to traditional models of legal 
professionalism.  
 
3.6 The Case for Terminal Value 5: Law Centres improve the legal 
knowledge their clients and local communities 
The role of Law Centres as public legal educators was afforded primacy in the 
original description of their functions. It was considered essential that Law Centres 
should advertise the services they offer and promote: “public knowledge of the legal 
system and the rights of the individual” (Committee of the Society of Labour 
Lawyers 1968:61). The purpose of this education was, for the founders of Law 
Centres to encourage the uptake of legal services. However, as Law Centres 
developed, their commitment to this role expanded, and it is repeatedly emphasised 
in the literature on Law Centres as a distinctive feature of their purpose and values 
up until the present day (Stephens: 1990, LCF: 2000, Mayo: 2014), justifying its 
inclusion as a terminal value.  
3.6.1 The case for instrumental value 5.1: Law Centres provide legal 
education to individuals and groups with the aim of improving their 
ability to identify, understand and secure their rights, protection and 
fair treatment. 
By 1974, the emphasis placed by the Law Centres working group on community 
development and community action meant that the Public Legal Education based 
activities of Law Centres were given prominence. The Law Centre’s Working 
Group conceived of public legal education as: “community development with an 
emphasis on law and legal skills” (LCWG, 1974:11) arguing that: “the powerlessness 
of residents to control their own life situation and to benefit from law and local and 
central Governments policies is seen to be related partly to the limited availability of 
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information”(LCWG, 1974:11). The working group stated: “Law Centres in one 
way or another are working with groups in their communities providing 
information, helping them to organise and enabling them to gain access to necessary 
skills and expertise and finally acting as their advocates” (LCWG, 1974:12). This is 
achieved through a number of strategies. Firstly, providing one-to-one casework 
and advice has an educational function. Secondly, through inviting individuals 
receiving advice to attend appointments accompanied by a community 
representative, Law Centre workers can maximise the educational impact of the 
advice encounter. The community representative can assist in clarifying legalistic 
language and learn from the experience of the person involved in the case, with the 
aim of disseminating this experience amongst the wider community. Thirdly, Law 
Centre workers educate through giving talks to local community groups and 
disseminating information leaflets, either those produced by Law Centre staff or 
community produced resources. Finally, they can help build capacity to resolve legal 
problems within the community through assisting local agencies to provide a 
comprehensive service. By “upskilling” local agencies they can spread expertise so 
that it is distributed throughout the community, rather than simply taking over “ 
legal” areas of work and creating silos of legal knowledge. The Working Group 
stated that: “By these and other means Law Centres can hope not only to make 
people aware of their existing rights but also to give them the knowledge and 
confidence to enforce them” (LCWG, 1974:13). In 1983, a leaflet published by the 
Law Centres Federation entitled “The Case for Law Centres” reported that Law 
Centres: “provide community education by means of talks and training courses for 
the general public and for those whose job it is to advise others” (LCF, 1983:2). 
However, as the funding climate became more restrictive, Law Centres found it 
increasingly difficult to deliver this function.  
 
The specialist literature on Law Centres reports that the ability of Law Centres to 
undertake Public Legal Education activities has been compromised by the demand 
of delivering individual casework. In 1984 Law Centres Federation recognised that 
extra funding was needed to pursue projects that were not related to individual 
casework, this formed part of the rationale advanced for central funding of Law 
Centres by: “an appropriate government department or intermediary body” 
(Stephens, 1990:145). In 2000, a leaflet published by the Law Centres Federation 
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stated that: “It is an integral part of Law Centres work to spread knowledge of legal 
rights, remedies and duties. There is an ever-increasing demand from schools and 
clubs of all descriptions for talks from Law Centres” (LCF, 2000:6).  A recent study 
of Law Centres conducted by Mayo in 2014 reported that Law Centres still 
espoused a commitment to their role in delivering PLE, in spite of the difficulties in 
securing funding for this work (Mayo et al 2014:49). As such, the provision of legal 
education merits inclusion as an instrumental value.   
 
3.7 Conclusion 
The above discussion has proposed a framework of Law Centre values which, taken 
together, are constitutive of Law Centres distinctiveness within the wider landscape 
of legal service providers. It has reviewed the extant literature on Law Centres, 
providing evidence to justify the selection of these values. This values framework, in 
conjunction with the updated framework for identifying and prioritising need 
presented at Chapter 4, will be used to evaluate the impact of the adoption of the 
different funding models presented at chapters 5-8.  
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4 CHAPTER 4: DEVELOPING A FRAMEWORK FOR PRIORITISING 
LAW CENTRES SERVICES BASED ON NEED 
 
4.1 Introduction  
In Chapter 3 above, it is argued that a value constitutive of Law Centres 
distinctiveness is the way in which they prioritise the provision of their services 
namely, on the basis of need. According to the Values Framework outlined above, 
Law Centres define individuals or populations as needy according to the extent that 
they fulfil one of two criteria: (i.) the extant legal framework does not serve their 
interests or extend to their protection (“Need Type 1”), or (ii.) The extant legal 
framework does in theory serve their interests and/or extend to their protection but 
they are vulnerable in the context of being able to successfully secure their rights, 
protection and fair treatment under the legal system as it stands. (“Need Type 2”). 
The founders of the Law Centre movement writing in Justice For All in 1968 
proposed a definition of what is referred to here as Need Type 2 based on the 
following criteria: they argued that the correct approach to identifying legal need 
was one which: “first examine(s) the type of situations in which legal services 
provide important advantages to the public and then… measure(s) the extent to 
which real need in such situations is left unmet” (Committee of the Society of 
Labour Lawyers, 1968:4). Since 1968 however, there has been an expansion in the 
empirical and theoretical literature aimed at exploring the precise benefits conferred 
by legal advice and representation, as well as an acknowledged proliferation in the 
laws affecting individuals in their everyday lives (Genn, 2012:2) This chapter reviews 
the updated evidence relating to the types of situations in which legal services have 
been found to confer important advantages in the context of securing just 
outcomes, in order to arrive at a model for understanding which individuals or 
groups might be considered in greatest need of legal services. This model will them 
be used in conjunction with the Values Framework presented above at Chapter 3 to 
evaluate the funding models presented in chapters 4-6.  
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4.2 Exploring the mechanisms through which individualised legal 
advice and representation assists individuals in achieving just 
outcomes  
 
As detailed above, the following discussion reviews the existing literature on the 
benefits conferred by individualised legal advice and representation (e.g. knowledge 
of the law, relational expertise, social capital) in relation to improving the ability of 
individuals and groups to secure just outcomes. The discussion is used to build a 
definition of “vulnerability” or “need” that is context specific. It is argued that those 
individuals who possess or are able to acquire the benefits conferred by legal advice 
and representation independently should be considered less needy or vulnerable 
than those who cannot.  
4.2.1 Legal advice as legal education  
Individualised legal advice can fulfil an important role in educating individuals about 
their rights, and helping them to understand their obligations and entitlements. 
Genn (1999) reporting the findings of her ground-breaking study of legal need, 
identified that 47% of those individuals who sought legal advice in relation to a 
specific problem cited the desire to understand their legal rights as a motivating 
factor (Genn, 1999:69) In addition, individualised advice may be seen to act in the 
first instance as a sort of “legal triage”, whereby individuals who are experiencing a 
justiciable problem, which they may or may not recognise as admitting of a legal 
solution, can be made aware of the legal dimension of the particular problems they 
are experiencing and directed to the appropriate course of action to achieve a “just” 
outcome. The role of legal advice as legal education may be seen to be particularly 
critical for individuals whose social networks do not include legal professionals or 
those who have previous experience of achieving just outcomes in respect of 
justiciable problems (see Barkun’s (1973) theory of the acquisition of legal 
knowledge, which posits socialisation as key to the attainment of legal knowledge). 
If individuals only socialise with other individuals with similarly low levels of 
knowledge, or if they are isolated (for example, as a result of mental illness) their 
ability to acquire legal knowledge may be compromised (Denvir, 2013:607). In 
addition, research has indicated that individuals from minority groups (BME 
groups, gypsies and travellers, refugees and asylum seekers, and members of the 
LBGT community) are less likely to possess the requisite legal knowledge to enable 
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them to identify and act upon justiciable events (Mason et al., 2009:56). As such, 
individuals within minority groups may be especially in need of programmes of legal 
education tailored to their needs (for example, located in an accessible area, 
resources translated into appropriate languages)  
4.2.2 Legal advice as dispute transformation  
A critical role fulfilled by a system of individualised legal advice is the way in which 
interaction with a legal advisor can enable an individual experiencing a justiciable 
event, to re-formulate that experience in such a manner as to make it amenable to 
recourse through the legal system. An influential study authored by Felstiner et al. 
(1981) attempted to analyse the way in which disputes become legal. Felstiner 
proposed a tripartite model of pre-legal processes resulting in legal disputes, 
whereby individuals perceive an experience as injurious (“naming” the experience), 
attribute “blame” for the experience to another party and proceed to claim through 
litigation.  
 
The amount of time taken to translate or transform a particular experience into a 
legal problem is contingent on two factors, firstly, the complexity of the legal matter 
at stake, and secondly, the complexity of contextual factors relating to the individual 
client and her circumstances. Clients with lower levels of literacy, those with mental 
health problems, individuals with little awareness of the extant legal processes or 
simply those who experience their problem as especially distressing may require 
additional time and support than their counterparts during the process of 
translation. As such, it may be asserted that the value of legal advice for individuals 
in these circumstances increases, both proportionally to the complexity of the legal 
problem experienced and in relation to the contextual factors that impinge on the 
clients ability to translate their experience of particular events into justiciable 
problems. 
 
It is important to note here that there exists evidence to support the claim that 
individuals from black and ethnic minority backgrounds have an increased tendency 
to report receiving advice that is of lower quality and less useful to them in 
addressing their problems than their white counterparts (O’Grady et al, 2006:632, 
Mason et al. 2009: iii). Research has also identified that individuals from minority 
groups experience greater barriers in seeking advice, are less likely to seek advice in 
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relation to justiciable events, and less likely to be satisfied with their experience of 
receiving advice when they do access it. A wealth of literature developed in the 
context of the US legal system explores the way in which the lawyer client 
relationship can act to subordinate and displace client narratives, particularly in 
instances where the client belongs to an ethnic minority group (Alfieri, 1991a, 
2111). If this experience were found to be reflected in the UK context, it would 
help to explain why individuals from minority groups report receiving advice that is 
not useful or relevant to them. Alfieri (1996) proposed a new ethic of professional 
responsibility for lawyers engaged in poverty law practice based on the values of 
race consciousness, contingency and collectivity (Alfieri, 1996:802). This ethic 
entails recognising that race and racial difference is an essential part of the client’s 
identity, promoting an understanding of the client and their choices as socially 
contingent, and further, acknowledging and accepting responsibility for dominant 
social and legal narratives which posit the client and their community as deviant or 
other (Alfieri, 1996: 804). Alfieri argues that by adhering to a doctrine of race 
blindness i.e. in asserting the legal process and procedure is colour blind, and 
refusing to mount arguments in favour of their client which draw on their racial and 
community identity, legal advisors are complicit in denying the identity politics 
intrinsic to the legal process, and in further alienating those who already perceive 
the legal system as unjust by refusing to acknowledge clients lived experience.  This 
argument suggests that the process of dispute transformation must be carried out 
with greater care, attention and reflexivity on the part of the legal advisor where the 
client belongs to a minority group.  
 
4.2.3 Legal Advice as empowerment  
Several arguments have been advanced for the proposition that legal advice operates 
to empower those individuals who receive it in respect of their civil law problems. 
These include: (i) that the psychological impact of the relationship between client 
and advisor is, in itself empowering (ii) that the encounter between client and 
advisor is one which enables the client to access and harness the social capital of the 
adviser in asserting his or her claim.  
 
4.2.3.1 The psychological importance of the adviser/client relationship  
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Sandefur’s (2006) research explored the rationales offered by those on low and low-
moderate incomes who chose not to act to resolve the justiciable problems they had 
experienced.  The reasons proffered by participants for failing to take action were i) 
shame, ii) a sense of powerlessness, iii) fear, gratitude and a sense of frustration, the 
latter generated in response to previous experience of civil law disputes (Sandefur, 
2006:123). Feelings of powerlessness in a given situation were related to 
respondent’s perceptions of the authoritativeness of the opponent, or the ability of 
their opponent to access resources (including legal advice and representation) that 
far outweighed their own. As a result, respondents were more likely to consider the 
matter settled in spite of their belief that they were being treated wrongly (Sandefur, 
2006:124). Access to legal advice, through alleviating this sense of powerlessness, 
may be an important component in enabling individuals to assert their rights. 
 
4.2.3.2 The adviser as a source of social and cultural capital  
The concept of social capital, first developed by Pierre Bourdieu, may be defined as: 
“the aggregate of the actual or potential resources which are linked to possession of 
a durable network of more or less institutionalised relationships of mutual 
acquaintance or recognition” (Bourdieu 1985, 248). Professional legal advisors, both 
through their membership of a professional formalised network, and through their 
repeated interaction with other agencies often implicated in civil law problems (such 
as Housing Associations, welfare benefits offices, local authorities etc.) possess 
considerable social capital which places them at an advantage in negotiating 
favourable settlements. This social capital is related to, but distinct from, the 
arguments made later in this section about the advantages conferred by the 
possession of relational expertise in litigation. Advisors can leverage this social 
capital on behalf of their clients to achieve outcomes that individuals without these 
networks would be unable to access. An example of this leveraging of social capital 
is detailed in research produced by “Justice for All” (2011) which highlighted the 
importance of legal advice in enabling individuals to enforce their rights in 
employment cases. In a number of cases identified as part of this briefing, the 
defendant in employment claims is unresponsive when approached by their 
employee regarding issues such as unpaid wages, or withdrawal of statutory sick 
leave. Intervention by a legal advisor, in the form of writing letters explaining their 
client’s legal entitlement and threatening to issue a claim, has been reported as 
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effective in settling the matter before it reaches a tribunal (Justice for All, 2011:2). 
The explanation for why the intervention of legal adviser should have this effect, 
when the actions of the client expressing the same substantively valid claim do not, 
is closely related to the status of legal professionals in society. The nature of the 
position and influence possessed by members of the professions has been a fruitful 
source of sociological enquiry since the beginning of the twentieth century. Talcott 
Parsons, writing in 1939 relates this influence to the possession of technical 
competence, the limiting of technical competence to a particular field (what Parsons 
refers to as “specificity of function”) and institutional authority (1939:460). The 
membership of a particular profession (through for example, qualifying as a solicitor 
or barrister) connotes the former and confers the latter: other parties in disputes are 
more likely to engage when a legal professional intervenes because i.) the 
intervention of a legal advisor, as an acknowledged specialist, lends credence to the 
veracity of the claim of the client and ii) the legal advisor is vested with the 
institutional authority to issue proceedings and marshal the coercive power of the 
extant legal framework.  
 
4.2.4 The value of individualised legal representation  
The value of legal representation for individuals with civil law problems is 
intrinsically linked with the structure of the justice system in England and Wales. It 
has been argued by numerous commentators (Genn, 2012, Assy, 2011, and others) 
that the adversarial nature of the justice system in England and Wales presents 
particular problems for those who approach the court without representation. As 
has been noted above, there exists a paucity of programmes educating individuals 
about their substantive legal rights; this lack of public legal awareness extends to the 
procedural norms of the court system. An adversarial system has been described as 
one in which three fundamental conditions are met. Firstly, an adversarial system 
necessitates that the parties involved in the dispute have both the freedom and 
responsibility to present evidence and construct arguments in relation to their claim, 
secondly, the evidence and argument must be presented before a decision maker 
who is both passive and neutral and thirdly, the evidence and argument must be 
presented in a highly structured setting where rules governing evidence, ethics and 
procedure are enforced. It is argued that a flaw in any one of these components is 
likely to undermine the functioning of the system (Assy, 2011:269).  
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In considering the features of the adversarial system as described above in 
conjunction with what is already known regarding a.) the lack of public education 
regarding the procedural rigours of the court system, and b.) the level of public 
knowledge of the substantive law, it seems relatively uncontroversial to suggest that 
individuals who approach the civil justice system unrepresented may be at a 
disadvantage. Interestingly, a meta-analysis of the impact of representation on trial 
outcomes published by Sandefur (2010) demonstrated that, for the range of 
problems studied10: “lawyers’ impact is largest when lower status people appear in 
hearings where perfunctory treatment of cases is standard operative procedure or 
the court’s adherence to the law is ad-hoc. In these settings, lawyers appear to assist 
their clients, in part, simply by assisting courts in following their own rules.” 
(Sandefur, 2008:45). In addition, Sandefur reported that the impact of 
representation was greatest when the procedural complexity involved in the case 
was average or above average (Sandefur, 2008:39).11 The perceived importance of 
procedural complexity in acting as a barrier to those who represent themselves has 
been recognised in the latest report from The Judicial Working Group on Litigants 
in Person (July 2013) which urgently recommended further work to assess the 
merits of three proposals which aim at reducing the complexity of procedures 
where one or more of the parties involved in a case is unrepresented.  
 
In addition, the case law developed on the relationship between Article 6 of the 
ECHR and the right to legal assistance emphasises the importance of the 
complexity of the law engaged in determining whether an individuals rights have 
been breached. The case of Airey v Ireland12 is widely considered to be the leading 
case concerning Article 6 of the ECHR and the right to legal advice and 
representation in civil law matters. The facts of the case were as follows. Mrs Airey 
had spent eight years attempting to negotiate with her husband to secure a 
separation agreement. Having failed to do so she sought a decree of judicial 
separation from the Irish High Court. At the time of the case, the Irish constitution 
did not provide legal aid for the purpose of seeking a judicial separation or for any 
                                                
10 Ordinary litigation in the lower courts and administrative tribunals  
11 Be careful- still under review and only available online in pdf form…  
12 Airey v Ireland (App No 6289/73) (1979-80) 2 EHRR 305 
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other civil legal matter.13 Securing a decree of judicial separation would require Mrs 
Airey to navigate the complex procedures of the Irish High Court and prove the 
grounds for a separation agreement with reference to substantive law and the calling 
and cross examining of witnesses. Whilst the High Court did permit parties to 
conduct their case in person, an investigation by the Commission revealed that, 
without exception, in each of the 255 separation proceedings initiated in the six 
years prior to 1978 a lawyer had represented the petitioner14. Mrs Airey did not have 
the means to employ the services of a lawyer for this purpose. Mrs Airey, in 
application to the European Commission on Human Rights, alleged that these facts 
constituted violations of Article 6 (right to a fair hearing in the determination of 
civil rights) and Article 8 (right to respect for private and family life). The European 
Court of Human Rights, in discussing the merits of the case, made reference to a 
number of factors, including; the complexity of both the procedures of the Irish 
High Court and the substantive legal issues raised by Mrs Airey’s case, the 
requirement for her to prove grounds for the separation which might entail her 
providing expert evidence and calling and cross examining witnesses, her ability to 
navigate these difficulties as mediated by her humble background, the fact that her 
husband would be legally represented and further, that “marital disputes often entail 
an emotional involvement that is scarcely compatible with the degree of objectivity 
required by advocacy in court”.15  
 
The Court held that Mrs Airey’s right under Article 6(1), to access a court for the 
purposes of determining her civil rights and obligations, was violated on the facts of 
the case, as the possibility of appearing before the High Court without 
representation did not provide an effective right of access, for the reason that 
without representation, Mrs Airey would not be able to present her case properly 
and satisfactorily.  
 
As legal academics, including Miles (2011) have observed, successive cases brought 
against the UK in relation to the lack of legal aid for actions relating to defamation 
have proved instructive in elucidating the instances in which Article 6 might require 
that the individual be provided publicly funded legal advice and representation. In 
                                                
13 ibid p5 
14 Ibid per para 11 
15 Ibid, para 24 
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deciding McVicar v UK 16  which concerned a journalist appearing to defend a 
defamation action, the Court noted two of the factors that had contributed to the 
requirement of legal aid in Airey, firstly Mrs Airey’s background and limited 
experience of employment which impacted on her ability to navigate the complex 
procedural rules of the Irish High Court and secondly, the importance of the issues 
at stake in the case, with particular reference to the impact of the outcome on any 
children of the family. The later case of Steel and Morris v UK17 was also instructive 
on this matter, with the Court stating that: “The question of whether the provision 
of legal aid is necessary for a fair hearing must be determined on the basis of the 
particular facts of the case and will depend, inter alia, upon the importance of what 
is at stake for the applicant in the proceedings, the complexity of the relevant law 
and the applicant’s capacity to represent him or herself effectively”.18 In addition, 
the Court in this case made reference to the importance of equality of arms, in 
stating that each side must be “afforded a reasonable opportunity to present his or 
her case under conditions that do not place him or her at a substantial disadvantage 
vis-à-vis an adversary”.19 
 
This focus on the importance of legal representation in helping individuals to 
navigate procedural complexity, ensuring that the courts follow the rules set out in 
both substantive law and legal procedure and in assisting individuals in articulating 
their concerns points to a distinctive role for legal representation in ensuring 
individuals are able to vindicate their rights. Research published by Engler in 2010, 
which sought to review the existing data on the impact of representation in the US 
context, revealed that litigants who are unrepresented are often unable to vindicate 
their claims even when the substantive law supports their position (Engler, 
2010:75). Engler posits that litigants’ inability to articulate their claims was a 
determining factor in their failure to achieve outcomes that accorded with the 
substantive law.  Accordingly, in seeking to clarify the value of legal representation 
for individuals with justiciable civil law problems, it is instructive to look beyond 
arguments which attribute the value of representation merely to superior knowledge 
of the substantive law, and explore the other mechanisms through which it might be 
                                                
16 McVicar v UK (App No 46311/99) (2002) 35 EHRR 22 
17 Steel and Morris v UK (App No 68416/01) (2005) 
18 Ibid, per para [61] 
19 Ibid, per para [62] 
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said that legal representation confers a benefit on individuals who are able to access 
it.   
 
 
4.2.4.1 Legal representation as a source of relational expertise 
“Relational expertise” refers to the possession of an understanding of: “the social 
distribution of knowledge and professional and paraprofessional discretion within 
the specific human relationships through which professional work takes place” 
(Sandefur, 2008: 9, citing Barley, 1996). In the legal context, relational expertise may 
include knowledge of the patience levels of particular judges, which court clerks are 
most understanding, and even the attributes and skills of opposing counsel. 
Relational expertise is context driven, and as such, cannot be taught as part of an 
explicit curriculum of professional training. Many commentators have suggested 
however, that relational expertise can be essential for the successful conduct of legal 
work (Sandefur, 2008:10 citing Barley 1996, Eisensteen and Jacob 1977, Feeley 
1992, Kritzer 1998, Monsma and Lempert 1992, Sullivant et al. 2007; Szmer, 
Johnson and Sarver 2007:281). A legal representative with relational expertise may 
therefore prove to be an invaluable source of assistance to their client, particularly if 
the client has no prior experience of the court system.  
 
This notion, that the value of legal representation is linked with the level of 
relational expertise possessed by the legal representative, may be seen to be related 
to Galanter’s (1979) extremely influential theory which seeks to understand those 
actors who utilise the court system as situated on a spectrum between two ideal 
types, the “repeat player” and the “one-shotter” (Galanter, 1979:98). Galanter 
describes the ideal type repeat player as a unit which: “has had and anticipates repeat 
litigation, which has low stakes in the outcome of any one case, and which has the 
resources to pursue its long term interests” (Galanter, 1979:98). In contrast, a: “one-
shotter” is described as: “a unit whose claims are too large (relative to his size) or 
too small (relative to the cost of remedies) to be managed routinely and rationally” 
(Galanter, 1979:98). Galanter asserts that repeat players are able to access 
considerable advantages in litigation. These include, firstly the advantage of 
foresight: as the repeat player expects to engage in litigation, they set the terms of 
any arrangement with a “one-shotter” e.g. drafting a contract at the outset of an 
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interaction. Secondly, repeat players are able to access specialist advisers and can use 
economies of scale to secure cheaper services from them e.g. large banks often have 
panels of recommended lawyers who act for them at a discounted rate as a result of 
the repeat business they receive from them. Thirdly, repeat players are able to 
develop informal relationships with those within the system e.g. housing association 
staff may be familiar with the court staff and judiciary who they come into contact 
with through initiating repeated applications for possession notices. Fourthly, the 
repeat player may be said to have reputational concerns in relation to their 
bargaining position that the “one-shotter” does not. For example, a housing 
association may be concerned to be seen to maintain consistency in the settlements 
they accept from an individual tenant, for fear of undermining their status as being 
uncompromising in relation pursuing to unpaid rent. Fifthly, the repeat player is 
able to adopt longer- term litigation strategies that enable them to take risks or 
adopt positions that a “one-shotter” would not. According to Galanter, “one-
shotters” will adopt a litigation strategy that seeks to minimise the risk of them 
incurring maximum losses, for example, accepting a smaller settlement in order to 
avoid the risk of having to pay the costs of the other party. Repeat players, who 
have access to both increased resources and who are less personally invested in the 
outcome of the case, can afford to litigate strategically, pressing their case in the 
knowledge that they can bear even the maximum costs in one case, if the judgment 
would results in minimising costs in other similar cases. In addition, unlike the 
“one-shotter”, who is primarily interested in the immediate outcome of their case, 
the repeat player may be more concerned with changing the substantive law in a 
particular area through litigation. This enables them to adopt litigation strategies 
that the “one-shotter” would not countenance or indeed, be less interested in if 
setting new law meant risking the outcome in their particular case. (Galanter, 1979: 
99-101)  
 
If we consider the majority of matters that are litigated within the civil law, it 
becomes clear that many would fit Galanter’s model of the repeat player pitted 
against the “one-shotter”. Medical negligence, welfare benefits claims, employment 
claims, housing claims and community care claims can all be viewed as cases where 
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the repeat player 20  (insurance companies, the government, companies, housing 
associations etc.) is pitted against the one shotter (the injured individual, the 
claimant, the tenant, etc.). As such, it would seem that the value of legal 
representation may be measured according to the extent to which such 
representation can assist in ameliorating the disadvantages experienced by the “one-
shotter”. The experienced legal representative, who is possessed of the relational 
experience described above, combined with experience of opposing repeat players, 
may be able to assist the claimant by furnishing them with knowledge of litigation 
strategies that their legal adversary is likely to adopt or advising them regarding 
which aspects of their case should be pressed most forcefully.  
 
4.2.4.2 Legal representation confers benefits of improved articulation of a particular claim 
Whilst, as has been discussed above, it is the legal adviser who is primarily charged 
with transforming the lived experience of the civil dispute into an account that is 
amenable to processing through the mechanisms of the justice system, it is the legal 
representative who is tasked with advocating on behalf of the claimant. The process 
of training to become a barrister or solicitor with higher rights of audience requires 
the trainee to develop skills in advocacy. In addition, the process of legal 
qualification places emphasis on the ability to articulate matters clearly and using 
particular “legal” forms of language. As such, a qualified legal representative may be 
said to possess advantages that are not accessible to the majority of the public, and 
particularly those who are poor, lacking in formal education, have a low standard of 
written and verbal English or who are cognitively impaired. The disparity noted by 
Engler (2010) between the veracity of the claims of unrepresented litigants in 
relation to the substantive law, and the outcomes achieved in the housing courts, 
has in part been attributed to the inability of the unrepresented litigant to articulate 
their case effectively (Engler, 2010:75). As such, it may be hypothesised that those 
individuals with the types of vulnerabilities identified above, may have the greatest 
need of legal representation.  
 
                                                
20 This is not to say that each repeat-player possesses all of the advantages described to the same degree: smaller businesses 
for example, may not have the resources to hire litigators, or the resilience or interest to litigate strategically. 
 103 
4.3 A model for evaluating need/vulnerability in the context of 
prioritising legal services 
 
Having discussed the manner in which evidence suggests legal advice and 
representation acts to assist individuals in achieving just outcomes, it is now 
possible to summarise what this evidence tells us about who is most vulnerable in 
this context and therefore should be prioritised in terms of receiving legal advice 
and representation. Table 3.1 below summarises the evidence from each section 
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Figure 4-1 : Summarising the evidence: What does existing evidence tell us about 
who is most vulnerable and therefore most in need of legal advice and 
representation?  
Benefit conferred 
by legal advice and 
representation  
 
What does existing evidence tell us about who is most vulnerable and therefore most in need 
of legal advice and representation? 
Section 4.1  
Legal education 
 
Whilst levels of both substantive legal knowledge and knowledge of legal procedure are low across the 
population as a whole, evidence suggests that those who should be prioritised in terms of receiving 
legal education are: 
- Individuals on low incomes or who are otherwise lacking in economic capital 
- Individuals whose informal networks do not include individuals with legal expertise 
- Individuals with low levels of literacy, or whose first language is not English 
- Individuals with low levels of formal education 
- Individuals who have difficulty processing and organising information (for example, as a 
result of mental illness, drug addiction or other cognitive impairment). 
- Individuals who are isolated 
- Individuals who belong to minority groups 
Section 4.2  
Dispute 
transformation  
- Individuals whose disputes are particularly complex 
- Individuals who experience their justiciable event as particularly distressing 
- Special attention should be given to the way in which the process of dispute transformation 
is carried out in relation to individuals who are members of minority groups.  
Section 4.3- 4.3.2 
Empowerment 
- Individuals with previous negative experiences of the civil or criminal legal system 
- Individuals with low levels of social and cultural capital 
- Individuals who exhibit low levels of trust in their relationships with agencies and 
representatives of the state 
- Individuals whose cases involve an obvious disparity of means, power, social capital  
Section 4.4  
Ameliorating 
procedural 
complexity and 
ensuring that courts 
adhere to their own 
rules  
 
- Individuals whose cases are particularly complex 
- Individuals with little previous experience of the civil justice system 
- Individuals who are denied representation as a result of the changes introduced by LASPO. 
Section 4.4.1  
Relational expertise 
As above, individuals whose cases are complex, involve opposing a “repeat player” and who have little 
previous experience of the civil justice system should be prioritised. 
Section 4.4.2  
Improved 
articulation of 
claim 
As above, individuals who are: 
Inexperienced in matters of civil justice, have low levels of educational attainment, who experience 
their justiciable problem as particularly distressing, who have impaired cognitive abilities, or have 
difficulty articulating their claims and forming arguments.  
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It is apparent from Table 4.2 that certain factors, both situational and inherent, 
impact repeatedly on the extent to which individuals require certain aspects of the 
service legal advice and representation provides. Table 4.3 below attempts to 
combine these factors into a model for understanding vulnerability in relation to its 
impact on the ability of individuals to achieve procedurally just outcomes without 
legal advice and representation. 
 
Figure 4-2 Factors which increase individuals vulnerability in the context of 
pressing their civil law claims 
Attributes possessed by the individual  
- Low income or otherwise lacking in economic resources 
- Belonging to a minority group 
- Low levels of literacy, or first language other than English 
- Low levels of formal education and educational attainment 
- Difficulty processing, organising and articulating information (for example, as a result of mental illness, drug 
addiction or other cognitive impairment). 
Psychosocial factors relating to the individual 
- Low levels of social and cultural capital 
- Low levels of trust in their relationships with agencies and representatives of the state 
- Previous negative experiences of the civil or criminal legal system 
- Informal networks do not include individuals with legal expertise 
- Socially isolated 
- Little previous experience of the civil justice system (lacking in relational expertise) 
Other Factors relating to the individual and their justiciable event  
- A justiciable event involving an obvious disparity of means and resources (including social capital and relational 
expertise) 
- A justiciable event which is complex, or engages with complex areas of substantive law 
- A justiciable event that is experienced as particularly distressing by the individual involved 
 
The factors presented in Table 4.3 are not equally weighted, with some factors 
presenting greater barriers to the ability to achieve procedurally just outcomes than 
others. For example, it is possible to envisage a scenario where an individual is so 
distressed (i.e. during a child custody case) that this impairs their ability to engage 
effectively with the civil law to a far greater extent than someone who has both low 
levels of formal education and little previous experience of the civil justice system. 
It is further important to note that each factor may be present to a greater or lesser 
degree of severity in a given case. For example, one individual may have low levels 
of formal education, without that significantly affecting their ability to participate 
effectively in legal proceedings, whilst another individual may find their lack of 
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formal education a significant barrier to engaging with and understanding the civil 
law and related processes. As such, the severity of each factor or attribute is to be 
calculated according to the extent to which the presence of this factor impairs the 
ability of the individual concerned to present their case effectively. Whilst in general 
it may be said that the level of individual vulnerability increases according to the 
number of factors or attributes listed in Table 3 that apply to an individual in a 
particular case, the relationship should be considered as geometric, rather than 
arithmetic, as the presence of multiple factors may compound the individuals 
inability to present their case effectively. As such, the cumulative impact of the 
presence of multiple barriers to the achievement of formally just outcomes results in 
a valuation of individual vulnerability that is greater than the sum of its parts.  
 
4.4 Conclusion 
The above discussion has reviewed the evidence indicating the types of situations in 
which legal services have been found to confer important advantages in the context 
of securing just outcomes, in order to arrive at a model for understanding which 
individuals in groups might be considered in greatest need of legal services. This 
model will be used in conjunction with the values framework presented at Chapter 3 
in evaluating the funding models presented in chapters 5-8.  
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5 CHAPTER 5: RESPONDING TO LASPO- CHARGING FOR 
ADVICE  
 
5.1 Introduction  
 
Charging for advice was one of the earliest strategies proposed to supplement the 
income of Law Centres and other Not-for-Profit providers of legal services in a 
post LASPO landscape.  As early as 2011, Law Centres were considering the 
options available for launching fee charging projects, in an attempt to both develop 
a sustainable source of income and diversify funding models that were reliant on 
income from legal aid contracts. Key funders21 and supporters22 of the not-for-
profit legal sector hosted workshops, convened meetings, and funded pilot projects 
to assist those Law Centres who were keen to adopt this strategy as a means of 
surviving the cuts to legal aid. In theory, charging for legal services seemed like a 
plausible solution to a number of the problems created by the reduction in public 
funding for legal services; it would enable Law Centre’s to retain staff with expertise 
in areas of law no longer financed by the Legal Aid Agency, help them to support 
clients who could no longer access legal aid funded legal advice, and supplement the 
income of Law Centres, providing them with much needed unrestricted funds. 
However, at the time of writing, the early promise of this strategy as a means of 
mitigating the impact of LASPO on Law Centres has yet to be realised. Despite a 
considerable amount of assistance both financial and in terms of business planning 
and consultancy support; a recent review of charging projects conducted by sector 
specialist consultants DG Legal found that only five out of thirteen agencies that 
had attempted to introduce charging had broken even or were on track to break 
even (Gilmore and Howgate, 2014: 37). Whilst supporters of this strategy for 
surviving the cuts argue that it is still too early to draw firm conclusions regarding 
the on-going viability of this approach, the early experiments in charging have 
highlighted a number of salient factors which should be taken into account in 
evaluating the efficacy and/or desirability of this model as a means of generating 
sustainable income for Law Centres in response to LASPO. The chapter begins by 
                                                
21 Such as the Baring Foundation and partners in the Future Advice Fund Programme- see chapter five for further details, 
and BIG Lottery administered Transition Fund 
22 Including London Legal Support Trust, Hogan Lovells Solicitors  
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outlining the history of charging for advice within the Law Centres movement. The 
strategic and operational issues that are raised by the move to charging for advice 
are then discussed; drawing on original empirical data collected as part of a case 
study of a fixed fee-charging pilot for immigration advice developed by Avon and 
Bristol Law Centre. The chapter then identifies the implications of the adoption of 
this strategy for the ideal type Law Centre values framework developed in Chapter 
3. 
5.2 The History of charging for advice 
The first Law Centre to attempt to develop a charging arm was Islington Law 
Centre, who began discussions to develop this initiative in 2011 (Gilmore, 2014: 
2)23, although the debate about the potential for trading from the Law Centre began 
some ten years previously (LCN, 2014a: 1)24.  The Solicitors Regulation Authority 
(SRA) at this time prohibited Law Centres from charging for advice: accordingly 
Islington Law Centre applied both for a waiver to enable them to charge and 
authorization to incorporate as an Alternative Business Structure (ABS), a new legal 
entity established under the Legal Services Act 200725. The SRA stated that it would 
decide on the waiver before considering the ABS application (Gilmore, 2014:2). 
After a protracted period of negotiation (Baksi, 201326) it was decided in December 
2012 that the waiver would be granted, at which point Islington Law Centre 
abandoned its application to become an ABS. Originally the SRA planned to 
consider waivers for individual Law Centres on a case-by-case basis, before issuing a 
blanket waiver that enabled Law Centres to charge across the board.  
 
Once it was established that the regulatory framework would permit Law Centres 
charging for advice, two dominant models for charging developed: charging for 
advice under Law Centres’ existing corporate identity under the SRA Waiver 
(referred to hereafter as “charging in-house”) and setting up a separate legal entity 
to charge for advice. In the case of Islington and Rochdale Law Centres, it was 
decided that the most efficient model for doing this was to establish a separate 
trading arm: Islington settled on a model whereby the trading arm of the Law 
                                                
23 STVS Future Advice Bulletin No. 5  
24 Law Centres Network, (2014) “Report on the Islington Community Law Firm: Setting up a Law Centre Trading Arm- 
Strategies and Challenges” Law Centre Network Guides available online.  
25 An ABS is an entity that must have a non-lawyer owner or manager; and at least one lawyer manager.  
26 http://www.lawgazette.co.uk/analysis/features/law-centres-picking-up-the-pieces/5042728.fullarticle 
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Centre is both a Company Limited by Guarantee and a Community Interest 
Company, whereas Rochdale Law Centre decided to set up as a solicitors firm 
regulated by the SRA (Robins, 2012).  Both Rochdale’s charging arm (Rochdale 
Legal Enterprise) and Islington’s charging arm (Green Roots- ILC’s Community 
Law Centre) are owned by the Law Centres involved, and any profits made are 
reinvested or returned to the Law Centre. In the case of Green Roots, Islington 
Law Centre is the sole shareholder (Gilmore, 2014:2) whereas Rochdale Legal 
Enterprise is owned by the directors of Rochdale Law Centre, with a written 
agreement that all profits are reinvested or passed to the Law Centre (Gilmore, 
2014:3). Both Rochdale Legal Enterprise and Green Roots occupy separate 
premises, and are branded and marketed separately.  Both Rochdale Legal 
Enterprise and Green Roots recruited new solicitors with private sector experience 
to work alongside existing staff employed by the Law Centre. Law Centre staff at 
both Rochdale and Islington Law Centres undertake work for their respective 
charging arms on a consultancy or secondment basis. This staffing arrangement has 
provided flexibility as the new charging models establish their reputations and build 
their client base. In the case of Green Roots (the charging arm of Islington Law 
Centre), it is planned that in future years, staff will work either for Green Roots or 
the Law Centre, not both, in recognition of the different skills that each 
organization requires (LCN, 2014:5). 
 
The regulatory issues that beset Law Centres who wished to charge until 2012 
mitigated against Law Centres setting up charging pilots under their existing 
corporate identities. However, once the waiver was granted, it became clear that 
Law Centres could experiment with charging under their existing branding. This led 
to the development of two distinct models for charging for advice. The main 
differences between the two charging models described are summarized at Table 5.1 
below.  
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Figure 5-1 Key differences between charging models 
 Separate Charging Arm  Charging in-house 
Premises  Generally occupy separate 
premises to the Law Centre  
Occupy the same premises 
as the Law Centre 
Branding  Branded separately to the 
Law Centre  
Branded with Law Centre 
branding.  
Staffing  Employ new staff with 
private sector experience, 
supplemented by support 
from Law Centre staff as 
needed.  
Work generally undertaken 
by existing Law Centre Staff 
in addition to their Law 
Centre caseload.  
Regulation  Regulated by the SRA, the 
Community Interest 
Companies Regulator (if a 
CIC) and OISC (if providing 
immigration advice) 
Regulated by the SRA, The 
Charities Commission and 
OISC (if providing 
immigration advice).  
Marketing  Marketed as a separate 
project with a separate 
budget set aside for this 
purpose.  
Marketed alongside the Law 
Centre’s other services.  
Change to Law 
Centre’s 
constitution 
required?  
No.  Possibly, in order to 
facilitate charging under 
Charity Law.  
 
Having outlined the key features of the two different models Law Centres have 
adopted, the following discussion explores some of the drivers for and challenges to 
Law Centres charging for advice.  The themes and questions identified are drawn 
both from the existing literature on Law Centre charging models and original 
empirical material collected as part of research undertaken at Avon and Bristol Law 
Centre. In order to incorporate a wider perspective, and contextualise the 
experience of Avon and Bristol Law Centre, an interview with a sector expert 
management consultant who has been involved in supporting a number of law 
centres to develop their charging models is also cited. The following section 
provides an overview of the development of the Avon and Bristol model, and 
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explores some of the operational issues that may impact on attempts by Law 
Centres to establish these models.  
5.3 Charging in-house: the experience of Avon and Bristol Law 
Centre  
 
Avon and Bristol Law Centre (“ABLC”) was established in 1984 and is based in 
central Bristol. ABLC was established and run as a collective, (as were many Law 
Centres set up during this period) until 2012. ABLC’s major sources of funding 
prior to the cuts were their Local Authority funding and the contract they held with 
the Legal Services Commission for provision of legal aid funded advice. In a post 
LASPO funding landscape, ABLC’s major source of income is the funding they 
receive from Bristol City Council, which expires in 2016. They have also 
successfully bid for and won funding from various charitable funders and the 
Advice Services Transition Fund. Gloucestershire county council also provides the 
Law Centre with funding for delivering services to individuals from their local 
authority.  
 
In early 2014, ABLC began developing plans for a charging pilot that was scheduled 
to commence in May 2014. Under this pilot, clients would have the option to pay 
for immigration advice and representation which now fell outside of the scope of 
legal aid. Immigration has been identified across the Law Centres Network as an 
area of law in which it is both suitable and feasible to develop fee -charging models. 
Of the other Law Centres who pursued a charging model- Rochdale Legal 
Enterprise Community Interest Company has a specific focus on immigration 
matters that are no longer in scope, as does Green Roots Law, the Community 
Interest Company established by Islington Law Centre. At ABLC it was planned 
that the fee-paying work would be carried out by the existing immigration team of 
Law Centre staff (one full time solicitor, one trainee and one caseworker), who 
would undertake this work alongside their work for non-fee paying clients.  
 
The launch of the pilot was hampered by delays resulting from regulatory 
confusion. In 2012, when the first Law Centres were considering setting up 
charging functions, the regulations set by Solicitors Regulation Authority prohibited 
Law Centres from charging fees for legal services. In July 2012, the Legal Services 
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Board published an opinion stating that this ban should be lifted. At first it was 
communicated by the regulators that Law Centres wishing to charge for their 
services would have to apply individually for a waiver from the Solicitors Regulation 
Authority. However, in April 2013, to coincide with the introduction of cuts to legal 
aid, the Solicitors Regulation Authority published a blanket waiver enabling not for 
profit agencies employing solicitors to charge for providing legal advice.  ABLC 
originally applied for an individual waiver from the SRA, before the blanket waiver 
from the SRA allowing Law Centres to charge for advice was issued. Once this was 
in place, ABLC were able to commence with their charging pilot.   
Operational issues also impacted on the ability to commence the pilot. Chief among 
these were issues around payment systems- investing in a chip and pin machine 
proved too costly, so the potential for taking payments online was investigated. This 
was eventually ruled out on the basis that there was a risk that clients could 
withdraw their money before it was processed. This specific issue highlights a 
problem with a move to charging for advice that might be considered more 
widespread across the network- for Law Centres, whose processes and systems have 
been established to facilitate not for profit working, moving to charging for advice 
from their existing premises and under their existing branding may require 
significant operational changes to be made. These can include setting up new 
methods of payment (as in the case of ABLC), investing in different case 
management software, or updating their information technology infrastructure. The 
experience at ABLC demonstrates the importance of factoring the time and 
resource to dedicate to resolving these issues into the business planning process.  
For example, Law Centre managers reported that difficulties in deciding on the 
most appropriate payment system for charging clients created delays of nearly two 
months:  
 
“It didn't start on (predicted start date) we had a number of really dull practical problems around 
payment systems…  initially we were going to just get a chip and pin machine but that turned out 
to be quite expensive, then we were going to do online payments but then you realise that doing an 
online payment the client could actually withdraw that.. we thought: “well that's a bit of a risk, we 
don't really want to do that” so then we came up with something called isettle which is just an app 
basically, so we bought a tablet that's got an app on it and it's easy and cheap and seems to be 
working but it's just the nature of these things: there are all sorts of little issues that you don't 
think there are going to be…” Interview with ABLC CE 
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Investing in IT and other infrastructure that may be considered necessary to 
support a move to charging is expensive, and, it can be difficult to justify the up-
front expenditure in a climate of straightened budgets and financial uncertainty. 
One sector expert management consultant who has supported a number of Law 
Centres to develop charging arms, when interviewed argued that charging under 
existing branding, rather than setting up a separate charging arm, was, in his view, 
the better model for Law Centres to pursue:  
 
“I think if I was running a Law Centre with the experience that I have now I'd have a slightly 
different view than I had two years ago when I was first thinking about this…I think, based on 
what I have observed, if I was in a Law Centre I wouldn't have it in a separate office under a 
separate name because I think when you're looking at financial risk and cost, the cost of setting up 
a separate arm in potentially a separate building and doing all the branding is potentially very 
expensive, and I think it's a more safe option to potentially start that project under the same 
building at the same brand etc.”  
Interview with DG 
 
The experience of ABLC identified that even when charging under their existing 
branding, investment of resources may be necessary in order to deliver a service that 
would enable the Law Centre to compete with private practice. In interviews with 
staff tasked with undertaking the fee-paying work, the issue of appropriate resource 
allocation to the project was frequently raised.  
Staff involved in running the charging pilot reported feeling that they were under-
resourced, and further that the infrastructure of the Law Centre was insufficient to 
support the development of the charging model. The following extract reflects 
commonly identified issues:  
 
Well obviously the building's not suitable, I don't really like the Law Centre in general, sort of the 
fabric of the building, the equipment, the IT, all of those things, you know in a super duper firm 
would be running 24 hours a day, we don't have that luxury here, [if]the photocopier jams it's 48 
hours out of use, and if you're here at 10pm at night it's not much use. People have done them at 
home, just to get them in you know because the photocopiers and printers don't work.  
Interview with ABLC ITL 
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A further resourcing issue highlighted in the experience of Avon and Bristol Law 
Centre, concerned the need to ensure that staff were given the support to manage 
their fee generating work alongside their existing, grant-funded caseloads.  
 
In common with all other Law Centres who had chosen to develop charging 
models, including those that decided to set up a separate charging arm to deliver 
services, ABLC decided to price their services at below market rate. The following 
excerpt from an interview with ABLC management, explores the rationale behind 
this approach:  
 
“We've had quite a lot of debates about whether it fits with our charitable objectives [00:20:03], 
how we're perceived by the outside world, so you know we're putting together some sort of statement 
for our newsletter and things "this is what we're doing and why" and it's actually about the fact 
that LASPO has made us unable to help these clients but we feel we still want to and we've out in 
a reasonable fee scheme which is less than you would get from a private solicitor to enable us to do 
the work so it's going to be, just trying to manage [expectations] because we're a Law Centre people 
think that they can come here and  get advice for free how do we manage that? There are also quite 
a few discussions around who will we allow to pay us, will we allow a millionaire to pay us? How 
will we know? Do we do a means assessment, all those sorts of things, so we're just going to do a 
six month pilot and see what sort of clients we get coming here and what sort of issues that flags up 
because we don't want to be seen to be giving cheap legal advice to people that can actually afford to 
pay it and stopping people that really need it accessing it.”  
Interview with ABLC CM 
 
In light of this, it was decided that the fee paying work undertaken by the Law 
Centre would be restricted to immigration and human rights applications- no 
asylum or appeal work would be undertaken at the pilot stage due to the complexity 
involved in the latter types of cases. Clients would be charged on a fixed-fee basis 
rather than on an hourly rate. Within the plans for the pilot, private work would be 
capped at a maximum of twenty five per cent of the total caseload, and all profits 
would be ploughed back into the Law Centre, enabling the Centre to retain its 
charitable status. Fees were set at below market rate (within the Bristol area), to 
ensure that they were affordable for less advantaged people. In terms of defining a 
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target market for these services, the Law Centre decided to aim their services at less 
advantaged clients who would not be able to afford to access legal services offered 
by other private immigration firms in the Bristol area. In this manner, it was hoped 
that the charging pilot would enable the Law Centre to meet some of the unmet 
demand for legal services created both by the withdrawal of legal aid for 
immigration matters, and the withdrawal of key providers of immigration advice 
from the sector, most notably the Immigration Advisory Service. However, by the 
end of the pilot in May 2015 only seven cases had been completed for fee paying 
clients and by 2016 the decision had been taken to end the existing charging pilot in 
favour of developing a social enterprise company in collaboration with other Law 
Centres and not-for-profit providers.   
 
In developing the model described above, ABLC aimed to unite two objectives: i.) 
generating profit, and therefore creating a sustainable source of unrestricted funds 
for the Law Centre and ii.) meet unmet need through targeting the services at 
migrants on low incomes, creating a for-profit service delivered in the spirit of Law 
Centre values. However, is there an inherent conflict between these two aims? Can 
it be resolved and if so, which motive will dominate? These tensions are arguably 
magnified if a charging pilot intends to charge for advice under the Law Centre’s 
existing branding. The following section evaluates the charging model developed by 
ABLC against the Law Centre values framework developed in Chapter 3.  
 
5.4 Charging for advice and Law Centre Values  
In evaluating charging for advice as a model in the context of Law Centre Values, 
two key questions arise. The first is, is it possible to design a charging for advice 
model focussing on immigration law that is congruent with Law Centre values? The 
second question is, can such a model, if devised, generate sufficient profits to 
ameliorate the impact of LASPO and create unrestricted funding that can be used to 
advance Law Centre values in other areas of law? The following discussion 
considers these issues in greater depth.  
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5.4.1 Charging for Advice and Terminal Value 1: Law Centres improve the 
position of economically disadvantaged individuals and groups 
 
In the values framework described above at Chapter 3, it is argued that the first of 
the values that render Law Centres distinctive concerns the way in which they use 
the law, namely, to bring about social change in favour of economically 
disadvantaged groups. The literature on Law Centres indicates that they aim to do 
this in three key ways: i.) by extending the availability of legal services to as wide a 
range of people as possible, with particular reference to those individuals who 
experience barriers to accessing the law; ii.) by taking on complex and strategic 
casework that has the potential to reform the law in favour of the marginalised and 
iii.) through identifying and uniting groups of individuals with common interests 
and working with them to bring about social change. The following section 
considers how far the charging model developed by ABLC has the potential to 
deliver this value.  
 
5.4.1.1 Charging for advice and instrumental value 1.1 Law Centres deliver legal services to 
those who are economically disadvantaged with particular reference to those who are in 
greatest need (see Value 2 below) helping them to secure their rights under the existing 
law and working to extend and reform the law where their existing rights are 
inadequate.  
 
There is strong evidence to support the contention that the interests of individuals 
with irregular immigration status are marginalised within the UK: successive 
commentators have observed that the United Kingdom is perceived as having: 
“particularly hostile attitudes towards immigration compared to other countries” 
(Somerville and Katwala, 2016:1). While recent research based on opinion polling 
(Somerville and Katwala, 2016) has indicated that the position of the majority of the 
public may be more nuanced, particularly in respect of skilled migrants, politicians 
have responded to this perception of the views of the British public by introducing 
increasingly punitive legislation, with the express aim of reducing net migration to 
the UK. This situation is likely to be exacerbated by the decision to leave the 
European Union, taken in June 2016.  
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Charging for advice and representation in respect of immigration law, particularly in 
certain types of complex cases where changes to legislation have marginalized the 
interests of migrants by removing the right to appeal against removal, forcing 
individuals who believe they have a valid basis for remaining in the UK to seek 
judicial review, may be seen to be mission congruent. Mission congruence is 
achieved in these circumstances by virtue of the degree of the status of the client as 
marginalised and the mechanism of the law that is engaged - judicial review - may be 
characterized as: “the rule of law in action’ (Moffat and Thomas, 2014:237) and as 
such pursuing cases through this mechanism offers the opportunity to use the law 
to bring about change through exposing the decision making of the government, 
mandating reform of administrative processes and providing opportunities for 
campaigning and policy work. One of the seven cases undertaken and won by staff 
at ABLC as part of the pilot was a Judicial Review, (Interview with ABLC ITL ) 
demonstrating the potential for cases of this kind to be undertaken within the 
context of a fee-paying environment.  
 
There is consistent evidence that the withdrawal of legal aid for immigration law 
matters has restricted the availability of legal services, particularly for those on low 
incomes. The private sector is unlikely to develop solutions to meet this need, due 
to the low levels of profit involved.  The experience of ABLC provides a case in 
point: expanding demand for services correlated with a downturn in supply. Whilst 
the overwhelming majority of Bristol residents (at 2011 census) were born in the 
UK (some 85.3%), the number of new arrivals to the UK resident in Bristol 
increased rapidly from 4,021 individuals who arrived 1981-1990 to 8,885 individuals 
who arrived between 1991-2000. Post 2000, the number of newly arrived individuals 
in Bristol continued to increase, with 12,207 individuals who arrived between 2007-
2009 reported resident in Bristol at the last census27. This expansion in new arrivals 
was combined with a reduction in the number of advice services available. The 
closure of first Refugee Migrant Justice (in 2010) and then the Immigration 
Advisory Service (Bowcott: 2011) 28  restricted the availability of advice for 
immigration related matters.  
                                                
27 2011 Census: Year of arrival in UK comparing Bristol with England and Wales, Source: Table QS801EW 2011 Census 
Office for National Statistics, Crown Copyright 2012.  
28 Bowcott, O, [11 July 2011] “Tens of thousands lose support as Immigration Advisory Service closes” published in The 
Guardian available at http://www.theguardian.com/law/2011/jul/11/immigration-advisory-service-closes-blames-
government (Accessed on 29 June 2015).   
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The Avon and Bristol Advice Centre Network (“ACFA”) published a report in 
2012 which stated that ABLC were only able to take on 20% of the potential clients 
who contacted the Centre through their drop in service, due to high volumes of 
demand (ACFA 2012). The pressure created by the high demand for immigration 
advice services at ABLC was emphasized by all those staff that were interviewed:  
 
“the demand for free immigration advice since legal aid cuts has been massive, so we're very 
oversubscribed, every single week we're turning away half the people at least, so we can't see them.”  
Interview with ABLC IA  
 
“We've turned a lot of immigration clients away [00:37:32] the only place for them to go is to 
private solicitors so they have to pay if they can afford to otherwise they get turned away to go 
nowhere.”  
Interview with ABLC CM 
 
This trend, has been reflected in the experience of not-for-profit providers of legal 
services across the country. A report by the National Audit Office stated that: “70 
per cent of not-for-profit providers could meet half or less of the demand for legal 
assistance from people not eligible for legal aid”. (Justice Select Committee, 
2015:32). A charging for advice model that targets services at low income migrants 
in return for an affordable fee could assist in ensuring that migrants on low incomes 
are able to access expert advice and representation.  
 
5.4.1.2  Charging for advice and instrumental value 1.2 Law Centres undertake strategic 
litigation with the potential to reform the law in favour of the disadvantaged 
There is some evidence that charging for advice in respect of immigration can create 
capacity to undertake strategic casework. The highly politicised nature of 
immigration policy means that immigration law changes rapidly (Thomas, 2015:676) 
creating uncertainty and complexity, a position that is likely to be exacerbated by the 
decision to leave the European Union. Immigration law has been described as 
operating in the context of: “chronic administrative difficulties within the Home 
Office and often intense and politically driven short-term pressures” (Thomas, 
2015:652). As such, it is perhaps unsurprising that immigration law has been 
 119 
described as the: “largest area of mass use of judicial review, regularly accounting 
for over 80 per cent of all claims lodged” (Thomas, 2015:652). A study published in 
2015 stated that 35% of the Judicial Review cases that reached final hearing between 
July 2010 and February 2012 concerned Immigration and Asylum matters, with 
Immigration only cases accounting for 16% of the cases reaching final hearing 
during that period (Bondy, Platt and Sunkin, 2015:12). The same research reports 
that 38% of the immigration only cases that reached final hearing were allowed 
(Bondy, Platt and Sunkin, 2015: 15).   
 
Certain types of immigration law matters with the potential for law reform affect 
individuals who may have the ability to pay something towards the cost of advice 
and representation. For example, recent changes to legislation have marginalized the 
interests of migrants by removing the right to appeal against removal, forcing 
individuals who believe they have a valid basis for remaining in the UK to seek 
judicial review. The Immigration Act 2014 introduced new removal powers, 
repealing and replacing section 10 of the 1999 Act. The new removal powers: 
“completely abolished the historic distinction between over stayers and illegal 
entrants and removed the need for separate removal directions to enforce removal” 
(Yeo, 2014:6). The elimination of the requirement to issue removal directions means 
that any person “who requires leave to enter or remain in the UK but does not have 
it” ((The Immigration Act 2014, s10 (1)) can be removed without advance warning 
and without the right to appeal under the authority of the secretary of state or an 
immigration officer.  
 
A bizarre quirk of this legislation is that the Act withdraws the right to appeal 
against removal from lawful migrants who contend that they do satisfy the terms of 
the immigration rules. Overstayers and illegal entrants will have a right of appeal, as 
they will be relying on human rights applications and grounds. This change 
represents an expansion in the discretionary power of the Home Office and 
immigration officials and reduces the opportunities for their decision making to be 
scrutinized- as such it can be argued that the introduction of the Immigration Act 
2014 constitutes a direct attack on the interests of migrants through intentionally 
creating a: “hostile environment for immigrants” (Thomas, 2015:674) as well as a 
threat to the rule of law. In respect of the now withdrawn appeal rights, empirical 
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data analysed by Thomas (2015:675) demonstrated that, in spite of their 
considerable advantages in terms of resources and repeat-player status, over the 
period 2007-2014 the government lost 34% of appeals based on entry clearance 
grounds, 42% of appeals based on family visitor grounds and 47% of appeals based 
on managed migration grounds. This would seem to indicate serious flaws in the 
application of the law by government, and the removal of the appeal process 
threatens the transparency of decision-making in this area of law.  
 
The only remaining course of action for an individual who believes that they are 
likely to be removed under this power, either because they are detained awaiting 
removal or have happened to receive notice, is to apply for: “judicial review and a 
declaration that he or she does in fact possess leave or to secure an injunction while 
making out some other basis for remaining in the UK, such as on human rights or 
international protection grounds” (Yeo, 2014:7). As such, it has been argued that: 
“much of the appeal caseload may simply re-emerge as judicial reviews… increasing 
resort to judicial review” (Thomas, 2015: 677). Moffat and Thomas (2014) argue 
that the cumulative effect of changes to legal aid for immigration advice and 
representation under LASPO, reforms to payment for judicial review under Civil 
Legal Aid (Remuneration) (Amendment) (No.3) Regulations 2014 (SI 2014/607) 
and the introduction of the Criminal Justice and Courts Bill 2014 will: “create a 
chilling effect, discouraging representatives from taking all but the most certain 
cases, this in turn will generate an increase in litigants in person and/or migrants will 
be placed at a higher risk of exploitation as they seek to secure private funding for 
legal representation, and the overall effect will be to insulate bad decision-making 
within the Home Office” (Moffat and Thomas, 2014:250).  These circumstances, 
combined with the findings of empirical research which indicate that the majority of 
appellants under the now withdrawn rights of appeal were business people, students 
and family members (Thomas, 2015:675) may serve as justification for charging for 
advice in this area of law. If the assumption holds that those individuals who 
previously appealed under the now withdrawn rights are similar in characteristics 
and means to those who will now wish to challenge removal through judicial review, 
this group may be able pay something towards the cost of immigration advice and 
representation. As such, charging for the provision of high quality advice and 
representation at affordable rates in respect of judicial review cases, may be seen as 
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a practical solution enabling Law Centres to both advance their mission and 
purpose and target their services at groups whose interests are undermined by the 
existing legal framework, exposing the failings of the extant legal framework. Such 
an approach however, would require the cherry-picking of cases, and would require 
investment in staff to create sufficient capacity to service this need at scale.  
 
5.4.1.3  Charging for advice and instrumental value 1.3 Law Centres identify and unite groups 
of individuals around the experience of particular justiciable issues and use these groups 
as vehicles for engaging in law reform activities 
 
Charging for advice may provide the flexibility to bring together groups around a 
common interest or need that other sources of income cannot. Under a charging 
model, Law Centres can, in theory, set their own criteria for the clients they choose 
to represent, including setting criteria to enable them to build specialisms in 
particular types of cases. Most sources of income outside of Legal Aid currently 
utilized by Law Centres (funding from Local Authorities, or from charitable 
funders) are restricted, in the sense that they are tied to the performance of 
particular services, the provision of services to clients on the basis of geography, or 
both. This can restrict Law Centres from allocating their resources on the basis of 
greatest need, or building a body of casework dealing with clients with similar issues 
as they are restricted in the types of clients they can offer assistance to. This excerpt 
from an interview conducted at ABLC elucidates this point:   
 
 “Well we're limited by our funding, so we've got core funding from Bristol, our legal aid contracts 
are procurement area based so some of them are South West [00:36:14] whereas the upper tier 
tribunal is for South West and Wales. It's unlikely they'll actually travel here, they'd either use an 
agent or they'd do it by telephone or email, and if people ring up and say "I'm in Plymouth can you 
help me" we say "no" because we haven't got any funding for it… North Somerset, who we're not 
funded for we have people from BANES (Bath and North-East Somerset) who we're not funded 
for…so sometimes they do actually turn up and say “we're from Catesham” which is BANES 
and we say: “we can't help you.” I mean for things like Community Care we have enquiries from 
Swindon and Oxford occasionally because [00:37:05] there isn't that many providers there with a 
legal aid contract”  
Interview with ABLC CM 
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Those Law Centres based in geographical areas where there is a paucity of other 
services feel the frustration of these restrictions more acutely, as they are forced to 
turn away needy clients or carry out work pro-bono. For ABLC, who operate in the 
South West of England, an area with very few remaining providers of legal advice 
and representation in immigration law, this issue has become particularly stark. 
Developing a charging model has the potential to create the flexibility to allow the 
Law Centre to undertake remunerated work for clients that they are currently 
unable to help. Whether the model of individualised advice and representation 
developed through the charging pilot creates the internal capacity (and willingness 
amongst clients) to build communities of interest around particular issues, with the 
view to undertaking law reform activities remains to be seen.  
 
5.4.2 Charging for advice and Terminal Value 2: Law Centres deliver their 
services to those in greatest need 
 
In Chapter 3, it is argued that in targeting their services at specific individuals or 
groups, Law Centres are guided by a twofold definition of need: individuals or 
groups are needy to the extent that either: i) the extant legal framework does not 
serve their interests or extend to their protection (need type 1) or, ii.) the extant 
legal framework does in theory extend to their interests and/or protection but they 
are ill-equipped or vulnerable in the context of being able to successfully access 
their rights under the law as it stands (need type 2). Chapter 4 proposes a refined 
definition of vulnerability, in recognition of the fact that whilst Law Centres and 
indeed the legal aid scheme historically relied on poverty as a proxy for vulnerability, 
the class of individuals for whom legal advice and representation is unaffordable is 
now so wide that a principled focus is required in order to ensure that Law Centres 
deliver on this value. In the context of individuals on low incomes who have 
migrated to this country, it can be argued both that i) the law does not adequately 
serve their interests and extend to their protection and ii.) where the legal 
framework does in theory offer migrants rights and protection these are increasingly 
difficult to access.   
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5.4.2.1 Charging for advice and meeting need type 1: those whose interests are not served by the 
extant legal framework 
 
As discussed above at 5.4.1.1, it is relatively uncontroversial to state that UK law 
does not adequately serve or protect the interests of migrants, particularly those on 
low incomes, who, whilst on low incomes, may be able to contribute something 
towards the cost of advice and representation. In substantive areas of immigration 
law, Sirreyeh (2016) argues that new immigration rules, such as the 2012 Family 
Migration Rules and the Immigration Act 2014 represent an: “explicit focus on class 
and income” (Sirriyeh 2016:6) to the detriment of lower income, lower skilled 
migrants. As such, there is a principled, need- based argument for providing 
affordable immigration advice for individuals falling into this category.  
 
Research conducted by The Migration Observatory at the University of Oxford has 
highlighted the rapid increase both in the volume of immigration offences defined 
in law and their enforcement. A report by Alvierti (2013) identified that: “since 1999 
British immigration law has added 84 new types of immigration offences, compared 
with only 70 that were introduced between 1905 and 1998” (Alvierti, 2013:2).  
Where prosecutions do occur and individuals are found guilty the majority are for 
three crimes: assisting unlawful immigration to a member state, seeking leave to 
enter or remain or postponement of revocation by deception and being unable to 
produce an immigration document at a leave or asylum interview (Alvierti, 2013:6). 
The increase in criminal prosecutions for immigration offences has been far 
exceeded by the number of administrative actions pursued against migrants in the 
form of enforced removals and refusals of entry at ports- Alvierti (2013:7) reports 
that in 2011, 30,763 people were subject to these actions. The proliferation of law in 
this area, combined with its inherent instability- a function of the political forces in 
play in this arena (Thomas, 2015:676) renders entitlements under immigration law 
difficult to discern, the following excerpt from an interview with an immigration 
caseworker at ABLC highlights these issues.  
 
You've got the rules you've got the legislation you've got the policy you've got the guidance and the 
you've got all the case law on top which is constantly changing and effects, I don't know I think it 
changes more and subtler changes than a lot of other areas of law, it's just constantly evolving, and 
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if you just followed the rules you might think you're not going to qualify for something but if you 
look at the interpretation in case law you might, and you have to make the argument persuasively 
because the Home Office caseworkers aren't trained in the law, they are trained to follow the 
guidance and if you want to make an argument that is slightly outside the guidance or the rules but 
follows case law you're going to have to lay that out very quickly or you haven't got any hope at all. 
You have to teach them all the time "This is how you should be doing this, this is how it fits 
in" and this is how they correspond to each other. So yeah, on your own you're pretty stuck.” 
Interview with ABLC IA 
As discussed above, it has been observed that frequent rule changes are brought 
about with the express aim of changing: “the rules of the game” (Thomas, 
2015:676) in favour of the government, to facilitate reductions in levels of net 
migration. Historic data on immigration litigation indicates significant levels of 
success on the part of appellants, indicating deficiencies in the application of 
existing law (Thomas, 2015:676). Providing low cost, expert immigration advice and 
representation may increase the likelihood of the law being applied in a manner that 
better serves the interests of migrants.  
 
5.4.2.2 Charging for advice and meeting need type 2: those who do have rights under the existing 
framework but are vulnerable in the context of being able to secure them.  
 
The withdrawal of legal aid for immigration law brought about by LASPO 
exacerbated the vulnerability of migrants in terms of their ability to secure just 
outcomes in respect of their justiciable problems- both directly, by removing legal 
advice and representation for the poorest individuals through the introduction of 
LASPO, and indirectly, by removing a proxy for quality that helped migrants to 
identify sources of quality advice and representation. Low income migrants with 
immigration problems may already be considered amongst the most vulnerable 
according to the vulnerability framework advanced at Chapter 4. The complexity 
and mutability of immigration law means that low income migrants are at risk of 
having low levels of legal knowledge, their status as low-income means they are at 
greater risk of having low levels of social capital, they are more likely than others to 
have English as a second language and there is an obvious disparity of means and 
resources between individuals with immigration law problems and their opponent in 
these matters, the Home Office. As such, there is a principled need-based rationale 
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for targeting affordable immigration advice and representation at this group. Even 
within the context of the broader category of low-income migrants, there are certain 
groups that research indicates may be considered more vulnerable than others: 
children and young people, individuals with learning difficulties or other cognitive 
impairments, and individuals with prior negative experience of attempting to resolve 
their immigration law problems.  
 
5.4.2.2.1 Children and young people  
The government’s own Equality Impact Assessment, conducted prior to the 
introduction of LASPO, indicated that children and young people were likely to be 
disproportionately affected by adverse consequences as a result of the removal of 
legal aid funding for immigration advice. Successive research reports 29  have 
identified the absolute number of individuals living with unresolved immigration 
status in the UK as particularly problematic, with the effects being experienced as 
particularly pernicious by the children of migrants with irregular status. Young 
people often only become aware that they do not possess regularized status when 
they come to apply to University or for employment opportunities (see the work of 
Just for Kids Law in developing the campaign “Young, gifted and blocked”). 
Interviewees at ABLC reported seeing increasing numbers of this type of case, as 
the following interview describes:  
 
“We've got Nigerian clients who were also sponsored over, Zimbabwean clients, who our 
government went over and paid for them to come here, but their children don't have status, so a lot 
of those children then will find out later on, when the go to college, University – [that they] 
can't. [00:04:28] Even things like getting jobs, they can't do it, it's really sad.  
 
And where do they go for help, to sort that out?  
 
Some come here, and some we can take on, but we have limited resources, so it's usually the most 
desperate.”  
                                                
29 e.g. Sigona, N. & Hughes, V. [2012] “ No way out, No way in: Irregular migrant children and families in the UK” 
Published by the ESRC Centre on Migration, Policy and Society, University of Oxford; Dorling, K. [2013] “Growing up in a 
Hostile Environment: The rights of undocumented migrant children in the UK” Report by Coram Children’s Legal Centre 
available at (http://www.childrenslegalcentre.com/userfiles/Hostile_Environment_Full_Report_Final.pdf Accessed 29 June 
2015) and most recently Bawdon, F. [2014]“ Chasing Status: The ‘Surprised Brits’ who find they are living with irregular 
immigration status” Published by Legal Action Group.  
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Interview with ABLC ITL 
  
Whilst it is impossible to accurately quantify the number of individuals living in the 
UK with irregular immigration status, the most recent figures available estimate the 
irregular resident population across the UK at the end of 2007 at 618,000 people, 
with a range of 417,000- 863,000 (Gordon. I et al., 2009: 6). Irregular immigration 
impacts detrimentally on individuals in leaving them unable to access benefits, 
housing and healthcare. A study by COMPAS, an immigration focussed think tank 
based at the University of Oxford, estimated that there are up to 120,000 children in 
the UK with unresolved status, representing 0.9% of the UK’s total population of 
under-eighteens (Sigona, 2012: 22). Leading children’s rights charity Coram 
Children’s Legal Centre, giving evidence before the Justice Select Committee in 
2015, stated that children who have been trafficked or otherwise separated from 
their families were particularly negatively impacted by the changes to the Legal Aid 
scheme. For these young people, a representative from Coram stated: “representing 
themselves is often not possible due to [their] young age, language barriers and significant 
vulnerabilities, and the extreme complexity of immigration law and the Immigration Rules.” 
(Justice Select Committee, 2015: 23) The committee further noted that Coram 
Children’s Legal Centre: “experienced significant frustration in this area because, while the 
Centre could identify the legal issues in a case, the child involved was then unable to act on that 
advice.” (Justice Select Committee, 2015:23). Early evidence from the charging pilot 
indicated that the local authority was willing to pay ABLC to resolve immigration 
issues for young people under their care- indicating that this might be a market for 
affordable legal services.  
 
5.4.2.2.2 Individuals with learning disability  
The government’s Equality and Impact Assessment also cited migrants with 
learning disabilities or those experiencing mental health issues as particularly 
vulnerable in the context of the cuts to legal aid. The Exceptional Cases Funding 
scheme was set up by the government to act as a safety net, in order to enable 
vulnerable individuals to access legal aid in exceptional circumstances where 
individuals’ human rights were at risk. Evidence indicated that this scheme was not 
operating as effectively as it should be, with far fewer individuals than predicted 
accessing legal advice and representation through this scheme. A case brought by 
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Public Law Project in 2014, Gudanaviciene and ors v Director of Legal Aid Casework and 
the Lord Chancellor [2014] Civ 1622 (Admin) established that the guidance being 
followed by decision makers was unlawfully restrictive. In the case of “IS”, the 
Official Solicitor sought exceptional funding to access specialist immigration advice 
for a male Nigerian client (IS) who suffered from both physical and learning 
disabilities.  IS was unaware of the nature of his own immigration status, and 
without being able to access support to regularize it he was unable to access 
community care support from his local authority. His disabilities were so severe that 
without community care support he was cognitively incapable of looking after 
himself, and had been surviving through a combination of begging and small hand-
outs given to him by a relative. The Legal Aid Agency only agreed to provide 
funding for IS to be represented once they had been defeated in the High Court. 
The later systemic challenge (I.S. (by his litigation friend the Official Solicitor) v Director of 
Legal Aid Casework and the Lord Chancellor [2015] EWHC 1965 (Admin)) established 
that the Exceptional Case Funding scheme was operating unlawfully as it gave rise 
to an unacceptable risk that an individual would not obtain funding where a failure 
to do so would breach their rights under the European Convention on Human 
Rights or under EU law.  However, in May 2016, the Court of Appeal overturned 
the decision in IS  (The Director of Legal Aid Casework, The Lord Chancellor v IS (a 
protected party, by his litigation friend the Official Solicitor [2016] EWCA Civ 464; W.L.R 
4733 (CA (Civ Div)) finding that the criteria adopted by the Exceptional Cases 
Funding Scheme were lawful. In the period July-September 2016, 479 applications 
for Exception Cases Funding were received, the highest single quarter since the 
scheme began (MoJ, 2016:32). Of these, 255 were made in relation to immigration, 
making immigration the most requested category of law. 147 of the 255 applications 
received were granted by the Legal Aid Agency (MoJ, 2016:35). Despite the increase 
in applications, numbers are still well below those predicted pre LASPO.  
 
5.4.2.2.3 Individuals with prior negative experience of attempting to resolve their 
immigration law problems 
Failed claims and incorrectly submitted applications remain on an individual’s 
immigration history and have the potential to prejudice future claims for status. As 
such, individuals who have previously attempted to handle their case alone 
unsuccessfully may be considered especially vulnerable in the context of being able 
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to secure their legal entitlements. The following excerpt from an interview with a 
Law Centre worker highlights this issue:  
  
“People often come in after they've messed something up, so an application's been refused or an 
appeal. We've had a lot of people that have gone to appeal on their own and because they were 
unrepresented failed to do something that has had serious consequences. We had someone recently, it 
was a family visit visa, they failed at any point in the application or the appeal to mention Article 
8 and therefore couldn't appeal upwards even though they would have had a chance at the upper 
tribunal but their reconsideration request was refused because they'd never raised Article 8, of 
course, they didn't know to because they were unrepresented.  
Interview with ABLC IA  
 
The impact of failed claims on the prospects of individuals who, if properly advised, 
may have had a stronger case was reiterated in the following interview with a 
different immigration adviser working at ABLC: 
 
“…There are so many types of compassionate cases that just people don't fit within these 
rules…people's lives don't fit into these rules, and if they don't they're out…I've had the most 
educated type of people who, who can find it very difficult to fill out forms…so just preparing a 
whole application, the types of evidence you need and the quality of evidence that you need, that 
advice from a solicitor they just don't get…We just had a lady, who has come in today and she's 
tried to make so many applications on her own, been refused several times, with the very little 
money that she has pretty much gone, she's got a disabled child, another child: we're trying to help 
her, it's a domestic violence case but she was trying to get leave some other way as well she doesn't fit 
in the rules which would mean that she would get Legal Aid funding, but the children are the ones 
who are having to, to hack this, they're acting like adults already. 
Interview with ABLC ITS 
 
The client in the above example would originally have been able to afford to pay for 
immigration advice, but chose to go it alone to save money. By the time she reached 
the Law Centre she had spent the money she had on the fees entailed in submitting 
multiple failed claims. As such, the ability to provide quality immigration advice that 
is affordable to low income migrants before they submit claims may be considered 
imperative. Reaching vulnerable migrants earlier is also critical, as without lawful 
immigration status migrants are not entitled to work, claim housing or other 
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benefits, leaving them reliant on support from friends and voluntary organisations, 
or forced to work illegally, placing them at greater risk of exploitation and creating a 
negative spiral in vulnerability. Prior to LASPO’s introduction, organisations with 
experience of working with migrants warned that cuts to Legal Aid could result in 
vulnerable people being exploited as they attempted to secure funds to pay for 
advice, this excerpt from a publication by the Immigration Law Practitioners 
Association typifies the concerns expressed: [i]t is highly likely that the effect of legal aid 
cuts will not be wholly or immediately visible. It is not uncommon for migrants, their families or 
friends, to now seek to pay for immigration advice and representation in circumstances where legal 
aid ought to be available. The risk is that this continues or increases with the withdrawal of legal 
aid; and others may be lured or forced into dangerous or exploitative situations in seeking to secure 
money to pay for advice. 30  Evidence provided to the Justice Select Committee 
established to examine the impact of changes to legal aid introduced by LASPO 
confirms that the concerns voiced prior to the cuts have materialized. Organisations 
have reported individuals putting themselves at great personal risk in order to access 
advice in relation to their immigration status. The organization Bail for Immigration 
Detainees reported that: “a lawyer who BID regularly refers cases to has informed BID that 
she has represented destitute women who are working in prostitution in order to pay legal fees.” 
(Justice Select Committee: 2015, 22). 
 
As stated above, the complexity of immigration law means that migrants are more 
likely to have low levels of correct legal knowledge, and placing them in a poor 
position to evaluate whether advice they receive is of high quality. The criteria for 
applying for a Legal Aid contract prior to LASPO mandated that firms and not for 
profits demonstrate the quality of their work- resulting in a quality mark. The 
possession or absence of this quality mark could help vulnerable migrants identify 
whether the advice they were receiving was from a reputable provider. In the 
absence of Legal Aid funded providers of immigration advice, vulnerable migrants 
are at risk of exploitation by unscrupulous advisers. An interview with an expert 
consultant tasked with evaluating alternative models for the provision of legal 
advice in the wake of LASPO argued that the risk of exploitation of vulnerable 
migrants by low quality or unqualified advisers presented a compelling moral case 
for the establishment of charging models:  
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“If you're providing immigration services in let's say Rochdale or Manchester you will almost 
certainly have lots and lots and of cowboys providing that very low quality advice at a very high 
price, so it helps the community first and foremost. Secondly, if done properly it aids the viability of 
the Law Centre and backs up the previous argument of having a Law Centre is better than having 
no Law Centre and three it's, it reflects the times that we live in, i.e. that we've elected a 
government that doesn't want to spend money on public services and there are going to be further 
cuts, and therefore if you want to survive you have to adapt and change like people do in the private 
sector.”  
 Interview with DG 
 
 
Throughout the fieldwork undertaken, staff at ABLC reiterated concerns about the 
cumulative impact of the withdrawal of legal aid for immigration advice and the 
closure of organisations expert in providing immigration advice on the quality of 
services being provided to vulnerable, undocumented individuals. The following 
interview excerpt demonstrates this issue:  
 
Sometimes with fresh claims, if, depending on what the client's been told about the fresh claim, you 
know some clients don't have fresh claims but they need to do something, they've been told by the 
voluntary sector agencies that the only way you're going to get housing you know some shelter and 
some money is if you put in a fresh claim… And they come with no evidence and expect you to 
produce a fresh claim. And we can't do it. But some firms will do it because you can claim it under 
legal aid and a claim, a “nonsense claim” as we call them goes in, and then obviously it's refused, 
and the client's back in the situation but with a damaged immigration history because they've put 
in a failed fresh claim. So that's not the Home Office's fault, that's the vulnerability of the client, 
that's probably society's fault really for not looking after people properly that's led them to be 
homeless and so desperate that they'll say anything just to get a... I've had a, one of my clients, you 
were saying about bad representation, his claim was based on a religious issue, he was told "but 
political issues work in your country not religious issues" so he put in a political claim and 
obviously it was refused. And then he came to me to say "that's not my issue, it's religious, not 
political…I helped him, you know, explained to him what sort of evidence he would need to show 
that it's religious, rather than "here's my baptism certificate" it's not enough you know you need 
this lever arch folder full of evidence and then we can submit it. He was very, very surprised because 
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his previous rep had told him: "no, no what you should do is put in a political issue, say you want 
political asylum, that's how you get asylum for Iran". Obviously, not. But in the meantime it's 
[what’s] now on his record, is a failed application.  
        Interview with ABLC 
IA 
 
All of the above points to a compelling need-based case for establishing a model 
facilitating the provision of high quality, affordable, immigration advice. Migrants 
on low incomes, with low levels of skills and English language proficiency and 
complex cases are unlikely to be served by the private sector, due to the marginal 
profits working for this group would entail. Successive commentators have argued 
that the cumulative impact of changes to the law in respect of immigration, legal aid 
and judicial review will result in “cherry picking” (Moffat and Thomas, 2014:251) of 
the easiest cases, at the expense of the poorest and most vulnerable migrants. 
Providing a mechanism whereby this group can access expert, low-cost legal advice 
therefore, seems intuitively congruent with the aim of Law Centres to target legal 
services at underserved groups. However, as stated above, there is a pressing 
question as to whether this focus would enable Law Centres to run a charging arm 
that is successful in terms of generating a profit for the Law Centre.  It should be 
remembered that the original purpose of adopting this strategy was to generate 
income for the Law Centre, and in doing so contribute to ameliorating the impact 
of LASPO and create unrestricted funds to support the other activities of the Law 
Centre. In commenting on a strategy of targeting services at those on very low 
incomes in the context of a charging pilot, the sector expert consultant who was 
interviewed stated:  
“…If your aim, was to develop a sustainable source of income, unrestricted funds which they could use for 
other areas…if that's your aim, why would you go for, given that you have the expertise, why would you go 
for a market that can only ever afford to pay marginal fees where you're still going to have to do a lot of 
work because for a lot of them, particularly for immigration,  there's a lot of vulnerability in the client group, 
why not go towards mid income level?...To restrict services to that degree, is not going to work… this just 
comes back to fundamental problem, that people are…guided by their political views or their cultural 
views…and that just doesn't work with business.”  
Interview with DG 
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One danger with attempting to combine the aim of meeting the unmet demand 
created by legal aid with generating income for the Law Centre, may be that Law 
Centres who opt to charge for advice end up working on cases where the profit 
margins per case are low. As such, they may need to take on large caseloads in order 
to generate the level of income necessary to break even, let alone make a profit that 
can be invested back into the Law Centre to support the provision of services that 
are free at the point of delivery. This danger is arguably particularly pronounced 
where Law Centres are attempting to charge under their existing corporate identity, 
and the fee paying work is being carried out by Law Centre staff who are attempting 
to balance this aspect of their role with their duties to non-fee paying clients. In this 
environment, it is easy for the fee paying work to be “squeezed out” by time 
pressures, or for staff to feel conflicted about how best to prioritise competing 
aspects of their work, as this interview excerpt demonstrates:  
“The demand is there, I've got previous clients, from [previous employer], who need extra help now, 
asking if I'll help them, help their friends, from Birmingham, even from Jamaica, or Leeds, but I 
just have to say I can't, I'm really sorry guys but I can't, on a daily basis we're getting enquiries 
through the internet accessible scheme asking can we help all these people and can we give advice, we 
can't cover that, there's not enough resources in our team to be able to respond to all of those. We 
can give generic advice as in, see a local solicitor, please make an appointment, yes we may be able 
to assist you privately but we can't respond by email to every single enquiry. We get in about 30 per 
week, 40 per week, even people saying, “I can pay you, please can you help?” At the moment we 
can't take them on so my caseload should be about sixty for the law centre and I'm on about one 
hundred and thirty.”  
Interview with ABLC ITL 
Given the small scale of the pilot, and low number of cases undertaken by ABLC staff, it is 
too early to conclude definitively whether there is an inherent and insoluble conflict 
between using charging for advice to generate funding at scale and designing a charging arm 
in such a manner that it supports, rather than detracts from the Law Centre value of 
designing services around vulnerability. However, the decision to discontinue the pilot in 
favour of setting up a separate social enterprise as of 2016 may provide a partial clue as to 
the conclusion reached by ABLC.  
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5.4.3 Charging for advice and Terminal Value 3: Law Centres are staffed by 
specialist, expert legal professionals  
One impact of LASPO repeatedly referenced during the fieldwork for this thesis 
was the likely implications of the cuts to legal aid for the retention of legally expert 
staff in the sector. In the specific case of immigration law, many in the sector 
expressed concerns prior to the introduction of LAPSO that the removal of legal 
aid for immigration law would lead to a reduction in the availability of specialist 
advice in the related area of asylum law, where legal aid remains available.  
 
There is considerable interaction between asylum and immigration law. One impact 
of the cuts to legal aid for immigration has been to render the retention of asylum 
law services commercially unviable for many firms who previously specialised in this 
area of law. Legal Aid contracts for the provision of asylum law advice and 
representation are small and difficult to run in a profitable manner. Firms have 
reported that asylum contracts are insufficient to support the retention of staff with 
expertise in this area of law now that funding for immigration advice and 
representation is no longer available. Many of those with expertise in asylum law 
were those individuals who had expertise in immigration law, and as such the loss of 
these individuals from the sector has created a dearth of individuals with expertise 
in immigration advice.  This issue was discussed in the Justice Select Committee. In 
giving evidence to the Committee, the Civil Justice Council stated that: “ we 
understand some of those with contracts are not using these to the full, as the 
contract is hard to run, and time spent interviewing potential clients who turn out 
not to be in scope is not funded.” (Justice Select Committee, 2015:31). In addition, 
the Immigration Law Practitioners Association stated that it had become 
increasingly difficult to find solicitors willing to take on legal aid funded cases that 
require specialist asylum and immigration advice (Justice Select Committee, 2015: 
31).  The net effect of the removal of legal aid for immigration issues combined 
with the nature of the contracts provided for asylum advice is likely to result in 
firms moving away from the provision of services in these areas of law, resulting in 
the loss of many years of expertise from the sector. 
 
5.4.3.1 Charging for advice and the ability to recruit, develop and retain staff with specialist 
expertise in the areas of law most relevant to their clients   
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In the context of the position outlined above, the prospect of developing a charging 
arm for immigration advice and representation proved intuitively attractive from the 
point of view of enabling Law Centres to recruit, develop and retain staff with 
expertise in both immigration and asylum law. In following this model, Law Centres 
were following a model prevalent in private practice. The following excerpt from an 
interview with a senior immigration solicitor at ABLC highlights this point:  
 
Speaking about my previous colleagues who I used to work with in my previous firm, a lot of them 
work for [private practice firm] who are the biggest Legal Aid law firm, but they also do a hell of a 
lot of private work, and that basically subsidises their legal aid work, so even if you get the clients 
in through legal aid and your reputation is good then the private clients will come to you, if you win 
cases” 
Interview with ABLC ITL 
 
In addition, enabling lawyers to continue to work on immigration cases was felt to 
be critical to supporting Law Centre staff to retain their expertise in immigration 
law. Relational expertise was highlighted as particularly important in this area of law. 
As discussed in Chapter 4 above, relational expertise relates to knowing the how to 
navigate legal systems and processes, and is intimately linked to repeat player status. 
In the context of rapidly changing policies and systems, it is vital that immigration 
lawyers continue to work on cases, in order that this expertise is not lost. The 
following interview excerpts illustrate this point:  
 
“Immigration Law changes all the time, and now it's become so complex: looking at the rules, the 
guidance, the types of evidence that you need, and the websites changed as well which doesn't really 
help… when clients come and ask you very, very complex matters you're dealing with the factual 
complexity of their history and on top of that you're dealing with changes in the rules all the time, 
and what's challenging is you're looking at a cross-section of so many areas: EA Law, we're 
looking at the Immigration Rules, Asylum, the family sides of the rules. It's huge and each area is 
huge in itself. Just keeping on top of it all and being able to provide the quality advice that you 
want to at a drop in is, is tremendous” 
Interview with ABLC ITS  
 
“(Expertise is) Completely vital, you can't do it without it, you just can't… particularly in the 
drop in because people can come in with any question, and it's a constant case of looking things up 
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and finding the correct information, and that's when you actually know what you're doing- if you 
don't know what you're looking for you don't know what you're missing [00:11:19]… Although 
everything in theory is publically available, it's almost impossible to find things, I mean really really 
difficult and people don't necessarily know what’s there, so they might find the application form but 
they don't even think to look for guidance on that form, or you know they follow the immigration 
rules to bring in a spouse but they don't look at the financial evidential rules in the appendix, so if 
you don't really know what you’re doing, and when it comes to things like European Law you 
think it's really quite straightforward but there are quite a few odd exceptions that are in there that 
people don't know about” 
 Interview with ABLC IA 
 
A further perceived advantage of developing an income stream through charging 
for advice, was the potential it offered to provide a sustainable and predictable 
source of income over the medium to long term. This income, it was argued, could 
be used to plan and offer longer-term security to staff, helping to retain expertise. 
Law Centres, in common with many not for profit agencies who rely on a 
combination of public and grant funding to provide their services, often have 
difficulties in offering longer-term security to their employees. The following quote 
illustrates this point:  
 
“One of our problems is that it's impossible to plan, and all voluntary sector organisations will say 
that, so this is one thing that we can do to hopefully have a long term source of income of some 
description.”  
Interview with ABLC CE 
 
Without being able to plan for the future, it is difficult to retain expertise, provide 
training for staff to further their skills, and recruit new lawyers into the sector and 
offer career progression to senior lawyers. This excerpt from an interview with a 
Law Centre solicitor highlights this issue:  
 
“The problem is, the wages don't go up, so you're kind of stuck, and in private practice there's lots 
of development opportunities, or you can move on, whereas here there is nothing, and that is an 
issue, trying to keep staff in the Law Centre, because the pay’s not good.” 
Interview with ABLC ITL 
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Additionally, the way in which legal education is currently structured means that 
without the ability to retain expert staff within organisations, the prospects for 
training the expert lawyers of the future are limited, as experienced lawyers are 
needed to trainee lawyers to enable them to complete their training contract. As 
such, the retention of expert staff is intimately connected with the ability to develop 
and train new staff. The prospect of a sustainable income, generated through 
charging for advice is therefore doubly attracting, in that it offers Law Centres the 
opportunity to access unrestricted income to invest in training and recruitment of 
new solicitors, and maintain sufficient experienced staff to provide that training.   
 
5.4.3.1.1 Charging for advice- a threat to staff recruitment and retention?  
Charging for advice arguably necessitates a shift in working culture, with emphasis 
placed on meeting targets, and generating profits, as in private practice. This raises a 
question as to whether changing the working culture might change the way Law 
Centre workers understand their role, affecting their job satisfaction and 
undermining the attractiveness of the Law Centre as an employer. How would the 
culture of working for a fee charging Law Centre, differ from private practice?  
When asked about their reasons for choosing to pursue a career at the Law Centre, 
the following responses from staff at ABLC typify those provided: 
 
I spent 10 years in private practice and got a bit disillusioned with that, and wanted to work in the 
voluntary sector particularly around the delivery of social justice which I didn't really feel private 
practice was doing anymore and that led me quite naturally to a job at the Law Centre. 
Interview with ABLC CE 
 
“I need just to be able to have clients again, rather than just worrying about money all the time… 
the fact that we get funded by Bristol City Council… means we can take on cases that would not 
be commercially viable at all. So for example here we can take on clients who are exceptionally 
vulnerable, who will need extra support, in addition to just providing instruction, a witness 
statement might take 4-5, 6 hours, they'd need to come back for several days, in a law firm those 
are the type of clients that would be sent on, someone else can deal with them, because you just don't 
have the time, so that’s a good thing.”  
Interview with ABLC ITL  
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Various studies have been conducted into the motivations, ethics and commitments 
of public sector professionals (LeGrand, 2003; Hugman, 2005) and Law Centre 
workers in particular (Mayo, 2014). This research typically identifies the incursion of 
private sector based strategies for improving productivity (such as establishing a 
system of targets) as alienating and undermining to the motivations of those who 
work in the public service professions (Mayo, 2014:113). In Mayo’s 2014 study, Law 
Centre workers are reported as being motivated to join Law Centres as a result of 
disillusionment with practising law in the private sector (Mayo, 2014: 119). 
According to trait theories, professions are characterised and distinguished from 
other forms of occupation by: “the monopolisation of particular forms of expertise, 
the erection of social boundaries around themselves through entrance qualifications 
and extended training, and an ideology of public service and altruism- that is, they 
claim to serve higher goals than mere economic self interest” (Abbott et al, 1998: 3).  
In Mayo’s study, it was found that Law Centre workers were particularly motivated 
by the latter of these traits, with one interviewee commenting that he would feel 
“ashamed” to enter private practice, as working in a Law Centre, with its particular 
public service ethos, had become part of his “self-image” (Mayo, 2014:115).  As 
such, there is a risk that the move to charge for advice, and the attendant processes 
which may be required to facilitate the success of this move (such as working to 
targets, limiting time spent per client in order to deliver a profitable service) may 
alienate existing staff, and diminish their enjoyment of and commitment to their 
role. Furthermore, might the knowledge that Law Centres require their employees 
to charge a subset of clients for advice reduce their appeal as a prospective 
employer? It is an area of concern that should be monitored when and if more Law 
Centres move to charging for their services.   
 
A further threat to staff retention and morale is also posed by the prospect of 
moving to a system where some staff are fee-earning whilst others are not. In this 
context, a further issue that bears consideration when developing a charging model 
relates to the impact of any redistribution or new investment of resources on inter-
departmental dynamics within the Law Centre. If only one department is to be 
involved in charging for services, and they require additional resources in order to 
set up and deliver the model, it is essential that all departments in the Law Centre 
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agree with both the principle of charging and any re-alignment of resources that is 
necessary in order to ensure that the charging model is appropriately supported. The 
following excerpt from an interview with a senior management consultant and 
sector expert involved in supporting Law Centres to develop charging models 
expands on this theme:  
 
If it was private practice what they would do, and Law Centres don't usually do this but private 
practice do [00:10:01] you'd do a cost allocation exercise in order for you to have a separate 
internal profit and loss account for each department …you would expect them to understand and 
expect that some categories of law are more viable than others and that they're there for the general 
good of the community so I would probably, if I were in the management team there, want to discuss 
that at a team meeting or an away type scenario because you can't have two different teams or 
attitudes you've got to be one cohesive unit and you've got to decide as a team what it is that you're 
there to do.   
Interview with DG 
 
In the absence of consensus amongst all stakeholders within the Law Centre, 
tensions may arise between those departments involved in generating income for 
the Law Centre and those departments whose work is funded through other income 
streams, particularly if it appears that scarce resources are being diverted towards 
the fee-charging department in the initial phase. Careful management of the 
transition to fee charging is therefore essential in order to avoid un-necessary 
conflict between departments that may prove damaging to staff morale. In the case 
of ABLC, there was some early evidence of conflict between the immigration law 
team and other departments, as the immigration team felt that they were “carrying” 
non-fee earning departments.  
Given these challenges, Law Centres who wish to charge for advice may prefer to 
set up a separate entity and hire new staff to deliver services to fee paying clients. In 
this manner, a charging arm could operate like a charity shop, where profits from 
the sale of goods unrelated to the charity’s primary purpose are used to generate 
income to support the charity’s aims.  
The drawback to this model, where new staff are brought in to undertake fee paying 
work, is that this strategy potentially limits the ability of the charging model to meet 
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a further aim, that of retaining expertise in areas of law no longer funded by legal 
aid within the Law Centre. Whilst advice and representation in asylum matters is still 
funded by legal aid, immigration is not, in spite of the fact that many individuals 
with asylum claims may also have related issues that fall under the purview of 
immigration law, and a knowledge of the law across both areas may be seen to be 
critical to delivering a high quality of service in asylum matters. If new staff are 
hired to undertake fee paying immigration work, and clients with immigration issues 
are referred from Law Centre staff to the fee charging arm, could this result in the 
de-skilling of Law Centre staff? In deciding whether to use existing staff to carry out 
the fee paying services this concern should be balanced with the potential for using 
existing staff to do both to resulting in staff feeling conflicted and overstretched. 
Instituting staff secondments between the charging arm and the law centre may 
provide a means of mitigating the threat of de-skilling but at the time of writing 
there has been no evaluation of the impact of such arrangements, if and where they 
exist.    
5.4.4 Charging for advice and Terminal Value 4: Law Centres are empathic 
allies of their clients  
One of the biggest concerns raised by the prospect of charging for advice has been 
the perceived conflict between this strategy and the distinctive manner in which law 
centres aspire to work with their clients. A recent research study conduced by Mayo 
et al. (2014) surveyed Law Centre staff, management committee members and 
trustees to try to elucidate the precise qualities that epitomise the distinctive ethos of 
law centre working. Many of those interviewed highlighted the way in which their 
personal politics influenced their decision to work for a Law Centre, with 
interviewees citing a personal commitment to socialism, equality, anti-racism and 
social justice, amongst other motivating beliefs (Mayo, 2014:41). Similarly 
emphasized, was an understanding of the decision to undertake a career within a law 
centre as a “vocation” (Mayo 2014:41). Law Centres were characterized as working 
with clients who were “vulnerable” (Mayo, 2014:43), had overlapping needs, were 
unable to secure help elsewhere (Mayo 2014:41) and whose claims were often for 
amounts that private firms would consider trivial. The manner in which Law Centre 
workers spoke about their approach to clients, emphasized patience, dealing with 
the client in a holistic manner, and providing a quality service that was expressly 
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client focused (Mayo, 2014:43). The history of ABLC is deeply rooted in this 
tradition of working with clients in a holistic and emphatically partisan manner.  
 
Avon and Bristol Law Centre was founded in 1984, when the Bristol Resource 
Centre changed its name to Avon and Bristol Community Law Centre. It was run as 
a collective, with full parity pay and a flat management structure, up until 2012. The 
chairperson’s introduction to the first ever annual report prepared by Avon and 
Bristol Community Law Centre, emphasized the distinctive features of the Law 
Centre. Notably, it is stated in this document that: “there has always been strong 
resistance within the Centre to using the majority of staff time for individual case 
work” (Edwards, 1984:2). The Law Centres values, as expressed in this document, 
are expressly political, with “fighting racism and sexism” (Edwards, 1984:2) 
identified as priorities for the Centres work. There is a strong emphasis on 
community development and campaigning work: “…the Centre recognizes the 
importance of such work, recognizes the gaps in provision for such groupings of 
people. A Law Centre is not a community solicitors office, it should be a resource 
for the community…The narrow attitudes of the legal profession, its inaccessibility 
to those most in need, has no place in a Law Centre.” (Edwards, 1984:2). In 
interviews with the managers at ABLC, it was emphasized that the recent transition 
away from a collective model of working, and associated restructuring of the 
organisation had been challenging, with one staff member stating that:  
 
“ There was parity pay, so everybody in the organisation was paid the same amount of money 
regardless of what they did from the Director to the Cleaner. All decision making was joint, 
collective decision making so I guess it chugged a little bit along like an old steam train and nothing 
much happened and I guess the other thing that happened was that there wasn't a lot of ownership 
or responsibility for things so getting things to happen was difficult. So this is where we are now, it 
isn't without it's problem's because we still have a number of people who were part of the collective 
who have had to move to a new way of thinking…There are quite a lot of new people [00:03:16] 
too because as a result of the restructure there were a number of redundancies so about half of the 
staff have been here less than eighteen months so it's been quite an interesting couple of years really 
for the Law Centre”  [00:03:29]  
 
Interview with ABLC CM 
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Interviews with management repeatedly highlighted the difficulties involved in 
encouraging Law Centre staff at ABLC to balance the desire to provide the best 
service possible for clients with the need to ensure that the Centre generated 
sufficient income from its legal aid and local authority contracts. It was repeatedly 
emphasised that when staff are particularly client focused, and attempting to work 
with clients who have complex needs in a holistic manner, it can be easy for the 
time spent on cases to exceed the amount that the Law Centre is paid for them, as 
the excerpt below demonstrates:   
 
“We certainly do spend quite a lot of time and certainly more than most private firms because we 
aren't trying to make a profit, but if we look at our time recording on almost any legal aid case 
we've always spent more time than we're paid for. Always, and sometimes it's double at least. So 
there's a lot of challenge just with trying to keep up with everything [00:03:06]”  
Interview with ABLC IA 
 
Management at the Law Centre attributed this difficulty in part to the working 
culture amongst Law Centre staff, and the legacy of an ethos that has historically 
subordinated financial considerations and instead, privileged providing client 
centred services: 
 
I'm not sure people generally have a, what’s the word I'm looking for, people are really interested in 
just getting on with the work for the client, and they don't have a business type head on, when you 
say to them "Could this be a certificate?" they'll often say " Well I suppose so, but can I be 
bothered, because I can just do the work [anyway]"  Because we haven't got that profit motive, so 
in the past we've just been able to do [that], but I think we have now started to recognise that it's 
all about cash flow and getting…if we can be paid higher rates for things why are we just carrying 
on doing them for a fixed fee when we could actually get other funding for it  so it's just about being 
a bit more savvy about that. But I just think that it's cultural, that people haven't, because we offer 
things for free the whole idea of trying to bring in more money is sort of a little bit of a conflict for 
people.”  
Interview with ABLC CM 
 
As with the Unified Contract for legal aid work, generating income through 
charging for advice using a fixed fee model requires Law Centre staff to adopt new 
ways of working with clients,. Under a fixed fee scheme, with fees set at levels 
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designed to be accessible to people on lower incomes, profit can only be generated 
through handling a large volume of cases, or selecting cases where the complexity of 
the individual’s circumstances is low. For Law Centre workers who are used to and 
enjoy working with the most vulnerable clients, in a client-centred manner, this 
transition in approach may prove challenging. The specific context of ABLC, with 
its recent history of collective management, cultural commitment to working 
holistically with extremely marginalized and vulnerable clients combined with a lack 
of commercial focus reported as evident in the working practices of some staff 
members, might seem to create circumstances that would particularly mitigate 
against the success of a fee charging pilot. However, the debates raised by the 
proposition of Law Centres venturing into charging for advice are reflected across 
the network of Law Centres. This excerpt from an interview with a consultant who 
has been advising Law Centres on developing sustainable funding models post 
LASPO, highlights the most commonly expressed concerns amongst Law Centre 
staff: 
 
“Yes of course, to give you a couple of examples, some staff in Law Centres have said look, this is 
not what we joined for, we joined to give vulnerable people free advice [00:01:57] at the time that 
they need that advice, we didn't come here to privately charge vulnerable clients, so that's one 
cultural objection. I do remember once a couple of years ago when LCN got a lot of Law Centres 
together and I think we were at, probably Allen and Overy, and it was a time when someone was 
retiring from Hackney Law Centre, and he was saying "over my dead body, this is just shocking 
and shameful and helping the government to bring in its cuts agenda", you know if we go down the 
charging avenue” 
Interview with DG  
 
The importance of staffing any charging model with commercially oriented staff is 
something that the management of ABLC were clearly cognisant of. The 
management felt that the private sector background of the staff they had in place to 
run the charging pilot mitigated in favour of the model’s success, as the following 
excerpt demonstrates:  
 
I think that's just about getting the right sort of people to do it and the person that we've got doing 
it here is from a private practice background so the idea that you've got to make some money this 
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year is not a wild and crazy idea for her …they have a budget, they have targets and this is one of 
them, so that's not really a problem for us to be honest [00:06:24]  
Interview with ABLC CE 
 
As such, Law Centres wishing to pursue charging for advice as a mechanism for 
generating unrestricted funds using their existing staff may have to think carefully 
about whether developing this income stream requires them to fundamentally alter 
the way in which they have traditionally sought to work with clients, and whether 
this is a sacrifice worth making.  
 
5.4.5 Charging for advice and Terminal Value 5:  The communities in 
which Law Centres are based and the clients they work with have 
higher levels of legal knowledge and are better able to secure their 
rights 
Historically, Law Centres have evinced a commitment to their role in delivering 
legal education as part of providing preventative, community based services. 
However, reliance on Legal Aid, particularly in the period from 2007 onwards, had 
depleted the reserves and unrestricted funds of many Law Centres. The 
introduction of fixed fees (see Chapter 1), and the move to the Unified Contract 
ushered in a new method of payment that had a detrimental affect on Law Centres’ 
cash flow and reserves, and consequently their capacity to undertake legal education 
activities. As stated above at Chapter 2, a study of Law Centres in 2014 reported 
that Law Centres had largely subordinated their legal education function. Mayo 
observed that many Law Centres have: “shifted away from this because of the 
pressures of the funding system for legal aid, even if they still espoused this wider 
role in principle” (Mayo et al 2014:49). A report produced by the Ministry of Justice 
in 200931 highlighted the impact of the introduction of fixed fees on the ability of 
not for profit legal aid providers to carry out community based activities, such as 
identifying and publicizing local issues, providing second tier support to other 
agencies, and carrying out preventative and educational work (MoJ, 2009: 64), 
stating:  
 
                                                
31  Ministry of Justice, [2009] “Study of Legal Advice at Local Level” accessed at:  
http://www.justice.gov.uk/publications/docs/legal-advice-local-level.pdf on 15 June 2015  
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“The purpose of the fee (and of legal aid) is to help people who are unable to pay privately to deal 
with legal problems when they arise. On this basis, all the above activities are rightly and properly 
outwith its scope. Nevertheless, they form an important part of the activities of many of the NfP 
organisations providing legal advice services, and may provide direct benefits in terms of reducing 
both social exclusion more generally, and the incidence of legal problems.” (MoJ, 2009: 64) 
 
Mayo, in her 2014 study stated that legal education was mainly facilitated by 
separate project funding from charitable sources where it was still being carried out. 
As such, an issue implicated in the move to charging for advice is the impact that 
doing so may have on existing sources of funding, specifically income from 
charitable trusts, local authority grants and fundraising from the general public. 
Many charitable funders have a policy of only awarding grants to organisations with 
charitable status. Whilst Law Centres who charge for advice under their existing 
branding are able to retain their charitable status, there is a concern that if the 
perception spreads that Law Centres charge individuals for the advice they receive, 
this may affect funder willingness to consider them for grants.  At ABLC, senior 
management were fully cognizant of this concern, and anxious to monitor the 
impact on the organisation’s reputation as the pilot continued:  
 
I think we still have some concerns, I mean, one of the my biggest concerns is that it will damage 
our reputation as a charity if people see that we're charging for services and that's something that we 
really need to keep a close eye on 
 
Interview with ABLC CE 
 
An additional concern expressed was the potential for the charging pilot to add to 
the confusion about explaining what a law centre is and what it does. As has been 
discussed in earlier chapters, public recognition of Law Centres, the services they 
provide and their place in the landscape of advice providers is relatively low, 
compared with other jurisdictions, such as Canada and Australia (Smith, 1997: 896). 
Lack of understanding of the work carried out by Law Centres and the way in 
which their aims may align with other organisations working in the area of poverty 
alleviation by charitable trusts continues to pose a problem for Law Centres who 
wish to draw on these funds.  
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“I think we need to be really clear about what it is that a Law Centre is for and what it does, and 
I think, there's much, as you say it's complicated to talk about what we do anyway because we do a 
lot of different things and its all a bit messy and difficult so if you start complicating it more by 
saying: "well you know, we do some free stuff but we charge for other stuff" I think it just confuses 
the message even further, in what is already quite a confusing message, so I feel quite strongly 
that   the way we are doing things now, to test the water”  
Interview with ABLC CE 
 
As such, unless charging for advice is able to generate profit at a level to fill both 
the gap left by the withdrawal of legal aid, and create unrestricted funding for legal 
education, Law Centres who wish to pursue this strategy should consider the impact 
of this strategy on other sources of funding, and devote both time and resource to 
managing messaging and relationships with funders.  
 
5.5 Conclusion  
Charging for advice in an area of law where legal aid is no longer available seems 
intuitively appealing as a strategy for responding to the cuts introduced by LASPO- 
it enables Law Centres to retain expertise in an area of law for which they no longer 
receive public funding and provide affordable legal advice and representation to an 
indisputably vulnerable client group. However, designing and delivering a charging 
model that is congruent with Law Centre values may not generate profit at scale for 
the Law Centre. Whilst ABLC is distinct from other charging pilots where Law 
Centres have decided to set up separate legal entities to conduct their fee charging 
work, many of the lessons from this case study are likely to be applicable to other 
Law Centres, particularly where they have focussed on delivering services at below 
market rates to clients whose legal issues are no longer funded through the legal aid 
scheme. If charging for advice is to succeed as an income generation strategy 
providing funding at a level necessary to meet the funding shortfall created by 
LASPO, Law Centres may have to follow the market in the way in which they 
design their model- “cherry-picking” the less time intensive cases, delivering 
casework at scale and setting fee levels that enable them to make a profit. Designing 
services around profit, rather than need, appears to conflict with a number of ideal 
type Law Centre values, particularly Terminal Value 2: the ability to deliver services 
to those in greatest need and Terminal Value 4, the ability of Law Centres to 
 146 
position themselves as empathic allies of their clients. The introduction of charging 
may also affect the culture within a particular Law Centre and therefore undermine 
the ability to retain staff (Terminal Value 3).  There is a risk that in charging for 
advice, Law Centres may undermine the mission and values that render them 
distinctive, although much depends on the way in which this strategy is deployed.  
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6 CHAPTER 6: MERGING TO SURVIVE: THE EXPERIENCE OF 
KIRKLEES LAW CENTRE  
6.1 Introduction  
In the debates prior to the introduction of LASPO in 2011, merging with other 
advice providers emerged as the government’s recommended solution for those 
not-for-profit advice agencies likely to be impacted by the cuts. Government 
ministers argued that the cuts to funding introduced by LASPO provided an 
opportunity to improve efficiency and reduce duplication of services (see HC Deb 
(2011) 521 col. 142). The then Justice Secretary, Kenneth Clarke stated that:  “We 
are working with the sector… to ensure that the Governments reforms help to 
improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the advice services available to the 
public” (HC Deb (2011) 530 col. 994). The Conservative- Lib Dem coalition 
government’s championing of this approach was in keeping with the policies of 
previous administrations who from the mid-2000s onwards had implemented 
policies with the aim of reducing spending on Legal Aid by incentivizing efficiency 
and compelling providers to collaborate (see Chapter 2 above). The continued 
emphasis on this approach by the coalition government belied the evidence that 
these policies and their implementation had served to weaken the not for profit 
advice sector and threaten its ongoing sustainability.  
 
For those Law Centres considering merging as an option in the wake of the cuts, 
Citizens Advice Bureaux would seem to be an obvious choice as a partner.  This 
chapter presents a case study of a merger between a Law Centre and a CAB, and 
seeks to elucidate lessons from this merger for other Law Centres considering this 
strategy. From the earliest days of the Law Centres movement, closer working 
relationships between Law Centres and CABs were contemplated.  The proposals 
contained within “Justice For All”, which may be considered the founding 
document of the Law Centre movement (Committee of the Society of Labour 
Lawyers, 1967) references collaborations between Law Centres and Citizens Advice 
Bureau as potentially promising. The authors of Justice for All argued that Law 
Centres should provide second tier support to Citizens Advice Bureau (CABs) and 
their workers, accept referrals from them and further suggested co-location so that 
CABs might function as a: “screening system, [ensuring] that the time of lawyers is 
not taken up with non-legal problems that could be handled more appropriately by 
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others” (Committee of the Society of Labour Lawyers. 1968:45). Law Centres and 
Citizens Advice Bureau fulfil functions that, whilst distinct, may be considered 
complimentary and in recent years, arguably overlapping. Citizens Advice Bureau 
have a much stronger brand identity and higher media profile than Law Centres (a 
function of the history and mission of the CAB movement), and their treatment in 
the debates around LASPO by government officials was largely complimentary, 
with the then Justice Secretary Kenneth Clarke stating that: “I agree with the hon. Lady 
about the value of good CABs… the best are very good. I am anxious for us to do what we can to 
strengthen CABs, as are my colleagues in other Departments: we are considering what we can do to 
help them across Government.” (see HC Deb (2011) 521 col. 176). This positive 
treatment may be considered a function of the less contentious nature of CABs 
work, in contrast with the reputation garnered by Law Centres (Goriely, 1996:234). 
Indeed, the annual report and accounts published by Citizens Advice32 for the year 
2014/2015 demonstrated that the national charity receives up to sixty per cent of its 
income from government sources (Citizens Advice, 2015:51). As such, the 
prospects of accessing public funding (from both central and local government) 
might seem to be materially improved by Law Centres choosing to merge with 
CAB’s.  
 
In spite of the incentives to merge listed above, merging to survive has proved an 
unpopular strategy across the not for profit advice sector as a whole: a 2015 survey 
of not-for-profit advice agencies commissioned by the Ministry of Justice found 
that only 5% of respondents had opted to merge or amalgamate with another 
agency in response to the cuts. Within the Law Centres Network, only three Law 
Centres have taken the decision to merge, and of these three, only one has pursued 
this strategy of its own volition. The following chapter begins by describing the 
national picture for merging to survive as a response to LASPO, before moving to 
consider the factors that mitigate in favour of a successful merger between not for 
profit agencies. In doing so, the discussion draws on empirical data gathered at 
Kirklees Law Centre: the only Law Centre who proactively initiated a merger with a 
Citizens Advice Bureau in order to survive the cuts.  The chapter explores the 
distinctive history of Kirklees Law Centre and its position within the local advice 
                                                
32 Citizens Advice is a national charity with 307 local Citizens Advice members which are all individual charities 
in their own right. Together they make up the Citizens Advice service. 
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sector in order to contextualise this decision, and elucidate those factors that were 
predictive of the mergers success. The chapter then moves to explore the 
implications of the merger for the Law Centre’s distinctive values, arguing that 
whilst the merger has been successful in terms of allowing the Law Centre to retain 
specialist expertise across a number of areas of law (Value 3) and that the careful 
and intelligent way in which the merger was conducted has broadly enabled staff to 
continue to work with clients in a manner that expresses empathy and solidarity 
(Value 4), there are early indications that the merger may alter the way in which the 
Law Centre works to bring about social change (Value 1), impact on the type of 
need the Law Centre is able to address (Value 2) and have a neutral effect on the 
Law Centres capacity to undertake public legal education activities (Value 5).  
6.2 Merging to survive: The national picture 
In the parliamentary debates leading up to the introduction of the Legal Aid, 
Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012, emphasis was placed on 
merging as a potential survival strategy for not-for-profit providers of legal advice 
and representation in the UK. The government’s contention was that there was 
duplication in the system that could be remedied by partnership working strategies. 
The then Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State at the Ministry of Justice, Jonathan 
Djanogly, speaking in parliament in 2011 stated:  
 
“The core funding for legal help, for instance, typically comes not from the Ministry of Justice, but 
from the local authority. We have to make up for a decade of people overlooking the need to co-
ordinate funding, by seeing what the funding streams are and ensuring that they work in the way 
that they should. That will involve ensuring that there is no duplication. There is currently a lot of 
duplication in the system.” (HC Deb (2011) 521 col. 142)  
 
In order to incentivise partnership working and support the not-for-profit advice 
sector to adapt to the changes introduced by LASPO, the Big Lottery Fund UK, in 
partnership with the Cabinet Office announced that £67million would be made 
available to frontline advice services under the Advice Services Transition Fund. In 
announcing the first projects awarded funding through the programme, Nick Hurd, 
the then Minister for Civil Society stated: “At a time of big change, it is important 
that people can continue to access high quality local advice. The partnership fund is 
designed to help local providers come together and deliver a better coordinated and 
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more sustainable service.”33  A review of the Not-For Profit advice sector produced 
by Cabinet Office set out the principles guiding the way in which this fund would 
be distributed. This document repeatedly emphasised the importance of local 
partnership working to meet local needs (Cabinet Office, 2012:16). This focus was 
designed to address government concern that the community-based nature of 
advice services had resulted in fragmented sector consisting of a: “multiplicity of 
organisations” (Cabinet Office, 2012:11), that in turn led to inefficiencies and the 
proliferation of preventable problems. Implicit within the review, was the allegation 
that despite the fact that not-for-profit providers of advice services had historically 
relied on both central and local government funding to support their services, they 
were lacking sufficient ability, collectively or individually, to demonstrate how their 
services contributed to “local and national public policy objectives”. The authors of 
the review stated that that sector: “will have to adapt and the funds allocated in the 
Budget 2012 will be aimed at facilitating the transition toward more effective and 
cost efficient advice services” (Cabinet Office, 2012:10). The review set out five key 
principles that applicants for funding should adopt in designing the projects they 
sought funding for. These were: (i) collaboration- between advice organisations, 
other voluntary sector and civil society organisations and public bodies with the aim 
of building sustainability and improving the efficacy of services, (ii) early 
intervention, addressing the “root causes” of demand for advice, (iii) resilience and 
innovation, diversifying funding and adapting more sustainable service delivery 
mechanisms, (iv) focusing on outcomes and impact- organising around needs and 
using information on outcomes to refine and develop the models adopted and (vi) 
exploiting remote channels, such as telephone and online technologies to deliver 
advice (Cabinet Office, 2012:16).  
 
The conditions of the programme stipulated that all projects must meet two 
outcomes: firstly, advice organisations must collaborate effectively with each other 
and other agencies to improve service outcomes for clients and secondly, applicants 
must use the money to diversify their funding sources, with special mention being 
given to developing enterprising business models. Just 25% of the total fund was 
allocated for delivery of frontline services, and such activities would only be funded 
in the context of “a broader plan for adaptation and sustainability” (Cabinet Office, 
                                                
33  https://www.biglotteryfund.org.uk/global-content/press-releases/england/140513_eng_astf_advice-services-for-better-
future 
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2012: 16). Only partnerships comprising not-for-profit advice organisations could 
apply, although non-advice giving not-for-profits could be included in partnerships 
if it was felt that their involvement improved the prospect of the stipulated 
outcomes being achieved. All applicants were required to submit a formal 
partnership agreement to BIG Lottery for their approval before the project could 
commence. The funders stipulated that partnerships should normally be comprised 
of organisations working across a second tier local authority area, although 
applications would be considered from local partnerships that operated in a 
different way, for example, across a local authority boundary or in smaller 
settlements within a single area. Grants of between £50,000 and £350,000 were 
awarded to successful partnerships with a stipulation that they be spent over two 
years. In total, 228 partnerships received funding through the programme. 
However, a survey of the partnerships funded through the ASTF conducted by 
Advice Services Alliance found that only 4% of partnerships that responded were 
considering merging as a strategy to improve efficiency and deliver more effective 
working practices (Advice Services Alliance, 2014: 8), making a merger the least 
popular strategy adopted. This apparent reluctance to merge is reflected in the 
findings of a 2015 survey of not-for-profit providers of advice services 
commissioned by the Ministry of Justice. (Ministry of Justice, 2015:35). The 2015 
survey of not-for-profit providers found that of the 718 not-for-profit advice 
agencies that responded, only 5% had opted to merge or amalgamate with another 
organisation since the cuts introduced by LASPO. This compares to the 36% of 
responding organisations who had invested in new technology, 16% of responding 
organisations who had expanded the geographic reach of the services they provide 
and the 8% of responding organisations who had introduced fee charging for some 
types of problem. (Ministry of Justice, 2015: 35). Given the considerable incentives 
provided to encourage the merging of advice organisations, this finding may be 
considered surprising. A partial explanation for this apparent reticence may be 
found in the history of the funding of the not-for-profit advice sector, and the way 
in which successive reforms to Legal Aid funding designed to incentivise 
partnership working instead led to disillusionment with the concept (Hynes, 
2009:66) and created a culture of competition, rivalry and distrust between 
providers (Owers, 2000:152). Successive studies of third sector organisations have 
revealed that the factors inhibiting collaborative working include: “inflexibility in 
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statutory organisations, competitive bidding for funds, dominance of quantifiable 
performance measures, differential power relations and a lack of trust” (Milbourne 
2009, citing Kimberlee, 2002 and Milbourne et al. 2003). The changes to funding for 
legal aid over the period 1998-2010 outlined above at Chapter 3 instantiated some 
of these factors and arguably compounded existing tensions.  
 
In this context, it is perhaps unsurprising that merging to survive has proved a 
relatively unpopular strategy amongst advice agencies as a whole and Law Centres in 
particular. Of the three Law Centres who have merged in response to the cuts 
introduced by LASPO, Kirklees is the only one to have instigated this strategy of 
their own volition. The particular history of Kirklees Law Centre, it’s relative “new-
ness” and collaborative relationship with other not for profits in the area, worked to 
create an environment that the literature on not-for-profit mergers indicates is 
highly predictive of a successful outcome.  As such, the experience of Kirkless Law 
Centre may be considered to represent the absolute best-case scenario in the 
context of not-for-profit mergers. The following section explains the history of 
Kirklees Law Centre and its relationship with other agencies, before moving to 
describe the merger and the factors that mitigated in favour of its success.  
6.3 The history of Kirklees Law Centre 
Kirklees Law Centres was one of five Law Centres created as part of a programme 
of establishing and directly managing Law Centres undertaken by the Law Centres 
Federation. As part of this programme, the Law Centres Federation established new 
Law Centres in Bury, Stockport, Trafford and Devon. In 2002 the Law Centres 
Federation (now the Law Centres Network) received a grant from the Community 
Fund to fund two new posts in their Regional Development team, one of which was 
dedicated towards establishing new Law Centres in areas of need. The role of the 
Regional Development team was twofold, firstly they were tasked with working 
with Local Authorities and the Legal Services Commission to secure funding for 
new Law Centres and secondly, to directly manage the Law Centres until a local 
management committee could be put in place. At the point of securing a local 
management committee the Law Centre would be “spun-off” and become an 
autonomous entity.  
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Kirklees had previously been served by a Law Centre based in Huddersfield, which 
had closed due to issues with the centres management (Interview with SH). In the 
summer of 2002 Kirklees Metropolitan Council put a consultancy contract out to 
tender for a new Law Centre to serve the local community. The Law Centres 
Federation bid for this contract and were successful in securing it. A local steering 
committee was set up, consisting of representatives from the Local Authority, 
Citizens Advice Bureau, other charities and the Disability Rights Commission 
(Interview with NW). The Disability Rights Commission representative ensured that 
disability issues were incorporated into both the Law Centre’s business plan and 
service delivery, and trained all caseworkers in the provisions of the Disability 
Discrimination Act.  The LCF were successful in securing two contracts from the 
Legal Service Commission for the provision of advice and representation worth a 
total of £100,000 annually. The local authority committed to match this with an 
annual grant of £100,000 per annum. Metin Kemal, Regional Development 
Manager for the Law Centres Federation, in announcing this news, stated: “For the 
first time in many years we were in a position to establish a Law Centre which 
would not only be able to carry out work under LSC contracts but would also be in 
a position to engage in the sort of activities that distinguish a Law Centre from 
private practice such as work with ineligible clients, tribunal representation, legal 
education, community and social policy work…the Law Centre should be 
operational by January 2005 and will be on sound financial foundations thanks to 
the generous and progressive thinking of the local authority” (LCF, 2004:13). 
Difficulties in recruiting staff (LCF, 2004:13) initially delayed the opening of the 
Law Centre however, a Chief Executive and caseworkers with the ability to provide 
services in employment, housing, community care, mental health, welfare benefits, 
immigration and asylum and nationality law were in post by the time the Centre 
opened in October 2005. The Law Centres Federation directly managed the Law 
Centre for a year before its running was transferred to a local management 
committee, who took over the lease of the building.  The Chief Executive originally 
recruited to the post remains in service, and is now Chief Executive of Kirklees 
Citizens Advice and Law Centre, the entity resulting from the merger between 
Huddersfield and Dewsbury Citizens Advice Bureau and the Law Centre. The Chief 
Executive had previously been employed by the Legal Services Commission, and 
used his experience in this role to design a service that closely resembled the 
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Community Legal Advice Clinic model, negating the need for Kirklees Council to 
tender for the creation of a CLAC. Reflecting on this, the Chief Executive stated:  
“I think, perhaps because I'd come from the LSC I understood the policy there I could see the 
CLACs and CLANs policy coming in and so one of our aims was to try to create something like 
a CLAC but on our own terms so that we wouldn't get shoved down that road…. effectively we 
wanted something where we could say this is one point of entry for everybody, that was the 
fundamental thing behind CLAC so that people didn't have to go here there and everywhere but as 
I say, if we could do it with the funding that we had, we could develop it in the way that we wanted 
to and not be constrained by having to do all the other CLAC-y things … We really wanted to 
avoid that sort of tendering exercise and the risk of having some sort of private firms come in you 
know the A4E type thing which you know, the council didn't want either, they were very keen to 
keep that at bay but once you let it in they suddenly become required to open up tenders it just 
becomes very difficult.”  
Interview with KCALC CE  
 
As such, the Law Centre quickly established common cause with the other 
established advice agencies whose funding may have been threatened by the 
development of a CLAC.  
 
When asked to reflect on the challenges of establishing the Law Centre, particularly 
those resulting from the entry of a new advice agency into a wider landscape of 
established providers, the Chief Executive highlighted the importance of the 
presence of established providers of advice on the steering group for the Law 
Centre, stating:  “From [the] start up with the Steering Group which included the other agencies 
in it…I guess everybody sort of felt that they've had a stake in the Law Centre from the start and 
we've worked closely, I guess through having people on management committee but then just 
working together”(Interview with KCALC CE). The decision was taken that the Law 
Centre would co-locate with other advice agencies, in order to place the service at 
the heart of the existing network of agencies operating in Kirklees. The Law Centre 
was opened in a large building opposite the council offices that also housed Kirklees 
Citizens Advice Bureau, a Housing Rights Advice Centre (Fusion Housing) and a 
publicly funded service representing the interests of users of Health and Social Care 
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Services (formerly LINk34, now Healthwatch). After the Law Centre opened, the 
organisation managed to secure funding to redevelop the premises with the aim of 
creating a single reception and waiting area for all services located in the building: 
this was manned by Citizens Advice Bureau staff and volunteers. Prior to the 
merger the reception was open between the hours of 9.30am and 4.30pm daily. 
Clients could telephone and make an appointment with the Law Centre or walk in 
and wait. The CAB staff would triage clients and disperse them to the appropriate 
agency.  
 
Since the Centre was established, it has consistently employed between 6-12 full 
time staff. In 2013, Kirklees Law Centre employed three solicitors, one trainee 
solicitor, and two senior caseworkers on a FTE basis. Prior to the cuts introduced 
by LASPO, the Law Centre derived 60% of its income from the legal aid scheme.  
Whilst the Law Centre initially held contracts for housing and mental health advice 
and representation, these areas were abandoned prior to LASPO, and the Law 
Centre developed a reputation for working in discrimination. Reflecting on this, the 
Chief Executive stated:  
“We started off with benefits, immigration and asylum, community care, mental health…then we 
dropped housing quite quickly because… the only reason we had housing was because the guy from 
LCF who was setting it up was from London and he was absolutely convinced that the only way 
you could run a law centre was to do housing work but… [Kirklees] council have quite good 
housing stock there isn't a great deal of disrepair which is really where the money is so it's not a big 
money earner and it didn't make sense to be competing with one of our partners so we just dropped 
that quietly. [00:22:18] Mental health didn't really work out, we did try doing that, but it just 
didn't really pick up. I think the contract we had was too small and I think you really need 
somebody full-time doing it, and I think you need someone who's experienced and we were really 
trying to train somebody into it. It didn't really happen. So those two sort of fell by the wayside, 
and the discrimination work came through initially having a contract with the Disability Rights 
Commission and then we got legal aid contracts from that and they sort of developed and, really like 
doing discrimination work it's a really big thing for us. We've had some quite big cases.” 
Interview with KCALC CE  
                                                
34 LINk stands for Local Involvement Networks. Healthwatch was established in 2012 as part of measures introduced by the 
Health and Social Care Act 2012. Healthwatch England operates at national level to enable the collective views of health and 
social care “consumers” to influence national policy, advice and guidance. It provides leadership and support to local 
Healthwatch organisations. Local Healthwatch operate at local level. Their role is to gather and represent the views of service 
users, investigate issues where they arise and communicate community priorities to clinical commissioning groups.   
 156 
 
As stated above, prior to the cuts introduced by LASPO Kirklees Law Centre 
received approximately 60% of their funding through the legal aid scheme. The Law 
Centre attracted praise from the former head of the Law Centre’s Federation for 
their ability to manage their legal aid contracts successfully, stating that the Law 
Centre was very lucky to have: “a good manager… good caseworkers who could 
basically run the legal aid contracts and make them pay” (Interview with SH). The 
Law Centre had developed considerable expertise in employment and 
discrimination cases: prior to LASPO the centre employed three full time staff to 
provide employment law and opened around 300 cases per year. Once the cuts to 
LASPO were introduced, two staff were made redundant and the number of cases 
taken on (under Local Authority funding) was around 35.  Post LASPO the centre 
managed to retain contracts in asylum, community care and upper tier welfare 
benefits cases. The remainder of their funding, approximately £90,000, was 
provided by Kirklees Metropolitan Borough Council, who funded the Law Centre 
to deliver some employment and benefits casework, and to operate a telephone 
advice line for residents experiencing employment law related problems. The Law 
Centre was also awarded funding from the Council to support individuals pursuing 
complaints against the NHS. As part of the Kirklees Advice Partnership, a network 
consisting of members of all voluntary and statutory advice providers in addition to 
organisations that give information as part of their service and key stakeholders, 
Kirklees Law Centre received funding from the Advice Services Transition Fund, 
which it used to deliver benefits and employment casework. Delays of five months 
with the receipt of funding from the Advice Services Transition Fund resulted in 
the Law Centre spending down its reserves in order to continue to pay its wage bill. 
During this period (May-September 2013) the Chief Executive took a 50% pay cut, 
in order to enable the Law Centre to continue to operate. Additional funding was 
derived from compromise agreements, costs orders, and income from the Law 
Centre Federation for providing support to the Equalities Advice and Support 
Service. However, it is relatively uncontroversial to state that by late 2013 the 
financial position of the Law Centre was precarious and the Chief Executive was 
exploring all available options for funding in order to ensure that the Law Centre 
remained viable. Figure 6.1 on the following page sets out the timelines for the 
merger
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6.4 Merging to Survive: The drivers to merge 
Research published by the Institute of Voluntary Action Research in 2011 identified 
seven major reasons why voluntary organisations consider merging that may occur 
individually or in combination. These are: i.) the vulnerability of smallness, ii) 
financial pressures iii.) governance problems, iv) to exert a greater influence on the 
external environment   v) to meet users needs more effectively, vi.) to broaden the 
organisation’s offer and vi) having a history of collaboration (IVAR, 2011:11). The 
diagram below at Figure 6.2 demonstrates the distribution of these drivers to merge 
across both the Law Centre and Citizens Advice Bureau.  
Figure 6-2 Drivers to merge across KCAB and KLC 
 
 
Kirklees Citizens Advice was a long established organisation with a seventy-five year 
history: CABs had served Kirklees residents since 1939 (interview with Chief 
Executive of CAB). The Chief Executive of Kirklees Citizens Advice has been 
involved in the development of the Law Centre from the beginning, even sitting on 
the trustee board in the initial period after the Law Centre was founded. The Law 
Centre and Citizens Advice had worked together since the Law Centre was created, 
and Kirklees Citizens Advice had subcontracted with the Law Centre since 2009. In 
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addition, the Chief Executive of Citizens Advice had previous experience of 
successfully delivering a merger, having already presided over the merger of North 
and South Kirklees CAB, moving from South Kirklees CAB to become the Chief 
Executive of the newly formed Kirklees Citizens Advice in 2009. The history of that 
merger was as follows. In the mid 2000s Kirklees Council funded the five advice 
providers in Kirklees (including Kirklees Law Centre) through awarding five 
individual, annual grants. In order to make efficiency savings they decided to move 
to offering one, three year grant. The Council approached the advice organisations 
they funded with a proposal that would enable them to avoid the contract going out 
to open tender. As the Chief Executive of Kirklees Citizens Advice recalled: “they 
basically came to us and said: "If you can agree amongst yourselves how you're going to run this 
we'll give the contract to you so it won't go out to open tender"…so obviously there's a big incentive 
there to do that…So I persuaded colleagues in other agencies that the model we should adopt was 
having a lead body and what effectively were sub-contractors though I may have omitted to call them 
that at the time” [Interview with KCAB CE]. Rather than adopt a consortium model, 
it was decided that South Kirklees Citizens Advice should act as the lead body and 
subcontract with other advice agencies, including the Law Centre. Once South 
Kirklees Citizens Advice was established as the lead body, it was decided that the 
best interests of North Kirklees Citizens Advice Bureau would be served by the 
merging with South Kirklees CAB, to become Kirklees Citizens Advice. At the time 
of this merger the Chief Executive of Kirklees Citizens Advice had been keen to 
simultaneously broker a merger between the Law Centre and the newly formed 
Kirklees Citizens Advice in order to take advantage of the specialist skills offered by 
the Law Centre. Reflecting on his motivations for merging the Chief Executive of 
Kirklees Citizens Advice stated: “I thought the Law Centre would make us complete as a 
unit, because we were all about generalist advice, we didn't have a lot of specialist advice apart from 
debt, and the Law Centre was the opposite really they had loads of specialist advice and no 
generalist advice so, you know it was an obvious fit” [Interview with KCAB CE]. At the 
time, the trustees felt that this would create too much complexity, and so they 
rejected the proposal, however, the Chief Executive’s conviction that merging with 
the Law Centre would enhance the offering they were able to provide remained 
constant so that when the Law Centre announced they were looking for potential 
candidates to merge with in 2012: “they talked to a lot of people, they did the job properly but 
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the obvious fit was always going to be us, looking at the other candidates it just didn't make sense 
really or as much sense as it would do for us”. [Interview with KCAB CE] 
 
Whilst the financial imperative might explain why the Law Centre was keen to 
merge with Kirklees CAB, it is arguably less clear why Kirklees CAB, with it’s more 
stable financial position and long history of operating in the area, would be keen to 
merge with the Law Centre.  However, the literature on mergers states that 
disparities between the positions of the two organisations involved are relatively 
commonplace, and that larger, more financially stable organisations are likely to 
merge with non-pecuniary benefits in mind. In 2011 Wilder Research reviewed the 
extant literature relating to mergers between non-profit organisations. Their findings 
state that mergers are unlikely to occur amongst equally powerful organisations. 
Organisations that are financially stronger and or more stable as well as older 
organisations are more likely to merge, to take advantage of the specialisation of the 
smaller organisation or to increase capacity, without losing autonomy (Wilder, 2011: 
23 citing Campbell 2008 and Kohm & LaPiana 2003). This finding seems to be 
mirrored in the present case, with Kirklees Citizens Advice keen to capitalise on the 
Law Centres specialist skills to deliver a better service for their clients. 
 
As such, whilst financial expediency may be seen to be a motivating factor in the 
decision to merge, it is not the only or defining factor- a history of working in 
partnership, shared premises, shared values for what constitutes an effective service 
and an atmosphere of mutual respect and regard between the two Chief Executives 
are also key drivers. This is important as the literature indicates that the reasons for 
merging can be predictive of the success of the merger- in a 2002 study of three 
mergers it was found that “mission driven” mergers, where the organisations are 
merging to anticipate future demands are the most likely to result in an effective 
process (Benton & Austin 2011:462 citing Golensky & DeRuiter, 2002) whereas 
mergers chosen as a last resort by organisations experiencing financial problems are 
more likely to be marked by fraught processes. Additionally, maintaining an 
atmosphere of respect and collaboration, where partners are treated as equals 
regardless of their relative size in terms of staff, budget or geographic scope is seen 
to be key to successful mergers in the not for profit sector (LaPiana, 2005:12). The 
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fact that these elements were present in the decision to merge, mitigate in favour of 
the mergers success.    
 
6.5 The process of merging: factors predictive of success  
The literature on non-profit mergers identifies a number of factors, the presence or 
absence of which can impact on the outcome of the merger. These include, strong 
leadership with a common sense of purpose, sufficient time built into the process, 
similar or compatible organisational cultures and positive relationships between the 
executive teams of the organisations that are merging. There was clear evidence of 
the presence of all of these factors in the merger between Kirklees Law Centre and 
Kirklees Citizens Advice: the following section explains how these features 
manifested, relating them to the extant literature on mergers in the not for profit 
sector.  
6.5.1 Strong Leadership  
One factor mitigating in favour of the success of the merger is the fact that one of 
the parties had previous experience of leading their organisation through this 
process. Benton and Austin define competent leadership in a merger situation as 
consisting of knowledge of: “what to expect during a restructuring process, the 
organisational culture issues, the time required for successful change and the nature 
of the organisational change processes needed to address staff issues” (Benton and 
Austin, 2010:463) Importantly, the Chief Executive of Kirklees Citizens Advice had 
previously presided over the merger between his CAB (South Kirklees CAB) and 
North Kirklees CAB. As such, he was aware of the potential pitfalls, and positive 
about his ability to navigate them, stating: “all of my career has been about change and 
managing change [00:09:44], (I like it) otherwise I've got nothing to manage you know” 
(Interview with KCAB CE). This positivity about the merger, and confidence that it 
could be managed successfully, is again, a strong predictor of the success of the 
strategy.  Research indicates that mergers that are led by executive directors with a 
shared sense of mission are more likely to be successful: the importance of this 
shared enthusiasm this is commonly cited as the most important factor in predicting 
the success of the merger (Wilder, 2011: 24 citing Golensky and DeRuiter, 2002, 
also see La Piana (1994) and Ricke-Kiely et al 2013:159) Leaders should have the 
ability to articulate how the merger advances the mission, focussed on the way in 
 162 
which the merged organisation will facilitate improved provision of services to 
beneficiaries (IVAR, 2010:25). When interviewed about the merger the Chief 
Executives of both organisations described it as a positive development, the Chief 
Executive of the Law Centre stating: “I think for us it feels just like a natural development. 
I think... we went down to Derby and we spoke to them and theirs was much more of a sort of I 
think they were just required by the Local Authority to do it and it was bit like (blows through 
lips). But it's worked out OK for them [01:00:43]. Sheffield similarly they've had to merge. But I 
think ours is, it feels better in that it's a voluntary thing that we're driving so that's good…I think 
it would be a good thing for a lot of Law Centres, we'd certainly encourage it in places where it feels 
right to do it.” (Interview with KCALC CE).  This positivity is important, as research 
indicates that senior management have a critical role in positioning themselves as 
champions of change, expressing support for a merger and framing it as an 
opportunity rather than a threat (Benton and Austin, 2010: 464, citing Deetz et al. 
2001 and Marks and Mervis, 2000).  
 
6.5.2 The importance of personalities- positive pre-merger relationships  
Positive pre-merger relationships between and amongst the executive leadership of 
organisations that are intending to merge are cited as a critical factor in predicting 
the success of a merger, particularly in the initial stages. The absence of “egos” 
(Ricke-Kiely et al. 2013: 159) is cited as a necessary precondition of successful 
mergers, and personality clashes are frequently cited as a determining factor in 
merger failure (Charity Commission, 2009:7). This positive working relationship and 
lack of “ego” was clearly manifested in the relationship between the two Chief 
Executives in the case at hand. The Chief Executive of Citizens Advice stated: “one 
of the key things in that is the relationship that [KCALC CE] and I have, you know, that's the 
key to it because if you have two CEOs that are butting up against each other, usually male 
CEOs but not necessarily, could be female CEOs, then that is not going to produce a merger 
because they're all kind of, they'll all be looking after their own position and that sort of thing. But 
we've always had, I don't know that we've fallen out over anything yet so when you've got a good 
relationship like that you just know it's going to work, and I always knew it was going to work 
and it was a matter of convincing the trustees…we don't always agree and he comes up with 
different, you know perspectives because he has a different background but we always compromise 
and find a way forward. But as I say it's that lack of competitive edge between us personally that 
enables us to work together.” For his part, the Chief Executive of the Law Centre 
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expressed distaste for the way in which personal relationships could act to impede 
successful collaboration, and it was clear that he spent a great deal of time 
developing positive working relationships with his peers. When asked to comment 
on the barriers created by competition and rivalry between advice agencies he 
stated: “Yes, yes and it's a, it's a hard one. I think it's something people have to get over…you 
see some places and it's so destructive and it takes up so much time and for so little purpose 
that…you just want to say 'just stop it' but, but sometimes it's not that easy you've got to have the 
those personal relationships that work out…I think if you have that mind-set that you want to 
work with other people it’s better” Interview with KCALC CE. It was clear that the 
working relationship established between the two Chief Executives was respectful, 
friendly and functional, factors that mitigated in favour of the success of a merger 
between their organisations. In the literature on not for profit merger it was 
observed that mergers are particularly likely to success when extant working 
relationships have been developed through the prior (successful) completion of 
shared projects (Wilder et al. 2011:24 citing Dewey and Kaye, 2007 and Ferronato 
and Perryman 2003). This precondition for merging was also clearly present in the 
current case study.   
 
6.5.3 Ensuring sufficient time is built into the merging process 
A further factor implicated in the success of any merger is the ability to build in 
sufficient time to conduct due diligence and consider the structure of the newly 
created organisation. Research indicates that where the merger is viewed by the 
organisations involved as a constructive opportunity, not: “something to be done 
quickly or in haste” (Ricke-Kiely et al 2013:159 citing Norris-Tirrell 2001) it is more 
likely to be successful. Charity Commission (2009) and IVAR (2010) guidance 
reiterate the importance of building in enough time for merger, in order to ensure 
stakeholder “buy-in”. Guidance provided by the Charity Commission states that 
rushing the process or failing to provide realistic targets for the merger are two key 
reasons why mergers fail. Benton and Austin note that: “while there is often a desire 
to minimise the transition time, there is also a need for a thorough and deliberative 
process” (Benton and Austin, 2010:464). As stated above, the merger between the 
two organisations had been in contemplation since 2009, and talks had commenced 
in 2012. As such, sufficient time was built into the process to ensure that it was 
communicated to stakeholders effectively. The close working relationship that 
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existed between the two parties prior to the merger ensured that the process was 
conducted at a pace that was suitable for the organisations involved. 
 
6.5.4 Compatible organisational cultures  
Many researchers believe that “culture fit” is what makes or breaks a merger.  
Critical to the success of mergers is the ability to: “integrate the existing cultures 
into a new one and to formulate a common value system and shared vision” 
(Giffords & Dina, 2003:76, Cartwright & Cooper, 1993). The definition of 
organisational culture provided by Schein (1985) remains one of the most influential 
and frequently cited articulations of this concept (Benton & Austin, 2010:467). 
Schein states that organisational culture is: “a pattern of basic assumptions- 
invented, discovered or developed by a given group as it learns to cope with its 
problems of external adaptation and internal integrations- that has worked well 
enough to be considered valid and, therefore, to be taught to new members as the 
correct way to perceive, think and feel in relation to those problems” (Schein, 
1985:9, cited in Benton and Austin, 2010:467). It can comprise elements such as 
office attire, policies and procedures, staff-management relationships and decision-
making style (Benton and Austin, 2010:467 citing Kohm & La Piana, 2003). 
Cartwright and Cooper, writing in 1993 elaborate on this conception, stating that: 
“…Organizational culture concerns symbols, values, ideologies, and assumptions 
which operate, often in an unconscious way, to guide and fashion individual and 
business behaviour. Culture is often defined as: "social glue." It serves to bind 
individuals, and creates organizational cohesiveness. Organizational culture, like 
societal culture more generally, maintains order and regularity in the lives of its 
members, and only assumes salience in their minds when it is threatened or 
disturbed” (Cartwright & Cooper, 1993:60).  It is further noted that fundamental 
differences between employees in their thoughts, behaviours and actions may 
hinder the implementation of goals” (Giffords & Dina, 2003:75, citing Olie, 1994).  
 
In the immediate case, the close working relationship between the Law Centre and 
the Citizens Advice Bureau prior to the merger meant that both organisations were 
familiar with the other’s culture. As stated above, prior to the merger a number of 
the advice agencies that served the Kirklees community were located in the same 
building- Kirklees Citizens Advice, Fusion Housing, Kirklees Benefits Advice 
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Service and Healthwatch. All agencies shared a common reception that was staffed 
by Kirklees Citizens Advice, who were responsible for triaging clients and 
dispersing them to the correct agency (Interview with KCALC CE). Kirklees 
Citizens Advice delivered specialist advice on debt, using funding from the Money 
Advice Service and Citizens Advice UK. If an individual presented with a complex 
matter in another area of law they would be referred to the Law Centre or to one of 
the other advice agencies- Fusion Housing if it was a housing matter or Kirklees 
Benefit Advice Service if the matter concerned benefits. Kirklees Benefit Advice 
Service may themselves refer the clients on to the Law Centre if the matter related 
to an Upper Tribunal Appeal, or if the individual wished to have a student volunteer 
support them at a first tier tribunal relating to a benefit awarded on the basis of 
disability. Initially, post the merger; the functional distinctions between the 
organisations were largely extant. The Chief Executive of the Law Centre described 
the situation as follows:  
“For each area of law you've got different dynamics so for the asylum team for example, all of their 
work comes in through the New Asylum Model rota, through refugees come into the country they 
get sent up to here they get referred on to us they don’t go through any sort of triage they are just 
straight in. We've got an employment team then, who run a telephone advice service, so yes they get 
referrals through a CAB helpline, they also get direct calls in and so we've got volunteers staffing 
that line and they may refer things through for casework, but effectively everything comes through to 
them and they work out how to deal with it. If it's a debt matter, it doesn't come to anyone here, 
and there's a specialist team in the CAB. As we merge more and more, I'm expecting those 
distinctions to even out and then the debt team will be another team like…the employment team 
and gradually you'll lose that distinction between the Law Centre and the CAB. So yes it's all 
different. Benefits has always been the most complicated, so for benefits things you've got people come 
into CAB or who might see currently a generalist advisor well they'll see somebody at a gateway, 
they'll get triaged, they may go and see a generalist advisor they may have an appeal matter in 
which case they get sent to Kirklees Benefits Advice Service which is run by the council but again 
they sit in with the CAB, so they do all the appeals work. That service may refer it through to us 
to do a Upper Tribunal case if it doesn't succeed at first tier, but also the triage may refer things 
through to our students who are doing disability benefits work and really if that comes through to 
us if that went to appeal we may carry on and do the appeal there and so, there are different 
pathways” [Interview with KCALC CE]. In interviews about the merger it was 
observed that because the two organisations performed complimentary functions, 
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rather than performing identical roles, tensions that can be created when two 
organisations that are providing the same service through different working 
practices were avoided.  
 
As outlined above, the preconditions for the merger and history of the Law Centre 
mitigated strongly in favour of the mergers success. In many regards, the experience 
of KCALC may be considered the best case scenario for mergers of this kind:  the 
newly formed organisation may be considered to meet many of the factors 
traditionally identified as being salient when assessing the success of a merger (see 
Owen et al, 2011:7). However, it should be noted that the decision to merge, of 
itself, has not created additional capacity within the Law Centre or enabled it to fully 
replace the funding lost in the introduction of LASPO: whilst the financial position 
of the new organisation is stable, the service it is able to offer has not expanded, 
although management are hopeful that the new corporate identity and access to 
sources of funding through the citizens advice network might improve this.  
 
Research cited above emphasises the high level of risk involved in undertaking to 
merge, and the threat that merging poses to the distinctive values of the 
organisations involved. It is notable that the news of the Law Centre’s merger with 
CAB was greeted by some in the Social Welfare Law Sector as heralding: “the 
demise of Kirklees Law Centre” (ilegal, 2015). This statement was robustly refuted 
by the manager of the Law Centre, however, it is evident from the fieldwork that 
the decision to merge has impacted on the ability of the Law Centre to deliver the 
values identified above at Chapter 3. The following section explores the 
implications of the merger for these values.  
 
6.6 Merging with a CAB to survive and the impact on the ideal type 
Law Centre’s values  
It is impossible to assess the impact of the merger on Law Centre values without 
considering the history and organisational culture of the organisation the Law 
Centre chose to merge with. In merging with a CAB, the Law Centre chose to 
merge with an organisation that is part of a network with a very different history, 
culture and mission to its own. Citizens Advice Bureau emerged immediately prior 
to the beginning of the Second World War, with input from the Ministry of Health, 
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the National Council of Social Service and the Family Welfare Association (Goriely, 
1996a: 220). Their purpose was to help individuals manage their “war-time worries” 
and included dealing with: “every kind of domestic and personal problem ranging 
from what to do if one cannot keep up instalments on a wireless set to how to 
obtain compensation if evacuees damage one’s home” (Goriely, 1996a: 221). They 
were funded by central government, staffed by volunteers and immediately popular: 
one newspaper reported that from September 1939 to January 1940 the network of 
950 bureaux dealt with over 4million issues (Goriely, 1996a, 220).  
 
The Citizens Advice Bureaux were conceived in terms that were emphatically non-
legal in character, neither the Law Society, nor the Lord Chancellors Department 
had any role in establishing the scheme. They were staffed by lay volunteers, not 
lawyers, espoused their mission as: “providing friendship and sympathy to all who 
are in need of it” (Goriely, 1996a: 221) eschewed a means test, and offered general, 
non-specialist advice across a wide range of issues. They were a: “centrally planned 
service, with common goals” (Goriely, 1996a: 232), one of which was to: “collect 
information on the kind of problems which are at any specific time causing 
difficulty and distress and to bring such problems to the notice of those who have 
the power to prevent or solve them” (Goriely, 1996a: 221, citing the National 
Council for Social Service, 1941). Whilst the subject matter of the problems raised 
might relate to the law, the methods of raising awareness were emphatically non-
legal in character, and mainly revolved around the dissemination of information, 
including arranging BBC broadcasts to provide information to the public on specific 
issues. (Goriely, 1996a: 221).  
 
Whilst Citizens Advice Bureaux were not immune to the funding scarcity that 
pervaded the advice sector during the 1950’s: from the 1960’s to the 1980’s they re-
emerged and flourished, their numbers almost doubling (from 473-869) and the 
number of enquiries they dealt with more than quadrupling from (1.3 million to 6.8 
million) (Goriely, 1996:231, Smith, 1997: 906). In the 1980s-1990’s CABs 
increasingly specialised in: “the chronic problems of severe poverty, first in the area 
of social security and then of debt” (Goriely, 1996: 234). This specialisation brought 
with it a new relationship with the legal profession, as Jean Richards, in her history 
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of the CAB movement describes.  In the describing the early days of CABs, 
Richards states:  
 
“There was for many years a piece of paper which was supplied to all 
bureaux as they opened, warning against the danger of purporting to give 
legal advice or acting as a solicitor. This made many bureau workers nervous 
and contributed to the feeling that there was an almost mystical character in 
the law as a profession. Contrasting with this deferential attitude towards 
lawyers… there was a strong feeling that lawyers were not really much use. 
The reasons for this second, gut reaction were rooted in two facts (i) the 
number of complaints made about the inefficiency…of solicitors (some of 
which were undoubtedly justified) and (ii) the lack of knowledge shown by 
many solicitors of the areas of law which impinged most painfully on the 
clients coming into bureaux…” (Richards, 1989:149; cited in Goriely, 
1996:235).  
 
This increasing awareness of their own specialist insight into issues around poverty 
and social welfare gave CABs new confidence in their dealings with the legal 
profession, as Goriely, writing in 1996 states: “Many did not just believe that they 
understood social security law better than many solicitors, they knew it” (Goriely, 
1996:235). In the 1970s some CAB’s began experimenting with employing 
solicitors, by 1977 ten CABs employed lawyers and the national association of 
CABs resolved to develop more posts (Smith, 1997:906). The 1970s also saw 
attempts to combine CABs with Law Centres, with two combined CAB/Law 
Centres opening during the period 1973-1976 (Smith, 1997:906). In spite of the 
reported success of these ventures (Goriely, 1996:235) the scheme failed to expand. 
Goriely (1996) argues that this failure can be attributed to a combination of funding 
problems and perhaps: “an inbuilt suspicion of lawyers” (Goriely, 1996:235). In the 
mid-1980s it was observed that Law Centres and the advice sector had embarked on 
different courses, with the majority of CABs focussing on the provision of general, 
rather than specialist legal advice. 
 
By the mid-1990s the number of Citizens Advice Bureaux outlets in the UK stood 
at 1,000, in comparison with 52 Law Centres (Smith, 1997:916). The national 
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government grant awarded to the National Association of Citizens Advice Bureaux 
(NACAB) stood at £12million, compared with the £67,000 grant to the Law 
Centres. Unlike Law Centres, with their distinctive focus on community control 
(Smith, 1997:916 and Burdett, 2002) Citizens Advice Bureau are held to national 
standards, and the national association is tasked with pursuing a lobbying role in 
relation to government, guided by the aim of exercising: “a responsible influence on 
the development on social policies and services, both locally and nationally.” (Smith, 
1997:916 citing Chapman, 1995).  
In the early to mid-2000s however, Citizens Advice expanded the specialist legal 
advice services they provided. By 2008, Citizens Advice reported that the Citizens 
Advice Service consisted of over 400 independent advice agencies delivering advice 
from more than 3,000 locations. At this point in time, 242 bureaux had contracts 
with the Legal Services Commission to deliver legal advice and casework in 
categories of law, 20 bureaux employed solicitors engaged in the conduct of 
litigation, over 100 CABs offered services in County Courts and 94% of bureau 
offered advice and representation services in tribunals (Citizens Advice’s Response 
to the Legal Services Board’s discussion paper “Wider Access, Better Value, Strong 
Protection”, 2009:1). In spite of this increase, funding received from the Legal 
Services Commission was dwarfed by funding from central and local government, a 
press release published by Citizens Advice in 2011 stated that 14.6% of individual 
bureau’s total funding came from the Legal Services Commission, compared with 
42.7% from local government.  
 
In the debates immediately preceding the introduction of LASPO, the then Justice 
Secretary Ken Clarke remarked that: “only 15% of CAB funding comes from my 
department, and about 50% of CABs receive no legal aid funding at all” (HC Deb (2011) 521 
col. 176). In spite of this low level of exposure compared to Law Centres, who prior 
to LASPO received 46% of their funding through Legal Aid (Randall and Smerdon, 
2013), Citizens Advice Bureau were mentioned by name by the Justice Secretary in 
promising support, emphasising the virtue of the non-adversarial approach they 
adopted (HC Deb (2011) 521 col. 176).  In 2011, the then Justice Secretary Ken 
Clarke stated that: “I am anxious for us to do what we can to strengthen CABs, as are my 
colleagues in other departments: we are considering what we can do to help them across Government. 
I am doing my best, and we will settle on some support” (HC Deb (2011) 521 col. 176). No 
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such promises of support were forthcoming for Law Centres. As described above at 
section 2 of this chapter, in the aftermath of the cuts, funding was made available to 
the advice sector through the Advice Services Transition Fund. Over eighty per cent 
of this funding (£54million) was awarded to Citizens Advice Bureaux.  
 
6.6.1 Merging with a CAB to survive and Terminal Value 1: Law Centres 
improve the position of economically disadvantaged individuals and 
groups 
In the values framework described above at Chapter 3 the first of the values 
proposed concerns the way in which Law Centres use the law, namely, to bring 
about social change in favour of marginalised groups. The literature on Law Centres 
emphasises the pursuit of strategic litigation as a key approach through which Law 
Centres seek to reform the law in favour of the marginalised. The following section 
considers the impact of the merger on the ability of KLC use strategic litigation to 
bring about change in favour of marginalised groups.  
 
6.6.1.1 Merging with a CAB to survive and instrumental value 1.2: Law Centres undertake 
strategic litigation that has the potential to reform the Law in favour of the economically 
disadvantaged 
In the following discussion it is argued that merging with a CAB, whose approach 
to bringing about policy change is primarily based on the provision of information, 
individual casework and engagement with government, rather than a combination 
of strategic litigation and campaigning has implications for the way in which the 
Law Centre delivers its objective of using the law to bring about social change. As 
per the discussion in Chapter 3, it is widely recognised that: “the deployment of an 
assertive and challenging litigation role…distinguish[es] Law Centres from the rest 
of the not-for-profit sector.” (Smith, 1997:916). Prior to the merger, Kirklees Law 
Centre had a reputation for using this approach, undertaking strategic cases of 
national importance, particularly in relation to discrimination law. However, there 
are early indications that the merger, and the selection of partners that has been 
driven by the priorities of the new organisation may have impacted on when and 
whether KCALC deploy this strategy in the future.  
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Prior to the merger, KLC had a reputation in conducting complex casework in areas 
of discrimination law, garnering national media coverage in the process and 
sometimes setting them in opposition to the council, threatening their funding in 
the process. In Azmi v Kirklees Metropolitan Borough Council [2007] IRLR 434 (EAT) 
the Law Centre represented a teaching assistant who brought a claim for 
discrimination under the Employment Equality (Religion or Belief) Regulations 
2003, after she was refused permission to wear her full veil (niqab) when teaching 
alongside male members of staff, or for the timetable to be changed so that she did 
not have to work alongside male teachers. The head teacher observed Mrs Azmi 
and concluded that she did not carry out her role as effectively when wearing her 
veil: Mrs Azmi was tasked with providing support to children with English as a 
foreign language who were at risk of underachieving and it was felt that facial 
expressions and non-verbal communication were critical to the successful conduct 
of this post. The Employment Tribunal dismissed three of Mrs Azmi’s claims but 
awarded her £1000 for “injury to feelings”.  Mrs Azmi appealed to the Employment 
Appeals Tribunal, where her case was dismissed. The case sparked a national debate 
on multiculturalism in Britain with then Prime Minister Tony Blair and other 
government ministers commenting on the case: their interventions were criticised 
by the tribunal who branded their comments “most unfortunate” and sub judice 
(Press Association, 2006, Herbert, 2006). The government’s race minister, Phil 
Woolas, called for Mrs Azmi to be sacked stating that she was: “denying the right of 
children to a full education because her stand meant she could not do her job and 
insisted that barring men from working with her would amount to “sexual 
discrimination” (Press Association, 2006). Negative press coverage from the right-
wing media included a front-page headline in the Daily Express stating: “She loses 
discrimination case but Veil Case Teacher Costs Us £250,0000”: the accompanying 
editorial accused Mrs Azmi of having a “warped agenda” and of being “a politically 
motivated extremist who is doing terrible damage to [moderate Muslims] in the eyes 
of the long-suffering British public” (Daily Express, 200735). Law Centre workers 
received death threats from right-wing extremists as a result of the case (ilegal, 
2015). The decision to undertake the case on behalf of Mrs Azmi brought the Law 
Centre into conflict with the Local Authority: in 2008 the Council announced that it 
was considering defunding the Law Centre. The Council Leader at the time spoke 
                                                
35  https://www.express.co.uk/news/uk/3226/Veil-row-teacher-loses-fight-over-sacking Accessed 
on 30 December 2017 
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to the local press in 2008 stating “For a long time, we have, as a group, questioned 
whether council money should be given to the Law Centre… there is a lack of 
clarity between council objectives and what services the law centre provided36”. This 
“longstanding questioning” of the appropriateness of awarding council funding to 
the Law Centre seems surprising given that the Centre had been commissioned by 
the Council only four years prior to this statement being made (see Interview with 
SH).  
 
Post LASPO and during the merger the Law Centre continued to take on further 
high profile cases, including successfully arguing against a reduction in housing 
benefit for a disabled couple who were subject to the rules introduced in April 2013 
regarding under-occupancy (the so called “bedroom tax”). This case was brought by 
the Law Centre using funding from Kirklees Council. The Law Centre won at First 
Tier Tribunal in June 2014 and attracted praise from legal commentators for their 
skilful deployment of existing case law in this area (Peaker, 2014). In the statement 
of reasons provided, the tribunal judge was critical of the operation of the 
Discretionary Housing Payments scheme by Kirklees Council, stating: “I cannot see 
how the operation of DHP’s by Kirklees Council “plugs the gap” for the majority 
of appellants who appeared before me. If anything the operation of the policy 
creates unnecessary distress to disabled persons living in accommodation subject to 
regulation B13 and does not provide a safeguard against the clear discriminatory 
effect of that regulation” (Statement of Reasons, 2014:937). In March 2014, the Law 
Centre successfully brought a case for discrimination in the provision of goods and 
services against a public house on behalf of a transgender client. The Law Centres 
Network, announcing the decision, stated that: “this is the first time that a case of 
transgender discrimination in the provision of goods and services has been heard in 
a British court” and as such, represents a new development in equalities law and 
practice (LCN, 2014).  
 
In contrast, the Chief Executive of Kirklees Citizens Advice Bureau was reticent to 
endorse an adversarial approach that combined litigation and publicity to bring 
                                                
36  http://www.thepressnews.co.uk/press-news/kirklees-revisit-veil-teacher-firm-support/ Accessed 
on 30 December 2017 
37  Statement of reasons published at: http://431bj62hscf91kqmgj258yg6-wpengine.netdna-
ssl.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/08/Gresham-Decision-280714.pdf Accessed 30 December 
2017.  
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about social change, particularly when the Local Authority would find itself on the 
receiving end of these tactics. In discussing the CAB’s relationship with the Local 
Authority, the Chief Executive stated that: “we regard ourselves as partners of the Council” 
and issued a damning critique of what he described as the old-fashioned “agitprop” 
tactics that, he argued, were often associated with the voluntary sector and when 
deployed, resulted in outcomes that were not in the best interests of either the 
organisation or the client:  
 
“I suppose there was, I think there was a tendency for, yeah, let's caricature, [a charity] would 
receive a grant from the council, they would have councillors sitting on their board, yet they would 
feel absolutely no problem about slagging the council off, dragging them into court over some issue, 
possibly using the client to do so in order to win a point. I think a more modern view would be to 
say: we understand that the council are funding us and that doesn't mean to say that they get to do 
anything they want but we try to resolve things outside of the press, outside of the courts, because it's 
better for the taxpayer, it's better for the client, it's better for everybody really.” 
 
This suspicion of the law and legal processes as an effective mechanism for bringing 
about change resonates strongly with the position of the CAB movement in relation 
to the law as outlined above. The Chief Executive of the CAB appeared deeply 
wedded to the idea that negotiation and the wielding of “soft-power” (Nye, 1990) 
were the most effective approaches to achieving change, although, when asked to 
comment on the value of lawyers in general and the Law Centre in particular, he 
expressed that having the ability to deploy legal strategies in certain circumstances, 
magnified the ability to bring about change:  
“…It's having that facility to be able to take things further up the legal chain, it's to take the big issues, 
and that is another way of effecting change. Sometimes that can be a sledgehammer but sometimes it is the 
right thing to do, to create precedent and we can't do that without lawyers so we have to…If we're a CAB 
we probably wouldn’t embark on that, we wouldn't go that far, so the Law Centre can go much further than 
we can and that again is why you know, it magnifies our ability to change things, by having the Law Centre 
as a part of us.”  
KCAB CE 
How far the Law Centre would be able to continue to advance this role once it was 
brought within the umbrella of the CAB movement remains to be seen. In 
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interviews, Law Centre staff reported that they had had to: “pull our horns in 
considerably” as a result of the cuts to legal aid and subsequent merger. Is there a 
danger that in merging with the CAB, an organisation that has historically been 
reticent to engage with strategic litigation, and pursuing partnerships with 
organisations that are similarly cautious, the Law Centre might find itself unable to 
deliver on an organisational value that has been considered core to the ethos of Law 
Centres? In the case at hand, it might be considered too early to reach a definitive 
conclusion, but the potential for this issue to arise should be factored into the 
decisions taken by other Law Centres in deciding whether to merge with other 
organisations.  
 
6.6.2 Merging with a CAB to survive and Terminal Value 2: Law Centres 
deliver their services to those in greatest need  
For Law Centres, individuals and groups in need are those whose interests are not 
adequately represented by the law as it stands, either because i) the extant legal 
framework does not serve their interests or extend to their protection (need type 1) 
or, ii.) the extant legal framework does in theory extend to their interests and/or 
protection but they are ill-equipped or vulnerable in the context of being able to 
successfully access their rights under the law as it stands (need type 2). Chapter 4 
proposes a refined definition of vulnerability, in recognition of the fact that whilst 
Law Centres and indeed the legal aid scheme historically relied on poverty as a 
proxy for vulnerability, the class of individuals for whom legal advice and 
representation is unaffordable is now so wide that a principled focus is required in 
order to ensure that Law Centres deliver on this value. The following discussion 
considers the impact of the merger the ability of the Law Centre to prioritise their 
services on the basis of need, and ensure that they are reaching the most vulnerable 
in their community.  
 
6.6.2.1 Merging to with a CAB to survive and meeting need type 1: targeting services at those 
individuals whose interests are not served under the extant legal framework: Individuals 
on low incomes experiencing employment problems.  
Whilst in the course of the merger the Law Centre was able to preserve specialist 
legal advice in a range of areas of law including community care, welfare benefits 
and asylum and immigration, the provision of employment advice at the level 
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provided prior to the cuts introduced by LASPO was not preserved. The failure to 
preserve advice in relation to employment is problematic: there is a growing 
consensus that the interests of non-unionised low-income workers are not 
adequately represented under the extant legal framework (TUC, 2014: 6, Busby et al. 
2015:7). The combined impact of the withdrawal of public funding for advice and 
representation in employment matters and the introduction of tribunal fees, ranging 
from £160 to £950 for a single case (MoJ: 2016 12). The latter of these measures, 
the introduction of Employment Tribunal Fees, was introduced with the express 
intention of deterring individuals from using Tribunals to settle disputes, the 
consultation document that introduced the proposals for fees stated that: “…it is 
recognised that fees can influence the behaviour of those who might become involved in employment 
tribunal proceedings by encouraging them to resolve their dispute by other means (e.g. in the 
workplace, via mediation or conciliation)…Ensuring that tribunals, along with courts, are seen as 
an option of last resort is essential to improving the way disputes are resolved and encouraging 
reasonable behaviour” (MoJ, 2012:12 Charging Fees in Employment Tribunals and the 
Employment Appeal Tribunal, CP22/2011) Since their introduction, the 
combination of these measures has been recognised as impacting disproportionately 
on individuals in temporary employment or on low incomes. In the results of a 
survey conducted by the TUC, three-quarters of respondents on temporary 
employment contracts reported that a fee of £250 would deter them pursuing a case 
and sixty-five per cent of respondents with an annual income of less than £10,000 
would not pursue a meritorious case to tribunal (TUC, 2014:5-6). Busby et al. (2015) 
writing on behalf of the Institute of Employment Rights in a submission to a 
consultation issued by the Law Society, state that:  
 
“The IER is concerned about a legal framework that excludes many people from legal 
rights…Certain sectors, typically those involving low-paid, non-unionised workers are greatly 
under-represented amongst tribunal claimants; examples are many service industries and small 
employers…In other areas, regulations designed to promote fairness are probably irrelevant in 
practice because almost no claims are in fact brought: the Agency Worker Regulations 2010, 
designed to protect agency workers against discriminatory treatment, are probably a recent example” 
(Busby et al. 2015: 7).  
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The claim that Employment Tribunal Fees have impacted disproportionately on low 
paid workers is seemingly corroborated by evidence provided to the Justice 
Committee by The Council of Employment Judges, who stated that:  
 
“Prior to the introduction of fees, money claims were often brought by low paid workers in sectors 
such as care, security, hospitality or cleaning and the sums at stake were small in litigation terms 
but significant to the individual involved. There are few defences to such claims and they often 
succeeded…there has been a particularly marked decline in claims for unpaid wages, notice pay, 
holiday pay and unfair dismissal, the types of cases brought by ordinary working people” (Justice 
Committee, 2016: 28)  
 
These concerns have been validated in the recent judgment in the Supreme Court 
(R (on the application of UNISON) (Appellant) v Lord Chancellor (Respondent) [2017] 
UKSC 51 per para 41)  which held that employment tribunal fees were unlawful. 
Prior to LASPO the Law Centre employed three full time employment advisers, 
after the cuts and the merger this was limited to one part time adviser supported by 
volunteers. The remaining employment adviser at the Law Centre stated:  
“There are now no paid posts in the entire of Leeds, as you know, it's a big catchment area, a huge 
catchment area…statistically it's the biggest legal centre outside of London is Leeds, if you believe it . 
There's a big central Citizens Advice Bureau down by the markets in Leeds, that doesn't have a paid 
employment worker, they have 4-5 satellite bureaus around the city, none of them has an employment 
worker, none of them. The other bureau in Leeds, because they're independent are CAB's, Chapeltown 
bureau, that doesn't have a paid worker and they used to. There aren't any [jobs], not in the not for profit 
sector, if you go into the commercial firms and even there it's very difficult, but certainly not in the not-for-
profit sector you may as well be looking for a needle in a haystack as find a paid employment post. And it 
[paid employment advice] always seems to go first…. the [Chief Executive of the combined organisation] is 
saying he's talked to the Council and they've said "well we don't need employment [advice] really do we?"  
KCALC ES 
The Council’s position, if reported correctly, seems confusing given the socio-
economic context of Kirklees. In 2016, Kirklees Council published their strategy for 
Tackling Poverty, which states that: “in work poverty is a common problem for 
people in our communities” (Kirklees Council, 2016:3). In Kirklees wages are lower 
than the national average, figures from the Office of National Statistics demonstrate 
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that at April 2016 the average median gross weekly pay for individuals resident in 
Kirklees was 10% lower than the national average (Kirklees Council 2016a: 15).  
Roughly one third of the working age population of Kirklees lives on low to middle 
incomes, and wage increases have failed to keep pace with the Consumer Prices 
Index, resulting in lower standards of living.  (Kirklees Council, 2016: 5) Data 
published by Kirklees Council in 2016 reported that 1 in 3 households in Kirklees 
live in poverty and 1 in 4 households have an annual income of less than £10,000, 
(Kirklees Council, 2016: 7) despite levels of unemployment being at their lowest 
since 2005, at around 2% (Kirklees Council, 2016a: 15).  Amongst families living in 
Kirklees in receipt of child benefit, 30% receive both child tax credit and working 
tax credit and just under 1 in 5 children in Kirklees live in poverty (18%) (Kirklees 
Council, 2016: 7).  In Kirklees, 16% of those in employment work in 
manufacturing: the ONS Business Register and Employment Survey (BRES) 
reports that the percentage of Kirklees residents employed in manufacturing is 
double that of the UK population. After this the most common occupations are 
healthcare, education and retail: 13% of Kirklees employees work in health and 
social care, 12% work in education (3% higher than the UK population) and 11% of 
work in retail (Kirklees Council: Kirklees, 2016a: 15). Manufacture, health and social 
care and retail have been identified by the government as low pay sectors (BIS, 
2016), whilst the Resolution Foundation recently reported on pressing and on-going 
concerns about unlawful underpayment in the care sector- citing a recent case 
where a single care provider was forced to repay 3,000 staff over £600,000 in arrears 
of pay (Gardiner, 2015:2). 
 
In this context, it is unsurprising that four of the fifteen policies proposed as part of 
Kirklees Council’s strategy to tackle poverty in Kirklees focus on changing the 
behaviour of employers. Given these socio-economic factors, it is likely that a legal 
needs assessment of the community in Kirklees would identify unresolved, 
justiciable employment problems, which, if dealt with successfully, could help to 
ensure workers receive the payments and benefits they are entitled to and 
disincentivise poor behaviour on the part of employers. The following interview 
excerpt from an interview with the employment supervisor at KCALC expands on 
this reasoning:  
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“There are employers, and I think you've probably heard examples this morning, who are very exploitative: 
someone who's just had a lady come in downstairs who was told that she was going to be paid at the 
national minimum wage and they said: "oh no, you actually volunteered" and forged her signature on a 
document to try to prove that she had volunteered with them and not paid her for 2 months (she had decided 
not to go to University on the basis that she could go straight into a job with this company).  There [are] a 
number of areas of employment that are on our top ten most wanted list. Care work, care homes, that sort of 
thing, provision of care in people's homes is a typical example. We are continuously; I would say something 
like forty per cent of the calls we get are from care workers you know a huge number from that sector. 
Security guards. In this particular area, there are… about 40 firms around this area that manufacture 
bedding, they are: particularly bad employers…I had two clients call in, as a drop in, two young Asian men 
called in and one of them started talking and said "I work in a factory in Dewsbury I don't particularly 
want to say which one", and said "we're having problems at work with regard to holidays 
etc." [00:07:37] and I said "you work in bedding don't you?" And you can tell, because of their build, 
because it's really hard work is bedding, and these guys were muscular you know, big guys, and I said, you 
work in bedding don't you and they said: “yeah, that's right, I don't want to particularly say which one, but 
yes”. You get repeat offenders, time after time because nobody's doing enough about it”   
KCALC ES 
Given the evidence of unmet need identified in Kirklees in respect of employment 
law, it is concerning that the merger has not enabled the Law Centre to prioritise 
this area. In interviews at the Law Centre, it was expressed that the CAB tended to 
focus on the provision of advice in welfare benefits and debt, with housing coming 
a close third and employment being neglected as a priority. Whether it is the decline 
in availability of resources, or the strategic priorities of the CAB that has driven this 
resource allocation decision is difficult to discern, however, Law Centres looking to 
merge should be mindful that the organisation they choose to merge with has a 
compatible strategy for allocating resources.   
 
6.6.2.2 Merging with a CAB to survive and meeting need type 2: Delivering services to those 
whose interests are recognised under the extant legal framework, but who are vulnerable 
in the context of being able to successfully secure their rights, protection and fair 
treatment.  
Unlike Law Centres, Citizens Advice Bureau have significantly invested in delivering 
services via telephone and online; mediums of advice delivery that are being 
adopted by the combined CAB and Law Centre post the merger. The following 
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section discusses the potential implications of delivering services in this manner for 
Law Centre Value 2.2 and in the context of the vulnerability framework proposed in 
Chapter 4 
.  
6.6.2.3 The move to telephone triage and the ability to meet need type 2 
One important consequence of the merger has been to limit the face-to-face advice 
that is provided to clients. Research indicates that this reduction in face- to- face 
advice and the move to a telephone triage system may impact detrimentally on the 
ability of the Law Centre to target their services at the most vulnerable. Unlike Law 
Centres, CABs have developed a comprehensive online offering, and it is not 
unusual for CABs to make use of telephone triaging in order to limit the face-to-
face services they provide. In 2015, Jo Swinson, Minister for Business Innovation 
and Skills provided a written answer to parliament which states that the number of 
unique clients seen by CABs was declining due to:  
 
“…work undertaken to expand delivery through alternative channels; by phone and via the 
Adviceguide website. Clients are demanding more access to the service via these alternative channels 
and Kirklees bureau is reacting to this change in demand patterns.” (HC Deb 29 February 
2015 vol 592 c222637W).  
 
Unlike Law Centres, who have only recently begun to explore digital options for 
delivering advice, and whose members have often highlighted the inadequacy of 
online and telephone provision for meeting the needs of the most vulnerable (see 
Law Centre’s Network Written Evidence to the Justice Select Committee HC 311 
(2014: LAS 57:4), CABs have developed an extensive online offering and operated 
telephone advice services funded by the Money Advice Service and the Department 
of Business, Innovation and Skills. Post-merger, in keeping with this tradition, the 
newly formed KCALC reduced face-to-face general advice services, moving instead 
to a system whereby clients are “triaged” over the phone or encouraged by 
volunteers to self-help using computers. The aim of this was to restrict face-to-face 
general advice to the most vulnerable clients who would otherwise be unable to 
access services. The following interview excerpt with the Chief Executive of the 
Law Centre describes this new approach: 
 
 180 
So we're looking at trying to maintain two access points in Dewsbury and Huddersfield:  the front 
end bit if you like will probably be access to computers to try to get information there, or to 
telephones [00:09:22] to telephone through to the telephone front end. And then we'll try and keep 
face to face really for only those people who absolutely couldn't access services any other 
way. [00:09:43]   
KCALC CE 
 
One immediate concern is that this model of advice provision may prevent the 
most vulnerable claimants from coming to the attention of the service in the first 
place. If clients are unable to use the telephone to access the triage service, how will 
the law centre recognise their vulnerability and prioritise them for face-to-face 
advice? One Law Centre worker explained the challenges a move to telephone 
advice poses for vulnerable clients:  
 
“If you're giving somebody advice on the phone you're expecting them to pick up the phone and tell 
you exactly what's happened and they've got all the papers in front of them and they're going 
through all the costing and quite a lot of clients they might not be able to read the paperwork or 
they don't have the paperwork a lot of them don't open their post. I had one client who, his way of 
dealing with his post was to put the letters under the carpet and they letters would just sit under the 
carpet, so until somebody goes into that house and gets the letters from under the carpet you're trying 
to get information from an individual who doesn't have the knowledge or the capacity to give you the 
information that you need in order to be able to help them.” 
KCALC CC NQS 
 
As discussed above in the framework developed at Chapter 4, those who belong to 
a minority group, have English as a foreign language, experience difficulty 
processing, organising or articulating information (as a result of mental illness, 
learning disability or drug dependency) should be considered more vulnerable than 
others in the context of being able to achieve a procedurally just outcome in relation 
to their justiciable problem. Research indicates that these factors also put individuals 
at greater risk of service exclusion if the provision of the service is via a telephone 
(Balmer et al. 2012:6 citing Pearson & Davis 2002, George 2002, McKinstry & 
Sheikh 2006, Griffith & Burton 2011). Balmer et al.’s 2012 study of telephone 
advice also indicated that those with mental health issues were far less likely to use 
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telephone advice (Balmer et al. 2012:21) A separate study published in 2013 (Smith 
et al. 2013:264) indicated that young people aged 16-24 were less likely to use the 
telephone to access advice.  As such, there is some evidence to justify a concern that 
the introduction of telephone triaging may deter some of those individuals who are 
most vulnerable or dealing with the most complex cases from accessing the advice 
and support that they need- diminishing the ability of the Law Centre to address the 
needs of the most vulnerable.   
 
6.6.2.4 Individuals from BAME backgrounds and workplace discrimination   
 
Busby et al. (2015) writing on behalf of the Institute of Employment Rights in a 
submission to a consultation issued by the Law Society, repeatedly emphasise the 
disproportionate barriers facing low- income workers experiencing employment 
problems, including discrimination. The inadequacy of the fee remission scheme, 
the high burden of proof in evidencing discrimination and low levels of successful 
enforcement of judgements once made (Busby et al, 2015:7-9) have the authors 
argued, contributed to a situation where:  
 
“the actual enforcement of employment rights has become the exception, not the norm, restricted to 
those few highly paid individuals for whom legal costs and fees are not a significant burden… There 
is no evidence that fees have deterred weak or vexatious claims, instead they have deterred all types 
of claims, but especially those important claims for low amounts or which are hard to prove” 
(Busby et al. 2015:9)  
 
Those who are at risk of certain types of workplace discrimination, (women, 
individuals from BAME groups, individuals with mental or physical disabilities) are 
disproportionately represented in low-income occupations (Clarke and D’Arcy, 
2016). Certain protected characteristics under Equality Law, intersect with the 
criteria identified as constituting vulnerability in the framework developed at 
Chapter 4. Poverty may be considered to exacerbate the factors that render an 
individual vulnerable in the context of being able to pursue a legal claim 
successfully.  Poverty is not distributed equally across ethnic groups in Kirklees: a 
higher percentage of BAME residents in Kirklees live in households with annual 
incomes of less than £10,000 (38% versus 21%) (Kirklees Council, 2016: 5) Nearly 
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half of black and mixed ethnic group residents in Kirklees reported worrying about 
money most or all of the time. (Kirklees Council, 2016: 10). The council’s Tackling 
Poverty strategy reflects the intersection between poverty and other factors, stating 
their commitment to: “addressing issues such as discrimination, which reduce 
opportunities for some groups”. In this context it is particularly troubling that data 
gathered at the Law Centre indicates that the changes to the way in which legal aid 
funding discrimination law advice is accessed, may be detrimentally impacting on 
the ability of individuals with justiciable, meritorious claims for discrimination to 
access the legal advice and representation they are entitled to.  As stated above, the 
merger was unable to preserve capacity in face-to-face specialist employment advice 
at the level it had existed at prior to the cuts. In the context of this reduced capacity, 
there is a concern that the Law Centre is impeded from targeting their support at 
those who are most vulnerable in the context of accessing the rights that are 
afforded to them under the extant legal framework.  
6.6.3 The impact of merging with a CAB to survive on Terminal Value 3: 
Law Centres are staffed by specialist, expert legal professionals  
 
On the part of the Law Centre, the immediate impetus to merge was provided by 
the uncertain financial circumstances the Law Centre found itself in, and the 
pressing desire to secure funding to facilitate the retention of specialist legal 
expertise within the Law Centre. The following excerpt from an interview with the 
Law Centre Chief Executive explains his reasoning prior to the merger:  
 
“We're hoping really that the merger will give us some financial stability, that's a big plus for us 
because CAB have a reasonable level of reserves and we have none so it makes life easier that way. 
We should be able to integrate some higher level management roles and we should be able to make 
some sort of efficiency savings around things like finance worker, insurances, and those sort of joint 
costs so there may be some savings there”.  
KCALC CE 
 
In addition, it was hoped that being part of a larger organisation would open up 
new opportunities to secure additional funding, as the Law Centre Chief Executive 
explained:  
 
 183 
“We did apply for a contract with [00:56:19] Citizens Advice in Hampshire, for, basically as a 
support service for their employment teams across the whole region …though it went down quite 
well we didn't, we didn't get it on, on cost in the end but it was the only one we'd applied for and 
really had no idea, but there may be some more things like that and I'm thinking once we'll be 
inside Citizen's Advice it may be easier to pick up on things like that.”.  
Interview with KCALC CE  
It was also felt that the relative longevity of the Citizens Advice brand and their 
existing relationship with the Local Authority would help to protect the Law Centre 
from future cuts, as this excerpt from an interview with a Law Centre employee 
demonstrates:  
 
“I think it will make us a lot more, we'll be more identifiable particularly with the local authority 
because I know that the local authority are very closely connected with the CAB and it's very 
unlikely that the local authority are going to let go of the CAB. There's always going to be some 
sort of element of support so because we're in with that, that makes a big difference. I also think the 
CAB's visibility and its brand and it's nationally recognised, if I say to somebody "I work for a 
community law centre" they'll say- "oh what's that?" if I say, oh we work with the CAB they 
automatically know.” 
KCALC CCTL  
 
Throughout the process of merging the Chief Executive of KLC prioritised the 
retention of specialist, expert legal advice. Where redundancies were called for as 
part of the merger the Chief Executive chose to keep more expensive, expert staff 
at the expense of advisors who provided general (as in, non-legal) advice, as the 
following interview excerpt explains:  
 
“The thinking is to try to keep people with the highest levels of knowledge and I guess lose people 
with lesser skills and replace them with volunteers who can be skilled up or mentored or 
trained  supported you know all those things but it does mean yes, a lot of volunteers replacing 
existing paid staff. 
Interview with KCALC CE 
The Chief Executive of KCALC was also committed to maximising the efficacy of 
the specialist expertise retained through building a team working approach to 
undertaking casework, contrasting with the traditional model of individualised 
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casework that is an accepted tenet of traditional legal professional practice. The 
Chief Executive of KCALC saw this team working approach- whereby a 
multidisciplinary team within the Law Centre “owned” the client and their case, 
rather than the case being owned by an individual solicitor or caseworker, as a 
means of delivering a holistic approach for clients whilst ensuring that the time and 
skills of each team member were being put to the most effective use. The following 
excerpt describes this approach:  
 
“We're hoping that… [the approach means] we can get the people who are specialists, who have the 
real sort of knowledge to deal with those cases and those bits of cases that need those skills, and 
that experience and that knowledge to supervise people dealing with less complicated things and also 
to have those other people supporting so that if somebody's perhaps got a complex case but part of 
that case, what we find is that people come in anyway, they're seeing a solicitor but they still come in 
and say oh I've had this letter from the DWP and they've stopped my benefit because I didn't send 
a sick note, that doesn't need a solicitor to look at it that just needs someone to say "well go and get 
a sick note" but: “ If you need me to I'll send it off for you”. You don't want a solicitor doing that 
so it's about trying to get a good enough team operation that you can get people to deal with stuff at 
an appropriate level that client doesn't belong to a particular person a or solicitor  it's the team's 
case and somebody will deal with it.”  
Interview with KCALC CE  
In addition to retaining expertise, KCALC had historically been effective at 
developing and building the legal expertise and skills of its staff, in order to develop 
solicitors with the expertise in law and client working most valuable to the Law 
Centre. Prior to the merger KCALC had committed to providing a training contract 
to one of their employees who was about to qualify as the merger took place. The 
Chief Executive of KCALC planned to retain her post merger as a newly qualified 
solicitor in their Community Care team. Reflecting on her experience of her training 
contract and the importance of the legal skills she had learned at the Law Centre she 
expressed that the training she had received with KCALC had encouraged her to 
see herself as part of a “bigger picture” adopting a creative, problem solving 
approach to lawyering, and feeding back lessons from her practice to groups 
involved in policy work and lobbying for changes in the law:   
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I also think that there's a very analytical way of thinking when you're taking in problems and your 
looking for solutions for how to [00:33:42] effectively get your client from one end to another end, 
it's something you learn from your training [and] quite often on the LPC it's not really from 
academia it's about going through this process, how you start this process, how you get to the end 
and all the steps that you've got to go through in between, for whatever area of law that it is that 
you're doing, so it's a problem solving approach with a personal touch too. I guess we can feed that 
through to policy groups and to wider groups that campaign for social change and to give them those 
statistics, those case studies, those examples of how [the law is] really put into practice and how 
things can be effective and how things need to change. I know that we feedback a lot of our decisions 
to CPAG and campaign work like that which in turn lobby government so we're part and parcel 
of that bigger wheel.   
Interview with KCALC CC NQS 
 
The deliberate strategy of prioritising the retention of expertise through the process 
of the merger and restructure is indicative of a management that is cognizant of and 
committed to the values that make Law Centres distinctive. It must be emphasised 
that this is not an inevitable function of the strategy of merging to survive, but 
rather a deliberate and tactical approach to navigating a process that could have 
proved detrimental to Law Centres values- as such it may be seen to attest more to 
the abilities and awareness of the Chief Executive of KCALC than to the strategy of 
merging in general.  
 
6.6.4 The impact of merging with a CAB to survive on Terminal Value 4: 
Law Centres are empathic allies of their clients 
 
One immediate impact of the merger on the way in which Law Centre staff were 
able to work with clients was the move to a telephone triage system, the 
implications of which are discussed above at 6.5.2 However, it was evident from the 
fieldwork that the merger had not changed the way in which Law Centre staff 
related to the clients that they were able to work with face- to- face, having been 
referred through the triage system.  
 
The culture of the Law Centre management, perhaps as a function of the distinctive 
history of the Law Centre, it’s relative “newness” and it’s historic reliance on legal 
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aid funding, meant that the atmosphere in the Law Centre prior to the merger was 
more akin to that of a traditional solicitors office. Commenting on the distinctive 
culture of the Law Centre, the Chief Executive of Kirklees Citizens Advice stated:  
 
 “Law Centre, I think, the clue is in the word "law" centre…it kind of feels like a solicitors office. 
I think the other thing about the Law Centre that I've found is that the culture there is very much 
that [Law Centre CE and Law Centre Supervising Solicitor do all the management stuff and the 
other people just focus on clients and do their casework and they don't bother themselves about the 
running of the place by an large- that's not true in a CAB, the volunteers, as I've had today, 
they're all very interested in what you're up to and so yes, much more interest throughout the 
organisation … So those are the differences I would say”.   Interview with KCAB CE 
 
As previous chapters have discussed, this “corporate” management style is atypical 
within the Law Centres movement (Mayo et al. 2014:108). It is possible that this 
distinctive style developed as a function of the way in which the Kirklees Law 
Centre was established- in discussing the factors that facilitated the survival of Law 
Centres who generated their income through legal aid contracts, the former Chief 
Executive of the Law Centres Network stated:  
 
“…every law centre…, well not long into my time with LCN, had at that point taken up Legal 
Aid contracts but not all of them had embraced the whole, not so much management culture but I 
think basics of running a legal practice, having the office manual, having the systems in place and 
everybody working to the same systems and having the supervision. And the most important thing, 
I always thought, was proper file supervision…that sort of thing, and not every law centre adopted 
that, it was a struggle but each Law Centre had its own individual way of doing things.. [KLC 
Chief Executive] came from the LSC he'd been partnership manager at the LSC so he was very 
able, very good on running the contracts…We didn't have very many problems at all actually at 
Kirklees in terms of managing it, getting the contracts up and running, recruiting the caseworkers, 
they were very fortunate they got a good manager in [KLC Chief Executive], they got good 
caseworkers who could basically run the legal aid contracts and make them pay”  [Interview with 
SH].  
 
However, whilst the management style might have had more in common with 
private practice, it was apparent that the training provided at KCALC had helped 
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staff to develop skills in working with extremely vulnerable clients in an empathic 
and supportive manner. This expertise in working with the most vulnerable clients 
in a manner that conveys understanding and solidarity is key to delivering the Law 
Centre Value of being empathic allies of their clients. In the following interview 
extract the interviewee describes the approach the she adopts in relation to 
Community Care casework and expresses her views regarding the importance of 
being able to conduct face-to-face outreach work with clients with Community Care 
needs:  
 
I think for quite a lot of the community care clients in particular they don't know what 's 
wrong  they're not happy, they're not coping but they don't understand what it is that we can do to 
help them. They don't know what their rights are, quite often they've always lived the way that 
they're living or it's become normal, so it's very difficult for them to tell me what they want or what 
they need [00:16:43] so I think it's quite important that I can take the time with them to try and 
work out what's happened to them and to get a bit of background and to go through things and to 
try and identify what might be the problem... And it's really straightforward, but I can’t see how 
you can give quality advice that's effective and that's going to be long term if you're not getting the 
right information to start with, and when your starting point is that individual client you've got to 
do your damnedest to get that from them and for me it tends to be going into people's homes and 
literally going through their papers, and that's something they've got to allow me to do and feel 
comfortable with me doing, and asking questions that they might not necessarily know the answer 
to or might not even have occurred to them”  
KCALC CC NQS 
 
This attitude permeated staff attitudes throughout the organisation: from trainee 
level to the supervising solicitor, as the following excerpt attests to:  
  
“Our senior solicitor, his motto is "I will appeal anything, I will appeal everything" so any decision 
that comes through [senior solicitor] will take that decision and he will analyse it and he will pull it 
apart and he will challenge it regardless, I mean obviously he's doing it for his client so we're doing 
it from a one sided approach but before I came here, particularly before I came to the Law Centre I 
would never stand up and challenge a Judge’s decision, I would not go to a first tier tribunal and 
come back and say "oh that judge was wrong" and he's taught me that people in higher positions of 
authority, that governments, that local authorities can make decisions that are wrong and you have 
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to…look at that decision and be able to pick it out for errors in law and challenge it and I don't 
think that that's something that a support worker or somebody without that legal background 
would, it might not even occur to them- it didn't occur to me before coming here”  KCALC CC 
NQS 
 
From the above evidence it may be observed that KCALC is, at present, highly 
effective in providing training that promotes the development of the types of legal 
and client expertise that are intrinsic to Law Centre values.  It is perhaps too early to 
predict whether merging with the CAB, whose culture and approach to casework is 
characterised as less adversarial, will impact on the ethos and skills of the lawyers 
trained within the joint organisation.  
 
6.6.5 The impact of merging with a CAB to survive on Terminal Value 5: 
The communities in which Law Centres are based and the clients 
they work with have higher levels of legal knowledge and are better 
able to secure their rights protection and fair treatment 
 
The fieldwork raised relatively few lessons regarding the impact of the merger on 
the ability of KCALC to carry out community education about the law. The strategy 
of working in partnership with other agencies, adopted to create referral pathways 
in the immediate aftermath of the merger, provided opportunities for Law Centre 
staff to demonstrate the potential role of the law in solving social problems-. The 
access to funding opportunities through the CAB network, and in particular their 
work on financial capability and inclusion, might provide the opportunity for the 
combined CAB and Law Centre to develop the education aspect of their work at a 
later date. Post the merger- the combined Law Centre and CAB continued to 
support a partnership with Huddersfield University, training law students to 
represent clients in welfare benefits tribunals, this may be considered a form of 
community legal education, albeit a more restricted one than the original founders 
of the Law Centre movement might have envisaged.  
6.7 Conclusion  
The case study described above may be considered to exemplify best practice in 
mergers between not for profits: the two organisations involved manifest all of the 
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features that the academic literature on organisational mergers identifies as being 
critical to a successful outcome. In this respect the experience of the Law Centre 
may be considered relatively unusual. The excellent leadership, positive pre-existing 
relationship and thoughtful approach demonstrated by the heads of the two 
organisations prior to the merger meant that many of the pitfalls identified as 
commonly experienced in voluntary sector mergers were avoided. As such, the case 
study may be considered useful for Law Centres wishing to consider the potential 
impact of merging with another organisation on their ability to deliver their values 
even when the outcome of the merger is positive in its own terms.  
 
The decision to merge with an organisation that is culturally and historically less 
comfortable with undertaking activities aimed at challenging, reforming and/or 
extending the law to improve the position of those who are disadvantaged by the 
legal framework as it stands, may have implications for the ability of Law Centres 
who adopt this strategy to deliver Ideal Type Law Centre Terminal Value 1(Law 
Centres improve the position of economically disadvantaged individuals and groups 
within the extant legal framework). Further to this, it is unlikely that two 
organisations will share all the same priorities, as such, merging may require one or 
both organisations to compromise on their values. In the case of Kirklees Law 
Centre, there is some evidence to suggest that the decision to merge with an 
organisation that has not prioritised the retention of specialist legal advice in 
employment law, despite evidence of local need and is committed to digital and 
telephone triage, may impact on the ability of the Law Centre to target their services 
at the most vulnerable clients, potentially undermining their ability to deliver Law 
Centre Ideal Type Terminal Value 2 (Law Centres deliver their services to those in 
greatest need). However, merging with an organisation that is both financially 
stable, and a member of a large, comparatively well -resourced network with a 
distinctive brand identity and a track record of accessing government funding does 
offer the new organisation the opportunity to stabilise its financial position and 
retain many specialist staff, to a greater extent than would otherwise be possible. As 
is stated above, this is not an inevitable function of the merger but rather a 
deliberate strategy driven by the Law Centre management: as such Law Centres 
considering adopting this strategy should ensure they prioritise this in merger 
discussions in order that they remain able to deliver Law Centre Ideal Type 
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Terminal Value 3 (Law Centres are staffed by specialist, expert legal professionals). 
The timing of the fieldwork, which was conducted shortly after the merger had 
taken place and before the restructure had been completed made it difficult to 
assess the impact of the merger on Law Centre Ideal Type Terminal Value 4 (Law 
Centres are empathic allies of their clients) and Law Centre Ideal Type Terminal 
Value 5 (The communities in which Law Centres are based and the clients they 
work with have higher levels of legal knowledge and are better able to secure their 
rights). In the case of the former whether the newly combined Law Centre is able to 
deliver this value is contingent on the ability of the new organisation to retain it’s 
existing staff and train new staff to work in the manner adopted by the current staff. 
In the case of the latter, the extent to which the newly formed organisation will be 
able to deliver legal education to improve the legal knowledge of the community 
and clients depends on their ability to secure funding to develop this function- as 
this does not flow naturally from the strategy.  
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7 CHAPTER 7: EXPANDING THE FUNDING BASE FOR LAW 
CENTRES WITH PROJECT FUNDING - THE EXPERIENCE OF 
COVENTRY LAW CENTRE 
 
7.1 Introduction 
As described in Chapter 2 above, by the time the LASPO cuts to funding for Legal 
Aid were introduced in 2013, the majority of Law Centres were heavily reliant on 
two sources of funding: contracts for delivering legal aid, and grants from local 
authorities for providing legal advice and assistance. The way in which these 
funding streams were structured, broadly speaking, meant that payment was 
contingent on demonstrating that units of advice had been delivered to individuals 
who met particular criteria: as such, the funding was both legal services specific and 
focussed on outputs, rather than outcomes. As a result, Law Centres on the whole 
were not used to collecting data on the range of ways in which timely legal advice 
and representation can ameliorate complex social problems. The lack of data 
demonstrating the impact of legal advice and representation on a range of outcomes 
for individuals made it harder for Law Centres (and legal aid lawyers more generally) 
to make the case for the value of their services to general audiences (beyond the 
legal profession and those who had previous experience of accessing legal services).  
The following chapter describes the experience of Coventry Law Centre, who 
adopted a strategy for responding to the cuts that sought to address this problem 
and in doing so, expand the range of funding sources available to the Law Centre. 
In describing the strategy, the Chief Executive of CLC stated that: “We’ve made 
significant changes to how we deliver our work, the outcomes we expect to achieve 
and how we measure our impact. We’ve made a shift from the main focus being 
one of solving legal problems, to a wider view that now also embraces a greater 
concern for the lives of our clients…We know we can’t take for granted that 
everyone considers access to expert social welfare legal advice to be as important as 
access to healthcare or education, so we have made it our business to be able to 
show it” (Bent, 2017:3). In practical terms, this strategy entails shifting to project 
based funding, secured from funders who may not be used to funding legal advice 
and working in partnership with other agencies to demonstrate the impact of access 
to legal advice and representation on a range of outcomes, such as health, wellbeing 
and poverty. 
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This approach of expanding the range of potential funders, which necessitates the 
positioning of access to the law as a tool, rather than an end in itself, is highly 
congruent with the vision of role and value of the law subscribed to by the founders 
of the Law Centre movement. However, in the context of low levels of public 
understanding of the law and legal system (Pleasence et al. 2015), negative publicity 
regarding the cost-efficacy and indeed integrity of lawyers and a culture of 
nervousness around the rules on campaigning for charitable trusts- how scalable is 
this approach? Does designing projects with the aim of attracting funding from 
generalist funders risk subordinating specialist legal casework and strategic litigation 
in favour of activities that generalist funders are familiar with and more readily able 
to understand and justify to their trustees? This chapter reports on the first project 
that Coventry Law Centre undertook to trial this strategy: embedding a legal advisor 
in a team of social workers working with families as part of the Troubled Families 
Programme. In 2012, CLC received £75,000 funding from a coalition of charitable 
funders through the Future Advice Fund Programme, coordinated by The Baring 
Foundation. This money was used to finance CLC to deliver a tiered model of 
embedded advice to families being supported by Coventry City Council’s Troubled 
Families Team, who were tasked with supporting and “turning around” families 
with multiple and complex problems. The Troubled Families Programme was 
designed to operate on a payment by results basis. CLC reached an agreement with 
Coventry City Council that if they could demonstrate the value of the provision of 
this advice to both the Troubled Families Team and the families they worked with 
as part of the scheme, the Council would agree to continue funding the work of 
CLC after the philanthropic funding ended. The Future Advice Fund Programme 
provided funding for an evaluation of the impact of the project on both the 
operation of the Troubled Families Team and the families worked with as part of 
the scheme. This evaluation was used to successfully demonstrate the value of the 
scheme to Coventry City Council, who took over the funding of the model when 
the philanthropic funding expired. As such, the case study of the Troubled Families 
project represents the “holy grail” of grant-making for the philanthropic funder- a 
project that delivers its agreed outcomes, demonstrates substantial benefit for client, 
transitions along a: “path to sustainability” (Grossman et al. 2013:3) through 
securing next stage funding and is potentially scalable. The project was shortlisted 
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for The Lawyer magazines’ Ethical Initiative of the Year Award. In 2016, the Chief 
Executive of CLC credited the Troubled Families project with: “unlocking a new way 
of thinking about things to attract new income and replace legal aid funding. We haven’t shrunk. 
We’ve grown.” The adoption of this income generation strategy means that CLC has 
now completely replaced lost legal aid funding with new sources of funding. By 
2017, CLC had attracted support from 30 different funders, including a range of 
foundations and trust funds, the private sector and local universities (Bent, 2017:1).   
 
The chapter begins by exploring the national context for the strategy of growing the 
sources of funding for legal advice and representation through project funding. It 
then describes the operation of the Troubled Families project, before moving to 
explore the implications of working in this manner for Law Centre values, drawing 
on evidence from the evaluation of the Troubled Families project. It describes the 
significant benefits of this model, including the way in which working in this 
manner can both help to extend legal services to vulnerable individuals who might 
otherwise fail to access them, and reinforce the relationship between the client 
community and the Law Centre. The chapter concludes that whilst working in this 
manner appears to be largely congruent with Law Centre values, there are risks, 
especially in relation to the ability to use the law to bring about social change and 
the retention of specialist legal advice. 
 
7.2 Growing the funding base- the national picture  
Prior to 2010, Law Centres were heavily reliant on legal services-specific public 
funding to finance their work.  The three mains sources of Law Centre income were 
legal aid, local authority grants and funding from the Government Equalities Office. 
In their 2009-2010 Annual Review, the Law Centres Federation38 stated that: “Law 
Centres’ sustainability relies mainly on two different areas of funding: Legal Services 
Commission contracts for the provision of legal aid and Local Authority 
funding…” (LCF, 2010:4). Research published by the Baring Foundation confirmed 
this, stating that prior to LASPO, 46% of all Law Centres’ funding came from legal 
aid (Randall and Smerdon, 2014:7).  Grants from local authorities for the provision 
of advice constituted the majority of the remainder. Many Law Centres also 
                                                
38 (now renamed Law Centres Network) 
 194 
received funding from the Equalities and Human Rights Commission: from 2009 
the Commission provided £3.2million of funding to support a programme of face-
to-face legal advice for non-legal aid eligible individuals facing discrimination.  
Reflecting the funding landscape of the time, prior to 2010 the work of the Law 
Centres Federation Development Support Team primarily focussed on supporting 
the network of Law Centres to secure and manage legal aid contracts and assisting 
members to build their capacity to participate in public procurement processes 
(LCF, 2010:9).   
 
The election of a Conservative-Liberal Democrat government in 2010 and their 
commitment to austerity policies aimed at reducing public spending heralded a rapid 
decline in the availability of public funding for legal advice and representation. In 
addition to the changes to legal aid funding ushered in by LASPO, drastic cuts to 
local authority budgets were announced- a memorandum submitted to the Public 
Bill Committee by Law Centres Federation in response to LASPO stated that 
members were experiencing an average 53% cut in funding from local government 
(LCF, July 2011). In 2012 the Government Equalities Office took the decision to 
defund the Equalities and Human Rights Commission administered programme of 
face-to-face legal advice, a move that impacted severely on Law Centres already 
beleaguered budgets. As such the availability of legal service specific public funding, 
both national and local, was declining rapidly, with stark implications for the future 
of Law Centres.   
 
Responding to the new funding climate, in 2014 Law Centres Network amended 
their strategic goals, to include: “finding new sources of funding for Law Centres, taking the 
lead on attracting funding where appropriate such as with European Union funding and forging 
new partnerships with non-legal agencies so that clients get a more holistic service” (LCN, 
2015:5). Priorities set by Law Centres Network for 2014 included: “obtaining more 
funding for Law Centres including at the European level” (LCN, 2015:2) and: “increasing 
collaboration between Law Centres and a new focus on working with non-legal agencies” (LCN, 
2015:2). Key partners in helping Law Centres Network to develop this area of work 
were Trust for London and the Future Advice Fund- a coalition of funders39 
                                                
39 Comic Relief, The Diana Princess of Wales Memorial Fund and Unbound Philanthropy (a private foundation 
which makes grants in both the US and the UK) 
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brought together by the Baring Foundation to help support the advice sector in the 
wake of successive cuts to their traditional sources of income. The Future Advice 
Fund programme awarded grants to both Law Centres Network and individual Law 
Centres to develop new income streams. The programme distributed resources with 
the aim of supporting: “the building of a series of bridges to a future system of effective social 
welfare legal advice services” (Smerdon and Randall, 2013:2). The Future Advice Fund 
programme accepted applications for funding from organisations seeking to: i) 
attract new sources of income, ii.) make the most effective use of resources, iii.) 
strengthen their organisations to become sustainable in the face of an uncertain 
funding environment, iv.) make strategic use of the law, v.) build the evidence base 
for advice and vi.) advocate and campaign for the importance of advice (Smerdon 
and Randall, 2013:2). The Future Advice Fund Programme was divided into three 
strands: i) The Providers Fund- a grants programme of up to £2million over three 
years to: “(a.) help frontline advice providers to develop and implement ideas for 
restructuring and organisational development that will put their organisations on a 
more sustainable footing; and (b.) generate tools, resources and lessons on the 
future sustainability of advice services that are of benefit to the wider advice sector”. 
Coventry Law Centre received funding for their work with Troubled Families from 
the Providers fund. The other two streams of the Future Advice Fund Programme 
were the Strategic Fund, which made grants and commissions of up to £2million 
over three years in order to bring about: “a more supportive policy and funding 
environment for advice” (Smerdon and Randall, 2013:2) and The Learning 
Programme which aimed to support grantees to systematically capture, report and 
disseminate learning from the grants awarded under the Future Advice Fund 
Programme.  
 
The funders involved in designing the Future Advice Fund programme placed 
specific emphasis on the importance of Law Centres and other advice agencies 
being able to demonstrate the impact of their services on a range of other social 
problems. A significant portion of the strategic fund was spent on exploring the 
evidence base linking the provision of legal advice with improved health outcomes. 
From the mid 2000’s onwards, researchers and civil society organisations began 
exploring the links between the experience of legal problems and a range of other 
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social issues, including financial well-being, family breakdown, experience of mental 
health, unemployment, criminality and homelessness (Muller, P. et al. 2011: 2 see 
also Legal Services Research Centre; 2010, Scope; 2011, Youth Access; 2011; Centre 
for Mental Health; 2013). The funders involved in designing the Future Advice 
Fund programme were committed to funding research and initiatives with the 
potential to: “demonstrate the different positive benefits advice has” (Smerdon and 
Randall, 2013:12) with a view to using this evidence to convince funders who had 
not previously funded legal advice and representation to fund in this area. The 
strategy paper that articulates the goals of the Future Advice Fund Programme 
specifically references local authorities, health agencies, the department of work and 
pensions, the department of communities and local government, the home office, 
EU bodies, housing associations and non-advice charities working in relevant fields 
such as mental health, criminal justice and poverty as potential sources of “new” 
money for the sector. Coventry Law Centre received a grant from the Future 
Advice Fund Programme to “seed-fund” the initial twelve months of the Troubled 
Families project discussed below: this project has been held up as an exemplar of 
what can be achieved through designing projects that demonstrate the impact of 
legal advice to non-traditional funders. The following section describes the genesis 
of this project.  
7.3 Expanding the pool of funders through project funding- the 
experience of Coventry Law Centre 
Coventry Legal & Income Rights Trust was established in 1976 to provide free, 
specialist legal advice and representation to disadvantaged individuals and groups 
resident in Coventry. In 2001 Coventry Law Centre Ltd was formed, acquiring the 
assets of Coventry Legal & Income Rights Trust. Coventry Law Centre Ltd. is both 
a company limited by guarantee and a registered charity, and continues the work of 
the Trust in accordance with the purpose expressed in the company’s memorandum 
of association. This states that the purpose of CLC Ltd is:  
i) The relief of financial hardship and other forms of distress among the 
people of the City of Coventry in England and others through the 
provision of legal and other advisory, representation and information 
services which they could not otherwise obtain through lack of means 
ii) The advancement of education of the public by the improvement and 
diffusion of knowledge of the law and the administration of justice, 
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having regard especially to those areas of the law which are of particular 
concern to poor people or are directed to the relief of poverty 
iii) To promote such other charitable purposes as are for the benefit of the 
people of the City of Coventry” (CLC Annual Accounts, 2014:4) 
 
As such, CLC’s mission and purpose expressly positions legal advice and 
representation as a means to achieving other social goals, rather than an end in 
itself. When asked to describe the distinctive feature of the Law Centre’s work, the 
Chief Executive emphasised this view of legal services as a tool, rather than an end 
in themselves, stating:  
 
“…Specialist legal knowledge… that's our unique selling point… The other part of our unique 
selling point is actually caring about people: wanting to use the law for good and actually wanting to 
get alongside people and understand their situation and for me it's those three things that make us 
powerful.” 
 
Coventry Law Centre (“CLC”) offers advice, representation and advocacy across a 
range of areas of law, including: Community Care, Debt and Money, 
Discrimination, Employment, Family Law, Housing, Immigration and Asylum, 
Public Law and Welfare Benefits. CLC employs a staff of 26 solicitors, experienced 
advice workers and community workers. It has continued to recruit trainees using 
funding provided by The Legal Education Foundation’s Justice First Fellowship- 
Coventry Law Centre now holds two traineeships funded through this project. Prior 
to April 2013, the Legal Services Commission (now the Legal Aid Agency) provided 
CLC’s second largest source of income after Coventry City Council. As such, CLC 
was highly exposed to the effects of LASPO- the impact of cuts to legal aid on CLC 
was highlighted as a major risk factor in the 2014 annual accounts. In 2014, CLC’s 
annual accounts reported that: “the most significant risks to the charity are 
reduction or loss of funding from the Legal Aid Agency or the charity’s other main 
funder, Coventry City Council…the trustees have planned for this and have 
adopted a strategy of bidding for funding from other sources” (CLC Annual 
Accounts, 2014:3). Instead of restricting themselves to seeking income from 
funders with a history of funding legal advice and representation, CLC’s leadership 
deliberately adopted a strategy of diversifying their funding base through applying 
for project funding. In an article published by New Philanthropy Capital entitled: 
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“How we faced swingeing cuts but came out swinging” (Bent, 2017) the Chief 
Executive of CLC stated: “our strategy has been to stay true to our values and to 
our belief that specialist legal expertise is critical in preventing and tackling 
problems faced by people who are disadvantaged in society…” (Bent, 2017:2). In 
designing projects, CLC pioneered approaches that demonstrated the role and value 
of legal services in resolving complex social problems and applied to funders whose 
objectives related to finding a solution to these problems. As the Chief Executive of 
CLC stated in 2017: “To find funding and create capacity for [our] work…we’ve 
had to form new alliances and reconsider the way we use our legal expertise…We’ve 
found other organisations that are prepared to buy our expertise in these areas 
because they can see it helps them achieve their own goals” (Bent, 2017:3). The 
genesis of this approach lay in a project that embedded a legal adviser within the 
Children’s Services Department at Coventry City Council, as the Chief Executive of 
the Law Centre explains:  “Our journey of change began with successfully securing 
funding from The Baring Foundation to pilot working alongside the local authority 
Children’s Services department, who were seeking to meet the outcomes defined 
within the Government Troubled Families agenda” (Bent, 2017:2). The Chief 
Executive expanded on the rationale for developing this project in the following 
terms:  
 
“I suppose the thing in my head was, well if the Ministry of Justice isn't going to pay for this work, 
we have to start thinking, "who else does it matter to?" How can we persuade people who have got 
other targets that they are trying to achieve, that actually access to specialist legal advice and getting 
and having specialist legal advice is important for the client group that they are trying to work with, 
and if that's removed by the removal of Legal Aid, the activity that they're interested in, the goals 
they are trying to achieve for those clients are going to be undermined? Troubled Families was…the 
first opportunity I saw that made me think "That's actually our client group"- we know that they 
have legal need, it's new money and the  thing to do would be to persuade the government that its 
critical, in terms of the targets they are trying to achieve with those families [to have access to legal 
advice]. So it came from those two little seeds really and it was the opportunity that it was going to 
be new funding that made me think: “Right, well that's what we should do" 
Interview with CLC CE 
The following section describes the operation of the Troubled Families Programme 
at a national and local level, and demonstrates the way in which the structure of the 
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programme leant itself to the design of a project capable of demonstrating the value 
of legal advice in terms that enabled the Law Centre to make the case for 
sustainable, on-going funding.  
 
7.4 Understanding the Troubled Families programme 
The Troubled Families Programme was jointly announced in December 2011 by 
Prime Minister David Cameron and Communities Secretary Eric Pickles40 with the 
aim of incentivising local authorities to work with those families whose problems 
were most complex and intractable and therefore, according to the government, 
most costly to the state. The scheme operated on a payment by results basis and 
provided new resource to local government to work with families in a more holistic 
manner.  The programme was developed in order to fulfil the current Prime 
Minister’s commitment to ensure that 120,000 “Troubled Families” are ‘turned 
around’ by 2015 (although the programme has now been extended to 2016).  
Households are classed as “Troubled Families” qualifying for this programme if:  
a. They are involved in crime and anti-social behaviour; 
b. Have children not in school 
c. Have an adult in receipt of out of work benefits. 
d. Incur high costs to the public purse 
 
The Department for Communities and Local Government stated in March 2012 
that the cost of these 120,000 Troubled Families to the state is approximately 
£9billion per annum, the vast majority of which is spent on reacting to problems 
experienced by these families after they have occurred41.  
 
The Troubled Families Programme introduced a payment-by- results model to 
“incentivise and encourage local authorities to grasp the nettle: to develop new ways of working with 
these families, which focus on lasting change.”42 In December 2011, Local Authorities 
across England were provided with figures detailing the indicative numbers of 
                                                
40https://www.gov.uk/government/news/tackling-troubled-families 
41Department for Communities and Local Government [2012] “The Troubled Families programme: Financial 
Framework for the Troubled Families programme’s payment-by-results scheme for local authorities, p2 
Available at: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/11469/2117840.pdf 
42Ibid. 
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Troubled Families in their area. This figure represented the number of families that 
Local Authorities were required to ‘turn around’ by 2015. Local Authorities were 
then requested to compile a list of the families known to them who met the 
compulsory requirements of the scheme.  
 
7.4.1 Identifying “Troubled Families”  
Local authorities were asked to identify “Troubled Families” that they would be 
working with according to three compulsory criteria: households containing young 
people involved in crime and/or families involved in anti-social behaviour, 
households affected by truancy or exclusion from school, and, if these two criteria 
are met, households which also contain an adult on out of work benefits. The 
programme mandates that all families who meet these three criteria should be 
included in the programme. In addition, local authorities were invited to add a 
“local discretion” criterion for inclusion, enabling them to add families to the 
programme who meet two of the compulsory criteria and are a cause for concern 
for other reasons. In determining the local discretion criteria for inclusion, local 
authorities were asked to have regard to the amount of resource spent on families 
meeting this criteria, in order that the programme continue to target those families 
who cost most to the public purse. Examples of this additional criteria provided in 
the programme guidance include:  “families with a particular subset of health 
problems”, or “families subject to frequent police call outs”.  Local authorities were 
asked to have identified one third of the “Troubled Families” they intended to work 
with in 2012/13 and the majority of the families by 2013/14.  
7.4.2 The payment by results model 
As stated above, the Troubled Families Programme operated on a payment by 
results model, where local authorities were paid a percentage of the funding for 
working with Troubled Families as results based payment in arrears, contingent on 
their ability to demonstrate measurable improvement against the inclusion criteria 
(see Figure 7.1 below). In recognition of the upfront costs associated with 
restructuring services to cater to the needs of the Troubled Families, and to 
minimize risk, the Department for Communities and Local Government offered a 
percentage of the funding as an attachment fee, for commencing working with the 
families. However, the number of attachment fees available will reflect only those 
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who the Local Authority works with successfully (rather than every family that the 
Local Authority commences working with)43.  In recognition of the fact that Local 
Authorities “may not succeed in turning around every family” local authorities were 
encouraged to work with more families than their indicative numbers. 
Figure 7-1: Attachment fee versus payment by results 44 
Total funding available per family =£4000 
Year % Of payment offered as upfront 
attachment fee 
% Of payment offered as a results- based 
payment in arrears 
2012/13 80% 20% 
2013/14 60% 40% 
2014/15 40% 60% 
 
Figure 7-2: Results based payment from central government 45 
Result Attachment 
Fee 
Results 
payment 
Total 
They achieve all 3 of the education and crime/anti-social 
behavior measures set out below where relevant: 
1. Each child in the family has had fewer than 3 fixed 
exclusions and less than 15% of unauthorized absences 
in the last 3 school terms; and 
2. A 60% reduction in anti-social behavior across the 
family in the last 6 months; and 
3. Offending rate by all minors in the family reduced by at 
least a 33% in the last 6 months  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
£3,200 per 
family 
 
 
 
 
 
£700 per family  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
£4,000 per 
family  
If they do not enter work, but achieve the “progress to work” 
(one adult in the family has either volunteered for the Work 
Programme or attached to the European Social Fund 
provision in the last 6 months)  
 
 
 
£100 per family  
OR 
At least one adult in the family has moved off out-of-work 
benefits into continuous employment in the last 6 months 
(and is not on the European Social Fund Provision or Work 
Programme to avoid double payment)  
 
£3,200 per 
family  
 
£800 per family  
 
£4,000 per 
family  
 
                                                
43Department for Communities and Local Government [2012] “The Troubled Families programme: Financial 
Framework for the Troubled Families programme’s payment-by-results scheme for local authorities, p8 
Available at: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/11469/2117840.pdf 
44Ibid. 
45Ibid. 
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7.5 The Operation of the Troubled Families Programme in Coventry 
Coventry City Council’s Troubled Families Team sits alongside their Children and 
Families First Team and forms part of their Children and Families First Service (see 
Appendix G below). The Children and Families First Team works with families 
where it has been identified that a child within the family fits within the Level 2 or 
Level 3 descriptors of the Common Assessment Framework, and therefore requires 
“super light” or “light to intensive” intervention to minimize negative outcomes for 
the child. In August 2012 CLC began to provide embedded legal advice to the wider 
Children and Families First service. The intensive work with the Troubled Families 
Team began in January 2013.   
 
Coventry City Council opted to add three additional local criteria to the 
predetermined national criteria for inclusion in the Troubled Families Programme 
(see Figure 7.3 below) Figure 7.4 demonstrates the way in which the local 
discretionary criteria operate to prioritise those families who meet the National 
Criteria for inclusion in the scheme. The inclusion of the local discretionary criteria 
chosen by Coventry City Council further increased the likelihood that the families 
participating in the scheme would be experiencing one or more justiciable problems, 
that would adversely impact on the ability of the Troubled Families Team Key 
Worker to deliver the improvements necessary to receive the payment by results 
portion of the available funding.  
 
Figure 7-3: Local inclusion criteria for Coventry  
Domestic Abuse Household in which there has been domestic abuse within the last twelve months 
Parental Mental 
Health  
Household in which there is an adult with poor mental health 
Priority 
Neighbourhood 
Household located within one of the eight Police Priority Neighbourhoods 
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Figure 7-4: Understanding eligibility for the Troubled Families Programme in 
Coventry  
Family satisfies 
Crime and ASB 
National Criteria 
Family satisfies 
Education Criteria 
Family satisfies 
worklessness 
criteria 
Eligible for Intensive Family Support?  
   Yes- Will be allocated to Troubled Families Team; can 
be prioritized using local criteria. 
 
   Yes- will be allocated to Troubled Families Team if 
high risk or requires sanctions. Can be prioritized using 
local criteria.  
   Yes- will be allocated to Troubled Families Team if 
high risk or requires sanctions, can be prioritized using 
local criteria.   
   Yes, but will be worked with by the Children and 
Families First Team (L3 CAF) 
 
   Not eligible, but could be allocated to Children and 
Families First Team if meets L3 CAF Thresholds. 
 
   Not eligible, but could be allocated to Children and 
Families First Team if meets L3 CAF Thresholds 
 
   Not eligible, but could be allocated to Children and 
Families First Team if meets L3 CAF Thresholds 
 
 
The following discussion describes the project designed by CLC in detail, before 
moving to explore the findings of the initial evaluation of the project.  
 
7.6  Describing the project: elements of the tiered embedded advice 
model 
The tiered embedded advice model consists of a full time legal advisor, employed by 
the Law Centre. The legal advisor is embedded in the sense that they are tasked with 
working exclusively with the clients of the Troubled Families Team at Coventry City 
Council. They also attend training and meetings alongside the TFT key workers 
where this is appropriate. Critically, the cost of the scheme is calculated in such a 
way as to support the salary costs of both the embedded legal advisor and one 50% 
FTE solicitor posts at the Law Centre The intervention was designed as a tiered 
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model- to provide some of Coventry’s most vulnerable families with timely and 
effective access to legal advice delivered by the Embedded Advisor, and the option 
of priority access to specialist legal advice where necessary delivered by solicitors 
and specialist advisors at Coventry Law Centre. The following section describes 
some of the key features of the model.  
 
7.6.1 Outreach 
The outreach nature of the model is particularly significant; the legal advisor visits 
the client in his or her home and screens the client to identify whether or not the 
client is experiencing problems that may admit of a legal solution. The embedded 
legal advisor is based predominantly at the Law Centre, and travels to visit the 
clients of the Troubled Families Team when requested to do so by the family’s Key 
Worker. The process through which the legal advisor is involved with a particular 
family is detailed below at Figure 7.5. The embedded legal advisor will also travel to 
the client’s home and provide transport to and from the Law Centre for 
appointments where necessary or desirable.  This feature of the intervention is 
designed to minimize non-attendance at appointments, and reduce barriers to 
accessing specialist advice in a formal setting. The embedded legal advisor will 
support the client through the appointment at the Law Centre when requested to 
do so.  
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Figure 7-5 : Referral pathway  
Step 1 Family referred to TFT- Embedded Advisor contacted by TFT worker and invited to attend first 
or second home visit. 
 
Step 2 Embedded Advisor uses questionnaire to screen family members for civil law problems i.e. 
through conducting a benefits check, enquiring as to levels of indebtedness etc.  
 
Step 3 Having identified civil law problems, Embedded Advisor decides whether to refer client to 
Coventry Law Centre for specialist advice or undertake to advise the client in their home (or a 
mixture of both). If specialist advice needed, Embedded Advisor supports the client to access it.  
 
Step 4 Embedded Advisor monitors client’s case until all issues are resolved. The Embedded Advisor 
does not ‘close’ the case when issues are resolved so if further problems occur, TFT Key Worker 
or client can contact the Embedded Advisor at any point for additional legal advice, representation 
and support. The advisor forward diarises predictable events that may be likely to cause further 
problems for the family and makes contact to check if they are successfully navigating these 
events.  
 
 
7.6.2 Continuity and accessibility 
The embedded legal advisor is designed to provide a consistent point of contact for 
the TFT Key Workers and the families that they support. The embedded legal 
advisor is accessible by telephone during working hours, Monday- Friday. The 
embedded legal advisor is also accessible by email and text message.  
7.6.3 Information sharing and independence from the TFT 
The embedded legal advisor is independent from the Troubled Families Team. As 
such, information about the problems experienced by the families working with the 
TFT Key Workers is only shared with the Embedded Advisor where the family has 
given written consent. Information provided to the embedded legal advisor by the 
families is kept confidentially, unless the families provide written consent stating 
that the embedded legal advisor can share this information with the TFT Key 
Worker.  Families who are being supported by the embedded legal advisor are asked 
to sign an authority form, stating which information may be shared with other 
agencies and under what circumstances this will occur.  
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7.6.4 Line management and offloading 
The embedded legal advisor is managed directly by a supervising solicitor with 
expertise in Debt and Money at CLC. The embedded legal advisor meets formally 
with her manager on a bi-monthly basis. The embedded legal advisor is also able to 
discuss any issues or problems she is experiencing with her line manager on an 
informal basis, and is able to access peer support.  
 
7.7 The findings of the initial evaluation of the model  
As part of the research for this thesis an evaluation of the impact of the tiered 
advice model on the TFT workers and the families that they worked with was 
conducted. To better understand the benefits and drawbacks of the tiered 
embedded advice model, it was decided to interview workers at Warwickshire 
County Council’s Troubled Families Team, who did not have access to an 
embedded advisor, to explore their experience of working with Troubled Families 
to resolve their justiciable problems (Warwickshire County Council disliked the 
terminology “Troubled Families” and so renamed their team the “Priority Families 
Team”). The key findings of the evaluation are outlined in the discussion below.  
 
7.7.1 Improving engagement with the Troubled Families Team.  
The Troubled Families Team Key Workers do not have the power to compel 
families to engage with them, Families in the programme engage with the workers 
on a voluntary basis. TFT Key Workers reported that being able to offer their 
families priority access to advice and support from CLC, a recognised and trusted 
provider of legal advice and representation, provided an incentive for families to 
engage. Additionally, having an embedded tiered advice worker who could deal with 
issues spanning the full range of complexity on behalf of clients, without the need 
to refer externally, was seen as a benefit of the scheme.  Sustaining a positive 
relationship with the families is therefore critical to delivering the outcomes 
necessary to fulfil the payment by results criteria. The TFT Key Workers expressed 
concerns that referring clients to external agencies for assistance poses a risk in this 
context, as if the client has a negative experience with the agency they are referred 
to they can lose trust in the Key Worker who referred them to this service. CLC is 
recognised in Coventry as a provider of quality, expert advice and representation, 
and having priority access to their services was felt by the Key Worker’s interviewed 
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to enhance the credibility of the Troubled Families Team. Being able to offer 
families enrolled in the programme a priority service with access to a high quality 
provider of legal advice was reported as providing an incentive for families to 
engage with the Troubled Families Team.  
 
7.7.2 Reducing stress and improving the ability of Troubled Families Team 
Key Workers to focus on delivering their primary function 
Interviews conducted as part of the evaluation indicated the high prevalence of 
social welfare law problems amongst families supported by both the TFT Key 
Workers and the Priority Families Team, particularly in the areas of Debt, Housing 
and Welfare Benefits. Few of the Key Workers interviewed as part of this study had 
experience of either debt, housing or welfare benefits issues. Key Workers at 
Warwickshire Priority Families Team reported that attempting to resolve the social 
welfare law problems experienced by their families was extremely time consuming, 
and detracted from their ability to address other issues that the families may be 
experiencing. In contrast, TFT Workers at Coventry stated that they felt able to 
concentrate on their primary role of supporting the families, and better placed to 
use their specific expertise to assist the families in reaching the targets mandated by 
the payment by results scheme. One interviewee commented that:  
 
“ I just think that it's an absolutely fantastic support not just for the families but for us as a team 
and without it we would struggle to guide families in the right way and we'd be lost without it.”  
 
TFT Key Worker 1 
 
A report published in 2013 by the Think Tank “Policy Exchange” identified that 
high levels of long term exhaustion and diminished interest in work mean that the 
average working life of a social care worker46 is 11.4 years (Holmes et al, 2013: 46 
citing Curtis et al, 2009:10). This is considerably lower than the average working life 
of individuals working in comparable roles, such as nurses (Holmes et al. 2013: 46) 
The structural issues repeatedly implicated in this trend are high levels of stress, 
high caseloads, low levels of support and lack of potential for career development 
                                                
46Social Care Workers are defined as “social workers and social work managers, residential and day-care 
managers, youth and community workers, housing/welfare workers, care assistants/home carers and career 
advisors/vocation guidance specialists”. 
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(Holmes et. al 2013: 47). Given this evidence, the role of the Embedded Advisor in 
reducing stress and supporting the TFT Key Workers in fulfilling their role may 
prove critical in helping Coventry City Council to save resource which might 
otherwise be spent recruiting new workers to the role. 
 
TFT Key workers were unanimous in stating that the support provided by the 
Embedded Advisor was critical to reducing their stress levels and helping to 
reassure them that they were providing the best possible service to the families they 
worked with. The following interview excerpts typify remarks made by the TFT 
Key Workers interviewed when asked to comment on the impact the support of the 
Embedded Advisor had on their ability to cope with the demands of their role.  
 
I'd have been stressed. I mean we deal with stress anyway on a normal level but it would have been 
ten times higher. I would have had to probably work longer hours because it would have been; it is 
a whole other role being taken on. And the families would have been affected by that as well 
because I wouldn't have been able to dedicate the intensive time to their problems... 
 
TFT Key Worker 1  
 
Q. Do you have a sense of what you would do if [Embedded Advisor] wasn't there?  
 
I would panic.  
 
TFT Key Worker 4 
 
“I think you just feel more supported really, you know that if something comes up, you know who to turn to and you 
know who's going help”  
TFT Key Worker 6 
 
 
As such, the introduction of the Tiered Embedded Advisor model may be 
considered to confer numerous benefits, those that are immediately quantifiable in 
terms of savings made in worker time and travel costs, and those that are less 
immediately tangible and warrant further research such as the impact that the 
support provided by this intervention has on the stress levels, resilience and 
retention of TFT Key Workers. As stated above, when the twelve month grant 
provided by the Future Advice Fund drew to a close, Coventry City Council took 
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the decision to continue funding the tiered embedded advisor model, in recognition 
of the benefits this way of working had conferred on the Troubled Families Team.  
 
7.8 Implications of expanding the funding base for Law Centres 
through project funding for Law Centre Mission and Values 
 
In evaluating a strategy for surviving LASPO that is predicated on securing funding 
for particular projects, from funders who are not necessarily traditional funders of 
legal services, a number of questions arise in relation to Law Centre values. What 
impact does a shift to project funding have on the ability to use legal mechanisms to 
bring about social change? Can project funding, particularly funding derived from 
generalist, rather than law specific funders (e.g. charitable trusts) be secured to 
deliver specialist legal services? The following discussion explores these issues in 
greater depth.  
 
7.8.1 Expanding the funding base through project funding and Terminal 
Value 1: Law Centres improve the position of economically 
disadvantaged individuals and groups  
In the values framework described above at Chapter 3, it is argued that the first of 
the values that render Law Centres distinctive concerns the way in which they use 
the law, namely, to bring about social change in favour of economically marginalised 
groups. The literature on Law Centres indicates that they aim to do this in three key 
ways: i.) by extending the availability of legal services to as wide a range of people as 
possible, with particular reference to those individuals who experience barriers to 
accessing the law; ii.) by taking on complex and strategic casework that has the 
potential to reform the law in favour of the marginalised and iii.) through identifying 
and uniting groups of individuals with common interests and working with them to 
bring about social change. The following section considers how far project funding 
demonstrates the potential to deliver this value.  
 
7.8.1.1 Expanding the funding base through project funding and the ability to deliver legal 
services to those who are economically disadvantaged with particular reference to those 
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who are in greatest need, helping them to secure their rights under the existing law and 
working to extend and reform the law where existing rights are inadequate.  
 
Project based funding can offer the freedom and flexibility to deliver the legal 
services in new ways, helping Law Centres to move away from a “reactive” 
(Stephens, 1990) approach to legal services delivery. Indeed, one feature of the 
move to project based funding might be that Law Centres are required to deliver 
their services differently. As Griffin, the evaluator of the Future Advice Fund notes 
in her 2016 evaluation of the fund: “new income streams change the scope of the work an 
organisation does…Attracting new sources of funding requires advice providers to do things 
differently. Attracting new income sources to deliver the same sort of work that legal aid once 
covered would appear to be much less likely” (Griffin, 2017:33). Whether or not Law 
Centres are able to extend legal services to a wider range of people than would 
normally access them very much depends on the way in which projects are devised. 
In designing projects, Law Centres should have a clear understanding of the 
demographic and social characteristics of those clients who are at risk of not 
accessing services, and the extant evidence on the relationships between the 
experience of justiciable problems and other social and environmental factors (see 
Genn 1999, Balmer 2010. Pleasence et al. 2007, 2012, 2015), in order to ensure that 
the partners they work with and the funding streams they access facilitate their 
ability to reach this group. It would seem that projects designed as partnerships 
between Law Centres and public services or voluntary organisations who work with 
clients that are socially and materially disadvantaged and/or difficult to engage, 
might be particularly fruitful in the context of enabling Law Centres to deliver this 
value.   
 
The Troubled Families Embedded Advice project is an excellent example of the 
way in which projects can be designed to reach individuals who, research indicates, 
are socially disadvantaged and might otherwise fail to access legal services. That 
those participating in the Troubled Families programme were at greater risk of 
failing to access legal services would seem to be borne out by the observations of 
TFT Key Workers: the following interview excerpt encapsulates the prevailing view:  
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A lot of them wouldn't go, for a start (if they were required to attend the Law Centre 
themselves)….I should imagine that where there's been an expectation that a parent will go (alone) 
that they've had a lot of missed of missed appointments. …for some people it's just getting out that 
front door, the thought of getting onto a bus for some people having all these people around them is, 
is just too much, depending on where, where you are with your mental health really. 
TFT Key Worker 1 
 
Further to this, research indicates that this non-attendance amongst clients who may 
be considered socially disadvantaged (Balmer et al. 2010) has profound implications 
for Law Centres mission, creating a negative spiral where groups who are 
disadvantaged fail to see legal processes as a tool that they can marshal to resolve 
their problems- potentially leading to widespread disengagement with the law 
amongst these groups. Research conducted by Pleasence et al. (2015) demonstrated 
that of those respondents to the Civil and Social Justice Survey who took no action 
to resolve their legal problems, 21% reported that they chose this course of action 
because they believed that any action they took would make no difference to the 
outcome. As Pleasence observes: “some respondents may have been right, but 
without the benefit of advice they may have been wrong” (Pleasence et al. 
2015:104). The data linked beliefs around the lack of efficacy of taking action to 
resolve legal problems with higher levels of social deprivation. The Law Centre 
movement theory of change (as articulated in chapter 3 above) recognises this cycle 
(i.e. people who live under circumstances of social and material disadvantage do not 
engage with the legal system because they don’t believe that doing so will make a 
difference to the outcomes they experience, problems common to particular social 
groups are not processed through the legal system and so the law is not developed 
in the interests of the those who are socially and materially disadvantaged, 
reinforcing and validating the perception that the Law is not a tool that can assist 
disadvantaged groups to secure better outcomes) as a challenge to their ability to 
use the law to bring about social change. As such, securing project funding for work 
with an outreach component might be seen to be an important way of Law Centres 
delivering this value.  
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7.8.1.2 Project based funding and the ability to undertake strategic litigation that has the 
potential to reform the law in favour of the economically disadvantaged 
 
In shifting from legal service specific forms of funding (such as Legal Aid) to 
project funding, particularly where such funding is drawn from funders who do not 
have a history of funding strategic litigation, the ability to undertake complex, 
strategic litigation and casework may be undermined. The reasons for this are as 
follows: i.) funders believe that strategic litigation is disproportionately costly as a 
mechanism for achieving social change, ii.) low levels of public understanding of the 
law in general and strategic litigation specifically inhibit ability of Law Centres to 
communicate the value of strategic litigation to non- law specific funders, and of 
funders to communicate the value of this approach to their boards  iii.) funders are 
concerned about the reputational risk involved in adopting this approach, iv.) 
funders are concerned about the implications of undertaking strategic litigation for 
sustainability, particularly where the target of the litigation is central or local 
government and sustainability is reliant on the ability of the project to secure public 
funding and iv) undertaking strategic litigation in UK courts can be a lengthy 
process, and rules and policies around grant duration mitigate against the funding of 
this type of approach. These issues are explored in greater depth in the following 
discussion.  
 
7.8.1.2.1 Funder perceptions around the cost- benefit of funding strategic 
litigation as a mechanism for achieving goals mitigates against the 
funding of strategic litigation.  
 
Strategic litigation, when compared with other strategies for bringing about change, 
may be considered by funders to be disproportionately expensive. Assy, writing in 
2015 states that: “the costs of litigation in England and Wales are excessively high, 
unpredictable and frequently out of proportion to the amount claimed” (Assy, 
2015:202). In discussing the decision making strategies employed by private actors 
when seeking to bring about social change through either lobbying or litigation in 
the context of EU law, Pieter Bouwen and Margaret McCown observed: “At the 
most basic level, the initiation of litigation strategies is costly and, thus, interest 
groups with more material resources are advantaged, relative to those with fewer, in 
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using this approach.” (Bouwen et al. 2007:427). Although others, including Lisa 
Vanhala (2011) have argued that: “the assumption that litigation will always be the 
most expensive route to successfully influencing policy has not been demonstrably 
confirmed across a wide range of policy fields” (Vanhala, 2011:23), even Vanhala 
herself concedes that: “I am not arguing that the use of a litigation strategy is not 
expensive, in most cases it will be both costly and time consuming” (Vanhala, 
2011:23). In addition to this, there is a question as to what success looks like in the 
context of funding strategic litigation with a view to bringing about change. A 
recent report published by The Freedom Fund entitled: “Fighting impunity, funding 
justice: Investing in strategic litigation to end modern slavery” (2016) argued that 
donors funding in this area should have:  
 
 …an expansive understanding of success. Even courtroom losses can serve a powerful end by putting the issues in the 
media spotlight and starting a public debate. In some instances, the mere threat of legal action can galvanise change. 
However, these effects are less tangible than a courtroom win and can be difficult for some donors to square with their 
usual methods for measuring impact. (Freedom Fund, 2016:9)  
 
As such, generalist funders, when comparing applications for funding that centre on 
strategic litigation, rather than policy advocacy or service delivery, may find it 
difficult to justify or articulate the relative benefits of this approach internally, 
compared with other strategies for addressing the needs of the groups they are 
concerned with. If Law Centres are to target generalist funders for support for their 
services, they must recognise the difficulties in conveying the relative value of 
strategic litigation approaches.  
  
However, there is some evidence that funders with an interest in particular types of 
issue are embracing the potential of strategic litigation. The environment is one 
issue that has seen funders engage with strategic litigation as a tactic to a greater 
extent than others. The Children’s Investment Fund Foundation (CIFF), a private 
foundation with an endowment of $4.6billion and a mission to improve children’s 
lives, implicated climate change as the: “…single biggest threat to the future of 
today’s children”. As part of their efforts to support the global transition to a zero-
carbon society, CIFF awarded a multi-year grant of $9,461,800 to Client Earth, an 
organisation staffed by activist lawyers with a mission to fund the conduct of 
strategic litigation around clean air, energy and coal and to encourage the business 
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and finance sectors to take into account climate risk and impact in their 
management and investment decisions (CIFF, 2017). In 2015 Client Earth used this 
funding to challenge the British government on the illegal levels of air pollution 
witnessed in the country. London and several other British cities have failed to meet 
EU standards on nitrogen dioxide levels since 2010. The Supreme Court 
unanimously found in Client Earth’s favour and ruled that the next environment 
secretary must draw up a plan to meet EU rules by the end of 2015 (see R (on the 
application of ClientEarth) (Appellant) v Secretary of State for the Environment, 
Food and Rural Affairs (Respondent) [2015] UKSC 28. The resultant Air Quality 
Plans produced by the Government, were of such low quality that Client Earth 
brought a further judicial review in October 2016 (ClientEarth (No 2) vs Secretary of 
State for the Environment Food and Rural Affairs [2016] EWHC 2740 (Admin)) – the 
Judge found in ClientEarth’s favour- the second victory the NGO had secured 
against the government on this issue in two years. The scale and duration of this 
grant is striking, and testament to the commitment the funders have to the 
importance of this approach. Whether Law Centres (individually, or as a network) 
could access funding at this scale is a question that remains unanswered at this 
stage. The implications of Brexit, yet to be determined, may also close down the 
space for strategic litigation to generate effective outcomes to the extent that work 
of this nature has expanded in the UK context, this has been greatly facilitated by 
the expansion of law through the European Union and the Human Rights Act 
[1998].  
 
 
7.8.1.3 Project based funding and the capacity to identify and unite groups of individuals with 
common interests and work with them to bring about social change 
 
Project based funding offers the potential to access funds for community organising 
in a manner that traditional sources of funding, such as legal aid and even local 
authority funding, do not. The failure of the “judicare” system funded through the 
Legal Aid Scheme to support Law Centres to develop their work in organising 
communities around particular issues has been well documented (Mayo, 2014, 
Hynes and Robins, 2009:18). In the immediate example of the Troubled Families 
project, it is unclear whether the model facilitates this type of community organising 
activity.  
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TFT Key Workers repeatedly stated that the benefit of the Embedded Advisor’s 
involvement was that clients could delegate the legal aspect of problems to her, 
leaving them to focus on other issues. Is there a danger therefore, that models of 
this kind build a culture of dependence on the service, rather than empowering and 
educating communities about the law? Subsequent project funding secured by the 
Law Centre aims to fill this gap: in 2016 CLC were awarded funding for the 
RIPPLE project, a project that is based on the establishment of a series of groups 
of Adult Social Care services and their carers. The project aims to nurture a rights 
based culture: “by working with the groups to identify issues that are of current concern and 
explore whether there may be legal solutions e.g. by analysing Adult Social Care budgets and 
policies, supporting them in responding to consultations and challenging individual and policy 
decisions where there are relevant legal rights in play.” The combination of strategic 
casework and community development planned as part of this project demonstrates 
the potential of project focussed funding to support activities of this kind. 
 
7.8.2 Expanding the funding base through project funding and Terminal 
Value 2: Law Centres deliver their services to those in greatest need 
 
In Chapter 3, it is argued that in targeting their services at specific individuals or 
groups, Law Centres are guided by a twofold definition of need: individuals or 
groups are needy to the extent that either: i) the extant legal framework does not 
serve their interests or extend to their protection (need type 1) or, ii.) the extant 
legal framework does in theory extend to their interests and/or protection but they 
are ill-equipped or vulnerable in the context of being able to successfully access 
their rights under the law as it stands (need type 2). Chapter 4 proposes a refined 
definition of vulnerability, in recognition of the fact that whilst Law Centres and 
indeed the legal aid scheme historically relied on poverty as a proxy for vulnerability, 
the class of individuals for whom legal advice and representation is unaffordable is 
now so wide that a principled focus is required in order to ensure that Law Centres 
deliver this value through their work. The experience of the Troubled Families 
Project demonstrates the potential of project based funding to enable law centres to 
target their services at individuals experiencing both types of need, as the following 
discussion demonstrates.  
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7.8.2.1 Instrumental Value 2.1 Expanding the funding base through project funding and 
meeting need type 1: the case of individuals in receipt of welfare benefits.   
Through designing a project that aligned the delivery of specialist legal advice with 
the Troubled Families programme, the Law Centre proactively delivered services to 
those individuals whose interests might be considered to be increasingly 
marginalised through changes to the welfare benefits system, and increased the 
likelihood of reaching claimants who might not know when they had grounds to 
challenge a decision made against them. In describing the rationale for developing 
the project, the Chief Executive of Coventry Law Centre stated: “Troubled Families 
was probably the first opportunity I saw that made me think: "That's actually our 
client group"- we know that they have legal need”. The national and local inclusion 
criteria for the Troubled Families Programme meant that the client group worked 
with as part of the scheme were more likely than others to be reliant on welfare 
benefits for all or part of their income. Welfare benefits stands out as an example of 
an area of law where rapid policy change from 2010 onwards, accelerating trends 
that emerged under the Labour Government (Hamnett 2014: 491) has had the 
effect of marginalising the interests of those individuals who are in receipt of 
benefits. This marginalisation was given effect by the policies instantiated under the 
Conservative- Liberal Democrat coalition government elected in 2010. Upon 
election the Conservative-Liberal Democrat government chose to pursue a 
programme of cuts to public expenditure- a key vehicle for this reduction in public 
spending was through the process of reducing access to benefits (Etherington et al. 
2015:5). Cuts to welfare benefits and local authority funding designed to ameliorate 
the position of people living in poverty accounted for 50.8% of total cuts- evidence 
indicates that these cuts have disproportionately impacted on deprived areas and 
communities (Etherington et al. 2015:6). Commentators have observed that the 
welfare reforms introduced under the coalition government have served to penalise 
and stigmatise those in receipt of welfare benefits. Slater, writing in 2012 argues 
that: “Whilst the political creation of an undeserving welfare residuum has a very 
long history in British social policy, the White Paper (Universal Credit: Welfare that 
Works, 2010) marks a new development…towards an American-style system, one 
that comes down exceptionally hard on those whose “idleness” is seen as a creation 
of the welfare state” (Slater, 2012:958) An ESRC funded review of the cumulative 
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impact of changes to the welfare benefit system entitled: “Welfare Reform, Work 
First Policies and Benefit Conditionality: Reinforcing Poverty and Social 
Exclusion?” (Etherington et al. 2015) continues this theme, arguing that: “The 
central narrative that underpins the Coalition Government policy is the ‘attack’ on 
benefit ‘dependency’ which has involved an almost relentless assault on the idea of 
benefits as a positive and essential element of social welfare” (Etherington et al. 
2015:10)  
 
In terms of the way in which this sentiment has manifested in the extant legal 
framework, it can be argued that the interests of those in receipt of welfare benefits, 
are marginalised through four interconnected mechanisms: i.) reductions in the 
overall level of benefits available, through the imposition of a benefit cap, ii.) the 
introduction and application of a regime of sanctions for those who fail to comply 
with conditions surrounding their benefits, iii.) the increasing role of discretion in 
the award of certain types of benefit, iv.) reduced funding to enable individuals to 
access to advice and support in relation to welfare benefits problems. There is 
evidence to indicate that families with multiple children, women experiencing 
domestic violence and the disabled have been particularly adversely impacted by the 
changes (Meers, 2015:38). The inclusion criteria for the Troubled Families 
Programme means that those families included in the scheme are also likely to be 
those at risk of marginalisation under the reforms to the welfare benefits 
programme.  
 
The final mechanism through which it might be said that the extant legal framework 
does not serve the interests of those in receipt of welfare benefits, is through the 
withdrawal of funding for advice in relation to welfare benefits issues, directly, 
through LASPO, and indirectly through cuts to local authority funding, a traditional 
funder of advice for welfare benefit claimants. Etherington et al. (2015) argue that 
claimants of welfare benefits should have a right to representation and advice 
services, stating that: “Advice services play an important role in meeting the needs 
of claimants who have to navigate their way through an increasingly complex and 
constantly changing system. This fact needs to be recognised in terms of funding” 
(Etherington et al. 2015:47). Whilst legal aid for legal help remains for appeals to the 
Upper Tribunal, The Court of Appeal or Supreme Court on a point of law in 
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respect of welfare benefits, the lack of funding to provide advice earlier in the 
process means that vulnerable claimants are at risk of not identifying when they 
have a case that should be appealed to Upper Tribunal. Legal Aid for advocacy in 
relation to welfare benefits is only available in the Upper Tribunal or above through 
the Exceptional Cases Funding Scheme- from the period October 2015-September 
2016, only 5 welfare benefits cases were awarded exceptional funding (MoJ & LAA, 
2016): this in itself may be seen to provide partial evidence of the issues created by 
the lack of availability of funding for legal advice at an earlier stage.  
 
7.8.2.2 Instrumental Value 2.2: Expanding the funding base through project funding and 
meeting need type 2 
The Troubled Families Embedded Advice Project is an example of a project 
designed with the express aim of reaching individuals who experience justiciable 
problems, but are vulnerable in the context of being able to successfully secure 
procedurally just outcomes in relation to these problems. This approach to project 
design, starting from the intended client group, and tailoring the service to meet the 
particular needs of that client group, is emblematic of CLC’s broader approach. 
Through focussing on the needs and characteristics of their clients, rather than the 
type of service they provide, Coventry Law Centre have successfully attracted 
funding from non-traditional funders of legal services and brokered partnerships 
with non-legal organisations.  The Chief Executive of CLC articulates the Law 
Centres conception of its target client group in the following terms:  
 
Well obviously we start with people who would be eligible for legal aid so people living in poverty, 
that’s a general kind of catch all for the people we are aiming our services at but alongside that then 
we're looking at who are the people that really, without our face to face intervention won't be able to 
resolve the problems that they have that have legal solutions in fact they probably don't know that 
those problems have legal solutions, and layering on that, who are the people who have multiples of 
those. And many people do, but there are some groups of people who tend to have bigger multiples, 
so people who really can't navigate through life very well, so people with mental ill-health or people 
with learning disabilities, they are likely to get themselves into a spiral of problems. And I suppose 
there are people for who a life event triggers problems, but, if they're made aware of their rights, they 
are able to navigate their way out of it, so our target group are the people who an online service or a 
telephone service, isn't really ever going to be adequate and it isn't really ever going to get to the root 
 219 
of the problem and it isn't going to give them the confidence that they need to be able to manage a 
bit better going forward.  
 
The criteria for inclusion in the Troubled Families Programme adopted by Coventry 
City Council directly map onto the conception of need outlined above by CLC’s 
Chief Executive and the vulnerability model outlined above at Chapter 2.  The 
project is particularly successful in assisting the Law Centre to reach clients that 
research suggests are likely to have multiple vulnerabilities in the context of being 
able to secure procedurally just outcomes, particularly i.) individuals experiencing 
mental ill health and ii.) individuals who have low levels of trust in their relationship 
with representatives of the state and/or previous experiences of the civil or criminal 
legal system.  
 
7.8.2.2.1 Individuals with mental health problems  
The inclusion of mental health morbidity as a criterion for participation in the 
Troubled Families Programme is particularly salient in enabling the project to reach 
individuals who might be considered to be the most vulnerable in the context of 
securing just outcomes. Research has demonstrated that mental health morbidity 
increases vulnerability to a range of justiciable problems, including employment, 
housing, welfare benefits and domestic violence (Pleasence et al. 2003a: 552-553).  
The experience of the workers involved in the Troubled Families Scheme would 
appear to reinforce these findings: when interviewed, all of the Coventry Troubled 
Families Workers reported that their clients experienced problems with debt and 
housing, and the majority reported that their clients experienced problems with 
welfare benefits. Data collected by CLC demonstrates that, of the 61 cases opened 
in the first year of the project, 21 concerned Welfare Benefits (34%), 23 related to 
Housing (38%), 13 related to debt (21%) and 4 were concerned with family law 
(7%). The experience of mental health problems may also be seen to increase the 
risk of experiencing discrimination and mental health law related issues (such as 
conditions of hospital discharge) (Pleasence et al. 2003a: 554). 
 
In addition, research has also linked the experience of mental ill health with lower 
levels of capability to resolve justiciable problems. Research published by Pleasence 
et al. (2015) based on the findings of the Civil and Social Justice Panel Survey 
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indicates that the demographic factors that are highly associated with low legal 
capability include being affected by physical, mental and or stress related health 
problems. (Pleasence et al. 2015:xiii). The same study reported that: “inaction is 
more common among the problems of lower capability respondents, and handling 
alone far less common” (Pleasence et al. 2015:xiiii). This would seem to be borne 
out by the observations of TFT Key Workers, reporting on their experience of 
assisting clients to access legal advice and representation, and the value of having a 
legal advisor attend the client in their own home:  
 
Right. A lot of them wouldn't go, for a start (if they were required to attend the Law Centre 
themselves). And I should imagine that where there's been an expectation that a parent will go 
(alone) that they've had a lot of missed of missed appointments. I have to say on the occasions where 
I've needed a parent to go to the Law Centre I've actually taken them to make sure that they get 
there because to me that's a waste of valuable time for, for workers at the Law Centre, and at the 
end of the day it still needs to be done and sometimes it is about a little hand holding. I try not to 
do it because I much prefer to empower parents but if it needs to be that I put them in the car and 
we go then that's what we, that's what we do…for some people it's just getting out that front door, 
the thought of getting onto a bus for some people having all these people around them is, is just too 
much, depending on where, where you are with your mental health really. 
 
Failure to act to resolve justiciable problems may create a negative spiral of 
increasing mental ill health. Empirical evidence indicates that lower capability 
individuals are far more likely than their higher capability counterparts to report 
adverse consequences accruing as a result of their civil law problem (Pleasence et al. 
2015:xiiii). Pleasence reports that: “Stress-related ill health as a consequence of 
problems was particularly common for lower capability respondents, being reported 
on over one-third of occasions. Moreover, negative impacts on education, other 
mental health problems, drink/drug problems, physical ill-health, family 
relationships, and assault/being physically threatened and having to move home 
were all reported more than twice as frequently in relation to problems reported by 
lower capability respondents than problems reported by higher capability 
respondents.” (Pleasence et al. 2015:xiiii). As such the tiered embedded advice 
model, working with and alongside a programme aimed at the most vulnerable may 
confer a range benefits on the individuals who receive support through the scheme, 
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and potentially avert the negative consequences research indicates are likely to 
accrue from the experience of civil law problems. Further research should be 
conducted into the longer- term outcomes for clients resulting from initiatives of 
this kind.  
 
7.8.2.2.2 Individuals with low levels of trust in the state and/or previous 
experience of the civil or criminal justice system  
 
Under the national and local criteria for the Troubled Families Programme, all of 
the families worked with as part of the scheme will have had some involvement 
with the civil or criminal justice system, as a result of issues with school non-
attendance, anti-social behaviour, or child welfare issues. In the case of Coventry, 
the families worked with through the Troubled Families Programme were already 
well known to social services. As a result, families involved in the scheme may have 
pre-existing negative perceptions of the role of law and the legal system. In a study 
exploring families’ experience of involvement with multiple services (on both a 
voluntary and involuntary basis), Morris (2013) identified persistent themes, 
including: (i.) families awareness of and resistance to professional narratives around 
their caregiving practices (families tended to emphasise their own “ordinariness” 
and the closeness and persistence of their bonds with each other, whilst 
professionals descriptions of the families focussed on need, adversity and 
dysfunction; (ii.) families reluctance to disclose the extent of the problems they were 
experiencing out of fear of losing custody of their children (Morris, 2013:202). In 
researching the operation of the Warwickshire Priority Families team as a 
comparator to the Coventry Troubled Families Team, Key Workers with the 
Warwickshire Priority Families Team were asked whether the families they worked 
with experienced problems with issues such as getting the right benefits, problems 
with social services, discrimination, housing, employment. The response given by 
the Key Workers tended to reflect their own judgment of the families 
circumstances, rather than the families perception of their situation. This was 
particularly evident in relation to issues involving discrimination and disputes with 
social services. Comments included: 
 
 
 222 
“Q: Problems - and I guess what I mean is...a difficult relationship with Social Services?  
 
A: OK, I'd say they'd say yes but personally I don't think it is. 
 
Priority Families Worker 69 
 
I've got some that are having supervised contact with their children but that actually seems to be 
alright, I mean they'd say that, parents would see that as an issue but actually it's in the plan... it's 
on-going so it is not an issue to us but it is to the parents because they obviously want the children 
back. 
 
Priority Families Worker 68  
 
[00:02:39] I've got a family with a hearing impairment so they'll often say that professionals are 
discriminating against them. Sometimes I do think professionals could do more for them, being 
honest. But I think it's a hard one. 
Priority Families Worker 69 
 
In addition, the relationship between client families and the welfare benefits system 
was often characterized as “chaotic family versus unyielding system”. The majority 
of interviewees spoke of their clients being unable to “manage the systems to access 
benefits”: no mention was made of assisting clients to challenge the decisions of the 
Department for Work and Pensions in respect of welfare benefits, including in cases 
where those decisions had resulted in sanctions for clients. These findings were not 
replicated in interviews with the Coventry Troubled Families Key Workers, who 
had the benefit of the Embedded Legal Advisor. Further research is necessary to 
explore the reasons for this disparity, but these findings do indicate a further 
possible benefit to having an independent source of legal advice attached to, but 
distinct from, the Key Workers operating as part of the Troubled Families Teams.  
 
A complicating factor is that the very fact of a family’s inclusion in the Troubled 
Families Programme may compound their existing low levels of trust in the State. In 
most local authorities the Troubled Families Team sits alongside the social work 
teams responsible for working with families where there are existing concerns about 
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the children in the household which, if escalated could result in the children being 
removed from the home. The threat of this happening, however remote, could 
understandably create wariness on the part of the family. In addition, the framing of 
the Troubled Families Programme has attracted criticism from commentators as 
being the latest expression of an “underclass discourse” that: “locates ‘troubles’ or 
‘problems’ in the family itself and emphasises behaviour as the target of action 
without regard to wider social or economic considerations” (Lambert & Crossley, 
2017:87). In this context, the ability of the Embedded Advisor to establish their 
independence from the Troubled Families Team Key Workers may be seen to be 
critical in ensuring that families feel able to engage.  
 
In the case of Coventry, the embedded advisor was at pains to emphasise her 
independence from the Troubled Families Team. After the first introduction visit 
where the Embedded Advisor accompanied the Troubled Families Key Worker, any 
additional visits were undertaken independently. The Embedded Advisor went to 
great lengths to ensure that families understood her role, emphasising that she 
would not share information with the Troubled Families Team Key Worker (unless 
under specific agreed circumstances) and that she was there for the sole purpose of 
assisting them with their Social Welfare Law problems. A number of Troubled 
Families Team Key Workers reported the success of the Embedded Advisor in 
encouraging individuals to disclose information that they would not initially reveal 
to the Key Worker- the following excerpt is indicative of a general trend:  
 
“When I did the assessment no mention of any debt. They don't look like they're in any debt… so 
this was a real revelation. And it turned out that there was four thousand pounds worth of debt 
there, but there was almost seven thousand pounds worth of debt in other areas. [After] introducing 
her to [Embedded Advisor], Mum quickly opened up and said, "I've got a shoebox full of shame," 
and [Embedded Advisor] went round and took the shoebox away and copied it all out and this is 
where I know it's in safe hands now but I don't know exactly what's going on. [Embedded 
Advisor]'s dealing with it.”  
TFT Key Worker 6 
 
Any Law Centre project designed to align services with a social programme that 
might be seen as stigmatising or perpetuating negative perceptions of the role of law 
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and the state in peoples’ lives (e.g. aligning Public Legal Education with the British 
Values Agenda in schools) must be managed carefully, in order that Law Centre 
Values are not undermined. However, initial evidence from the Troubled Families 
Embedded Advisor project indicates that, if managed carefully, the presence of an 
independent legal advisor alongside such programmes can help to empower 
vulnerable individuals in a manner that is highly congruent with Law Centre Values.  
 
7.8.3 Expanding the funding base through project funding and Terminal 
Value 3: Law Centres are staffed by specialist, expert legal 
professionals  
 
When interviewed about the strategy of expanding the base of funding available to 
Law Centres through project based funding from generalist funders, the Chief 
Executive of Coventry Law Centre implicated the issues involved in funding the 
retention of a range of specialist expertise as a particular deficiency of the approach, 
stating: 
 
I think the other risk with the model is that, what I've tried to do is to get funding for programmes 
of work which rely on a key person to deliver…the person that links with the client but also to seek 
funding for specialist legal casework as part of that programme, that's quite hard in that people 
have multiple legal needs and you've got a pot of money for legal casework that on its own doesn't 
buy you a legal caseworker. So ultimately it would work brilliantly if we got loads of those projects 
and that was going into a pot that could then buy a caseworker or a pool of caseworkers, we've in 
truth probably got one more specialist caseworker than we might have… It's difficult, the common 
thing is that people need benefits and debt advice, and the other stuff is kind of mixed, so it 
wouldn't even justify having an extra caseworker but it creates an extra workload. So I guess the 
weakness for other people trying to follow the model is that if they don't benefit from local authority 
funding in the way that we do that is unrestricted in that it's not for a specific project it's for 
delivering casework so having extra funding to combine with that makes it work for us, but the 
model would probably be difficult to pull off if you didn't have that.  
CLC CE 
In the immediate case of the Embedded Advisor Project, the project funding was 
designed facilitate the retention of specialist support at the Law Centre- funding was 
provided for 50% FTE post at the Law Centre to support the retention of expert 
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solicitors, in addition to funding for the Embedded Advisor to carry out the 
outreach work with the families. The tiered nature of the scheme, and the access to 
a range of specialist expertise it conferred, was highlighted as a particular strength of 
the project. Without the combination of the input of the embedded legal adviser 
and the back-up expertise provided by the other experts within CLC, clients may 
not be able to access the specialist help that they need to resolve their social welfare 
law problem before it escalates. Additionally, the ability to offer in-house referrals 
(within the Law Centre) to expert, efficient, reliable staff with the skills to deal with 
complex problems was found to be a further benefit to the scheme, in contrast to a 
previous experience with an advice worker at Citizens Advice who did not have in-
house access to specialist legal advice. The following interview excerpt describes 
this: 
 
“Our first port of call for a while was [worker name] at Citizen's Advice, She was amazing, she 
wholeheartedly believed in what she was doing, the service that she was giving, and while you were 
actually dealing with [worker name] it was great, [00:16:29] the moment [worker name] had to 
pass it on to one of her colleagues it sort imploded. That doesn't happen with the Law Centre 
because…[CLC Embedded Advisor will say]"Right, I've got an expert on that so I'll bring her 
in" and it's done. We made the arrangements, job done, I was there with the parents to support 
because [they’ve] got mental health problems and away we went.” 
TFT Key Worker 1 
As such, this model of legal advice delivery can be considered a holistic service for 
clients. Through employing an experienced advisor with a detailed understanding of 
social welfare law problems, issues are diagnosed quickly and correctly. The fact that 
the advisor has immediate access to expert legal advice and representation in the 
form of qualified solicitors at the Law Centre, enables her to secure the appropriate 
level of support for clients at the earliest possible stage. In addition, the fact that the 
advisor is based primarily at the Law Centre, and can therefore retain ownership of 
the case until it’s conclusion, overcomes issues associated with information sharing, 
reduces confusion and improves the experience for both the client and the TFT 
Key Worker supporting them. The reputation of the Law Centre as a provider of 
expert legal advice enhances the ability of the embedded advisor to negotiate on 
behalf of clients. The ability of this scheme to circumvent the need to refer, greatly 
improves its efficacy. The ability to demonstrate and convey the importance of 
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maintaining a range of specialist advisors to generalist funders is critical, in order 
that project funding is able to support the Law Centre to employ, develop and 
retain expert staff. In order to ensure that specialist staff are developed and retained, 
funders may have to develop different models of funding, as short-term grants will 
undermine the ability of the Law Centre to plan. Reliance on project funding may 
also require Law Centres to employ full time fundraisers to apply for and manage 
grants, in order to ensure that there are enough projects at any one time to retain 
specialist legal staff.  
 
Additionally, a shift to project based funding where advice workers are required to 
work on an outreach basis with extremely vulnerable clients with multiple and 
complex needs may have implications for the ability of Law Centres to retain staff, 
if the physical safety and mental wellbeing of staff are not supported. The 
Embedded Advisor working on the project expressed that at times, she had felt 
concerned for her physical safety in carrying out the role, and that the mechanisms 
in place to protect her were inadequate, stating that:  
 
“I was in a house of multiple occupancy and they phoned me and my phone it was on but it never 
rang and they'd been trying to get me for almost an hour. Anyway, I went out and I answered the 
phone and this very relieved gentleman said "Oh [embedded advisor], this is the Coventry City 
Council here, it's the lone worker scheme" and I said "Oh, hi!" and for some reason my phone had 
set the scheme off and they'd been trying to get me. They had tried to phone the Law Centre and 
they had tried to phone the two people who were named on the list and they couldn't get any of 
them. That was an hour later. So I don't think, it's not robust enough…” 
CLC TFT EA 
 
Additionally, the Embedded Adviser felt that she would benefit from more 
emotional support in carrying out her role. Whilst the embedded advisor is working 
with the families involved in the Troubled Families Programme in a different 
capacity to the Troubled Families Team Key Workers, both the Troubled Families 
Team Key Workers and the embedded advisor stated that the embedded advisor 
was exposed to many of the distressing and stressful situations experienced by the 
Key Workers. The Key Workers receive extensive one-to-one emotional support 
from their line manager and group sessions with a clinical psychologist to discuss 
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any issues that they might be experiencing. It was felt that it would be beneficial for 
anyone undertaking the embedded advisor role to have access to similar offloading 
mechanisms, although this would obviously impact on the cost of the scheme, and 
therefore its potential attractiveness to funders.  
7.8.4 Expanding the funding base through project funding and Terminal 
Value 4: Law Centres are empathic allies of their clients   
A key benefit of a move to project based funding is that it offers the potential for 
Law Centres to redesign the way they deliver services, moving away from the 
“judicare” model mandated by the structure of legal aid contracts, and potentially 
creating opportunities for Law Centres to engage more fully with their client 
communities. In 2014, Margerie Mayo visited Law Centres with a view to exploring 
the impact of the Carter Reforms to Legal Aid and the emphasis on New Public 
Management ideologies on Law Centres across England and Wales. Mayo’s research 
highlighted the negative features of reliance on legal aid funding from the Legal 
Services Commission, particularly once the Unified Civil Legal Aid Contract was 
introduced. The Unified Contract introduced fixed or graduated fees for all work, 
proposed a minimum contract size of £25,000 or £50,000, treated not-for-profit 
providers in the same manner as private practitioners and introduced best value 
tendering for all contracts (Hynes, 2009:55).  Importantly, under the terms of the 
Unified Contract payments were made in arrears, forcing Law Centres to spend 
down their reserves in order to continue to deliver casework. Fixed fees impacted 
most detrimentally on providers who worked with very vulnerable clients, as 
organisations ceased to be compensated for the extra time working with these 
individuals entailed. Mayo reports that: “under LSC funding systems there was less 
scope for preventative work or for policy work, community work or public legal 
education, unless funding could be obtained via separate sources” (Mayo et al, 
2014:49) Mayo’s study, which included interviews with staff at 43 Law Centres and 
key stakeholders, linked the adoption of funding streams such as Legal Aid that 
privileged individual casework with evidence of anxiety about a “possible loss of 
vision more generally… and fears that in struggling to meet the requirements of the 
current funding system Law Centres were shifting away from their original mission” 
(Mayo et al. 2014:49). A move to project funding, particularly where projects are 
designed to promote closer involvement with the client community, may be seen to 
go some way to redressing this shift. The value of moving to an outreach model in 
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terms of promoting solidarity with the client community, improving trust and 
encouraging disclosure was highlighted in interviews around the operation of the 
Troubled Families Team Embedded Advisor Project. Troubled Families Team Key 
workers reported numerous benefits arising from the outreach nature of the project, 
including encouraging clients to disclose information which they might otherwise 
have withheld, and address problems that they might otherwise ignore.  
 
“…having them in their own home it's a power balance for the families. They're in their own 
homes, it's a safe environment... whereas going to appointments that's when they start to not attend 
and not deal with the issues.” 
TFT Key Worker 3 
 
Interviewees reported that many families were reticent to engage with services, or 
intimidated at the thought of visiting an advice agency, and that the outreach nature 
of the scheme helped to overcome these barriers:  
 
“I think she's been able to quickly establish those relationships because they are in the people's 
homes. I haven't had one occasion where it's felt intrusive, it felt like it was the right place to do it 
because it was contained. Would the parents have felt the same if they had come here? I think they 
would have felt like they were being judged…” 
TFT Key Worker 4 
 
In addition, the outreach element of the project was felt to be of importance in 
establishing trust between the embedded advisor and clients who were often very 
vulnerable. The depth of the relationship established encouraged clients to call on 
the Law Centre for future issues: 
 
“The more she builds the relationships, which she does, they tell her more and they ask for help. I 
have families that ring her up now about financial problems…they're confident enough to ring 
straight through to her.”  
TFT Key Worker 3 
Since the empirical research for this project concluded Coventry Law Centre has 
used the evidence from its work with the Troubled Families Team to secure further 
project funding from Lankelly Chase, a generalist funder whose mission is to: 
“to establish the underlying causes of social disadvantage and to address those 
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causes.” This funding led to an even bigger grant of £1.5million, awarded by the 
Early Action Neighbourhood Fund47. This five-year grant supports a partnership 
between Coventry Law Centre, local learning disability charity Grapevine, a 
children’s services department and a housing management service in Coventry, who 
are working together to both build community capability and resilience and redesign 
the way in which public services engage with individuals with multiple and complex 
need- helping them to intervene earlier to resolve problems before they escalate. 
This experience demonstrates the potential of project funding to facilitate working 
in ways that reinforce the relationship between Law Centres and their communities. 
.  
7.8.5 Expanding the funding base through project funding and Terminal 
Value 5: The communities in which Law Centres are based and the 
clients they work with have higher levels of legal knowledge and are 
better able to secure their rights protection and fair treatment 
 
A shift to project funding offers the potential for Law Centres to deliver legal 
education in a manner that was not possible under Legal Aid Funding (Mayo et al 
2014:49). There is evidence that the Embedded Advisor Project enabled the Law 
Centre to assist vulnerable clients to build the knowledge and resilience to manage 
their own social welfare law problems in the future. The following excerpt from an 
interview with the Embedded Advisor provides an example of this:  
 
“Well it's not all about the numbers and stuff. I've got a client at the moment who has really 
surprised me because when I first met her she's got really, really bad anxiety and mental health 
problems and she suffered with it for 20 years, she's very nervous etcetera, never engaged with me, 
didn't really have any eye contact and everything,... I asked her if she could do something for me, it 
was just to make a phone call but that's massive for her and she did it and the next time I went to 
the appointment she told me the outcome and she'd actually followed it through. So I think it's 
about, the success for me is…getting them in a better place” 
CLC TFT EA 
In addition to educating the clients about accessing legal services and legal rights, 
there was some evidence that the presence of the Embedded Advisor may impact 
                                                
47 A collaboration between grant makers that aims to show national and local government how acting early on 
problems can save public money now and later on. 
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on the legal awareness of Troubled Families Team Key Workers. In comparison 
with their contemporaries at Warwickshire Priority Families Team, it was found that 
Troubled Families Key Workers at Coventry City Council evinced less confusion 
over what constituted a justiciable problem, and were more accurate in their 
understanding of the different types of social welfare law problems that exist. Three 
out of the four Priority Workers interviewed expressed the belief that their own lack 
of knowledge around social welfare law was a barrier to finding timely and effective 
solutions to their client’s social welfare law problems (Byrom, 2014:25). The Chief 
Executive of the Law Centre stated that an on-going aim of the projects run by the 
Law Centre was to improve the legal awareness of workers in the public sector, in 
order that they could provide a better service and ensure that their decision making 
upheld the rights of their clients.  
 
“…Through our IGNITE programme, we're still showing, and there are still people who are 
surprised, how poor the knowledge of peoples legal rights is amongst the public sector and how much 
they tie the clients or their customers hands behind their backs because they don't help them to get 
those rights upheld.” 
CLC CE 
As such, there is an on-going need for project funding to facilitate Law Centres to 
deliver legal education in their communities, a function that has been historically 
underdeveloped and arguably, hindered, by a reliance on legal service specific forms 
of funding such as legal aid.  
 
7.9 Conclusion  
The case study above details the experience of a remarkable Law Centre that has 
expanded, rather than reduced its services in the face of the cuts, through adopting 
a strategy of proactively building the funding base for its services. The Law Centre 
has achieved this through focussing on carefully designing projects that enable them 
to demonstrate the role of specialist legal advice in tackling complex social 
problems. The confidence of Law Centre management and staff in the role that the 
resolution of legal problems can play in improving a range of outcomes for clients 
has enabled them to proactively identify when a funder is attempting to improve 
outcomes for individuals who are likely to experience unmet legal need, and 
advocate for the role of their services in helping the funder to deliver these 
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outcomes. In designing projects, the Law Centre is careful to ensure that the project 
design is driven by their values and expertise, rather than adapting their priorities 
and services to fit funder requirements. In designing projects in this manner, the 
Law Centre has been able to expand the funding base for their work whilst also 
delivering their values. It is important to note that unlike some other Law Centres, 
Coventry Law Centre has the enthusiastic support of its local authority, the large 
on-going grant provided by the council afforded a level of security that enabled the 
management of the Centre to experiment with other approaches to securing 
funding whilst retaining a core staff of specialist lawyers across a range of areas of 
law. That is not to say however, that the support from the local authority is a happy 
accident- management at CLC devote time and energy to maintaining this 
relationship and demonstrating the value of the work of the Law Centre. As such, 
the scalability of this strategy across the movement is dependent to a great extent on 
the ability and skill of Law Centre management in building relationships with 
funders, developing partnerships with statutory and voluntary agencies and 
developing and evidencing a convincing narrative around the value and importance 
of legal advice and representation as a tool to achieve a range of positive social 
outcomes. However, there are risks in adopting this strategy- in shifting from 
specialist funders of legal services to generalist funders such as trusts and 
foundations, who may not understand the law or be ideologically committed to 
using law as a tool to improve the position of their beneficiaries, Law Centres may 
risk undermining their ability to deliver Law Centre Ideal Type Terminal Value 1 
(Law Centres improve the position of economically disadvantaged groups within 
the extant legal framework). As discussed above, of particular concern is the ability 
to secure support for the strategic litigation activities that have been considered 
synonymous with Law Centres approach to law reform. Relatedly, the case study 
demonstrates that a strategy of shifting to securing project funding from generalist 
funders may undermine the ability of Law Centres to retain a full range of specialist, 
expert legal professionals (Law Centre Ideal Type Terminal Value 3), due to the 
relatively high cost of supporting these roles, the need to retain a range of experts 
who can be called on intermittently and the short-term nature of most project 
funding from charitable trusts and foundations. However, project funding from 
generalist funders can free Law Centres to design ways of delivering their services 
that enhance their engagement with their community, ability to target the most 
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vulnerable (Law Centre Ideal Type Terminal Value 2), and their capacity to act as 
empathic allies of their clients, enabling them to deliver Law Centre Ideal Type 
Terminal Value 4 (Law Centres are empathic allies of their clients) to a greater 
extent than might be possible under traditional funding streams that mandate a 
“judicare” model. Similarly, project funding has the potential to facilitate public legal 
education and awareness raising about rights to a greater extent than other, 
traditional forms of funding, provided that funders can be convinced of the value of 
this endeavour.  
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8 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER 
RESEARCH 
 
8.1 Introduction 
This research has sought to explore the impact of the cuts to civil legal aid 
introduced by the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act [2012] 
on vulnerable people through understanding the impact of these cuts on Law 
Centres. The thesis began by explaining the history of the relationship between Law 
Centres and the legal aid scheme, characterising this as one of growing dependence 
by the former on the latter (see Chapter 2). This increasing dependence, borne of 
financial necessity, meant that Law Centres were highly exposed to the impact of 
cuts to legal aid funding: as a consequence of LASPO, by 2015, one-in-six Law 
Centres had been forced to close (Justice Select Committee, 2015:33). Those that 
remained faced numerous challenges the most pressing of which has been to 
develop new funding models to ensure their survival. This thesis has proposed a 
principled framework for understanding what a Law Centre is (Chapter 3), 
suggested a set of criteria that Law Centres might use to ensure that their services 
are reaching those who are most vulnerable (Chapter 4) and used the findings of 
original empirical research (Chapters 5-7) to explore the implications of the most 
popular strategies adopted by Law Centres in response to the cuts for their ability to 
deliver their core values. Accordingly, the thesis set out to address four main and 
one subsidiary research questions:  
1. What is a Law Centre? What are the organisational values that together constitute 
the ideal type Law Centre?  
 
2. What was the relationship between Law Centres and the legal aid scheme prior to 
the introduction of LASPO?  
 
3. What are the most common funding models adopted by Law Centres in 
responding to the cuts, why were they adopted and how do they operate in practice?  
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4. How have the different models chosen impacted on Law Centres? How do the 
different funding models impact on the ability of Law Centres to deliver the values 
set out in the ideal type Law Centre?  
 
Subsidiary questions 
5. What factors should Law Centres consider when assessing who is most 
vulnerable/in greatest need?  
 
Question 1 has been answered in chapter 3, question 2 in chapter 2, question 5 in 
chapter 4 and questions 3 and 4 have been substantially addressed in chapters 5-7. 
In this concluding chapter I aim to draw out comparative lessons arising from the 
three case studies, before moving to recommend areas for further research that have 
emerged in the context of this project. 
8.2 Comparative lessons arising from the case studies 
The following discussion summarises the implications of the three strategies 
discussed in Chapters 5-7 for the Ideal Type Law Centre Values described above at 
Chapter 3. Taking each of the Ideal Type values in turn, the following sections 
explores the lessons that can be drawn from comparing the findings in each of the 
case studies and their implications for future research.  
8.2.1 Terminal Value 1: Law Centres improve the position of economically 
disadvantaged individuals and groups within the extant legal 
framework: lessons across the case studies  
In the framework set out above at Chapter 3, it is argued that Law Centres deliver 
this Terminal Value in three ways: i.) by delivering legal services to those who are 
economically disadvantaged, helping them to secure their rights under existing law 
and working to extend and reform the law where existing rights are inadequate; ii.) 
by undertaking strategic litigation that has the potential to reform the law in the 
interests of those who are economically disadvantaged and iii.) through uniting 
groups of individuals around the experience of particular justiciable issues and using 
these groups as vehicles for initiating law reform through research and campaigning. 
As the preceding discussion has demonstrated, all three strategies adopted by the 
Law Centres studied have the potential to support Law Centres to deliver their 
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services to those who are economically disadvantaged, provided they are 
operationalised with this goal in mind. In the case of ABLC, who adopted a strategy 
of charging for advice, which might intuitively seem the least capable of directly 
supporting this goal, there is an argument that can be made that by setting fees at a 
marginal rate, the Law Centre is still able to deliver this value. However, of the three 
strategies considered, charging-for-advice is most likely to act as a barrier to 
reaching the most economically disadvantaged, and therefore the least able to 
support Law Centres to deliver this value.  
 
The strategy adopted by Kirklees Law Centre, of merging with a CAB, should 
enable the Law Centre to continue to reach the most economically disadvantaged 
clients, provided that reaching these individuals remains a priority for Citizens 
Advice. Whilst (as is discussed above at Chapter 6) the Citizens Advice Bureau 
began as an emphatically generalist service: both in terms of the issues they advised 
on and the target population for their services (Goriely 1996a: 221) by the 1980’s 
the movement had established a reputation for and expertise in working on issues 
of poverty and social welfare (Goriely, 1996a:235). Whilst this remains the case, a 
strategy of merging with Citizens Advice Bureau is likely to continue to support 
Law Centres to deliver their services to the most economically marginalised. In 
relation to the approach taken by Coventry Law Centre, that of expanding the base 
of funders for Law Centre’s work through seeking project funding, whether or not 
this strategy supports Law Centres to reach economically marginalised individuals is 
dependent on the design and focus of the project. Law Centres wishing to follow 
the approach undertaken by Coventry Law Centre must pay careful attention to the 
design of the projects they seek funding for and the funders they approach in order 
that they are able to deliver this value.  
 
In comparing the three strategies adopted in the case studies included in the thesis, 
one common challenge is finding funding to support Law Centres to deliver this 
value through strategic litigation. The experience of Avon and Bristol Law Centre 
indicates that a fee charging model, with prices set at below market rate and 
accepting only those cases where i.) the area of law implicated is no longer covered 
by legal aid and ii.) the case is complex or strategically important, may provide the 
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opportunity for Law Centres to continue to use this approach to reform and extend 
the law in the interests of those who are economically disadvantaged, provided that 
clients are able to afford to pay for this. Whether a fee charging model designed 
with these strictures would prove economically viable is another matter. In both 
Coventry and Kirklees, the strategies developed rely on securing funding from 
organisations and funders who have not historically engaged in or supported 
strategic litigation. In the case of Coventry Law Centre, at the time of writing no 
strategic litigation has been undertaken through the Troubled Families Project. 
Whilst this does not mean that, in the future, clients with appropriate cases could 
not be identified through this work, the design of the project did not include 
funding for strategic litigation approaches. As discussed above at Chapter 7, in 
choosing to merge with an organisation with a cultural suspicion of litigation and 
lawyers (Goriely, 1996:235) whether or not Kirklees Law Centre will be able to 
continue to undertake high profile strategic litigation remains to be seen. In the case 
of the strategies adopted by both Coventry Law Centre and Kirklees Law Centre, 
cultural suspicion of litigation and funder reticence regarding the role of these 
approaches may present on-going barriers to securing funding for this work. 
Making the case for the value of strategic litigation as a tool to improve the position 
of economically disadvantaged individuals and groups remains challenging, 
especially where funding for this work is sought from funders who do not have a 
history of engaging in these activities. Across the Law Centres Network, developing 
sustainable funding models that support the conduct of strategic litigation is likely 
to prove problematic. Further research is needed both to monitor the impact of the 
cuts to funding for Legal Aid on the volume of strategic litigation conducted, and to 
build the evidence base for the efficacy of strategic litigation in securing law reform 
in the interests of the economically marginalised.  
8.2.2 Terminal Value 2: Law Centres deliver their services to those in 
greatest need 
Across the three case studies included in the thesis, it is apparent that of the three 
models, the approach adopted by Coventry Law Centre appears most likely to 
succeed in facilitating Law Centres to deliver their services to those in greatest need. 
The ideal type Law Centre values framework presented at Chapter 3 above 
proposed two definitions of need: “Need Type 1”, where individuals are vulnerable 
 
 
 
237 
or needy because they do not have rights under the existing legal framework, and 
“Need Type 2”, where individuals are needy despite being afforded rights under the 
existing legal framework as they are unable to secure them. The project funding 
approach developed by Coventry Law Centre was designed from a “Need Type 2 
first” perspective: Law Centre management were looking for funding to support 
their work with individuals with high levels of legal need, identified that there was a 
partner organisation (in this case, the Local Authority) with new funding who were 
interested in improving outcomes for a target group likely to have high levels of 
legal need, and designed a project demonstrating that the partner could meet their 
non-legal need related targets more effectively through funding the Law Centre to 
address the legal needs of this group. Proactively identifying a group with high levels 
of Need Type 2 was essential to the efficacy of this strategy- if the individuals 
involved in the project had been less vulnerable in the context of securing their 
rights, then the impact of the Law Centre’s work on the partner organisation’s non-
legal need specific targets would have been reduced, and the funding would have 
been discontinued. The efficacy of this strategy in supporting Coventry Law Centre 
to deliver Terminal Value 2 is therefore contingent on the design of the project- 
Law Centres wishing to develop the strategy of securing project funding from 
generalist funders48 must ensure that the projects they design enable them to reach 
individuals and groups who are both of interest to these funders and have high 
levels of legal need if they are to deliver this value. Given the established 
relationship between deprivation, various types of health morbidity, and unmet legal 
need, this should not be a difficult task.  
 
Chapters 5 and 6 detail the ways in which the other strategies explored: charging for 
advice and merging to survive could be delivered in a manner that improves their 
ability to reach individuals who are more vulnerable (for example, in the former, 
through setting low fee rates and restricting charging to areas such as immigration, 
where individuals are particularly at risk of not being able to secure their rights and, 
in the latter, through merging with an organisation that works with individuals with 
multiple vulnerabilities in the context of being able to access their entitlements). 
However, both of these approaches to funding have resulted in delivery structures 
                                                
48 Non-legal specialist specific philanthropic and public funders 
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that operate in the manner of “traditional solicitors service” (Stephens, 1990:33-4), 
whereby the onus is on the individual to identify that they have a problem that may 
admit of a legal solution and proactively seek out the Law Centre for assistance. 
This delivery model arguably mitigates against reaching the most vulnerable or 
needy individuals (i.e. those who have a justiciable problem but do not recognise it 
as such). In the case of the charging model developed at ABLC, the limited 
resources available for undertaking fee paying work, and the necessity of 
undertaking those cases capable of yielding a profit, mitigated against targeting 
those with the highest levels of need. In the case of Kirklees, the merger and the 
resultant decision (driven by the priorities of the CAB) to move to telephone based 
initial advice may also prevent the new organisation from reaching those most in 
need..  
8.2.3 Terminal Value 3: Law Centres are staffed by specialist, expert, legal 
professionals 
Across all of the strategies explored as part of the thesis, there were worrying 
indications that securing sufficient funding to retain, develop and train specialist, 
expert legal professionals is likely to prove challenging. Charging for advice can 
provide opportunities to enable Law Centres to retain staff who otherwise would be 
redundant, but may threaten the desirability of the Law Centre as an employer, as 
the introduction of for-profit motives might change both the nature of the work 
and the culture of the working environment. Merging with organisations such as 
CAB, who may not see the value in retaining expensive, specialist legal advisors 
across a range of areas could threaten the ability to retain such staff, particularly 
when doing so would be at the expense of larger numbers of generalist advice 
workers. Securing project funding from charitable funders often results in fixed 
term contracts of relatively short duration, making it difficult for Law Centres to 
offer security and career progression. As such, the loss of specialist legal expertise 
from Law Centres and other organisations that formerly delivered advice and 
representation funded through the legal aid scheme may prove the lasting legacy of 
the LASPO cuts. However, if Law Centres are successful in demonstrating the value 
of specialist legal advice and representation in addressing various forms of 
deprivation and disadvantage, they may be able to expand the range of funders 
interested in supporting their work. For example, if Law Centres are able to 
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demonstrate that the provision of specialist legal advice that leads to the resolution 
of legal problems is an effective method of improving individual health and 
wellbeing, they may be able to secure funding from organisations and funders who 
are interested in promoting population health. In the USA, the US Department of 
Veterans Affairs are a key funder of medical-legal partnerships (Houseman, 
2015:13) which enable veterans to access advice and representation in relation to 
their civil law problems49 at the same time as accessing healthcare, in recognition of 
the role of legal support in improving outcomes for veterans that impact on the 
determinants of health e.g. access to housing, welfare benefits and employment. 
This approach, if successful, could deliver sustainable funding at scale for social 
welfare law specialists.  
8.2.4 Terminal Value 4: Law Centres are empathic allies of their clients 
As with Terminal Value 2 above, whether or not the strategy of expanding the 
funding base for Law Centre’s work with project funding supports the ability of 
Law Centre staff to deliver this value is dependent on the way in which the project 
is designed- in the case of the Troubled Families Project described at Chapter 7 the 
way in which the project was formulated enhanced the ability of Law Centre staff to 
work as empathic allies of their clients. In the case of this project, it was clear that 
the Embedded Advisor provided valuable independent support to individuals who 
may well have felt stigmatised by their inclusion in the Troubled Families 
Programme (see Chapter 7 above) and that the mode of delivery adopted in the 
project facilitated working with clients in a manner that was empathic and 
supportive. In the case of ABLC, discussed in Chapter 5, whilst arguably there is 
not an intrinsic contradiction between charging for legal advice and representation 
and being an empathic ally of clients, the realities of the requirement to generate a 
profit under a fixed fee scheme may create tensions where Law Centre staff equate 
being an “empathic ally” with providing a holistic, client-led service. These tensions 
may be exacerbated where the target market for the fee-charging service is 
individuals on low incomes who are not able to access advice from private practice. 
Whether or not the strategy of merging to survive (see Chapter 6) impacts on the 
ability of Law Centres to act as empathic allies of their clients depends greatly on 
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the culture and ethos of the organisation(s) that are being merged with. In taking a 
decision to merge, Law Centres who are considering pursuing this strategy must 
consider the congruence of their values with those of the organization they are 
seeking to merge with. Where staff from both organisations are to be retained, it is 
important to ensure that the working practices and attitudes of staff align, in order 
that the combined organisation is able to deliver on this value.  
8.2.5 Terminal Value 5: Law Centres imbue both clients and local 
communities with high levels of legal knowledge 
The case studies explored provided little insight into the ability of the funding 
models developed to support Law Centres to deliver effective legal education 
activities. This is relatively unsurprising, given that the most recent study of Law 
Centres (Mayo 2014) reported that the ability of Law Centres to deliver community 
legal education activities had declined as their reliance on restricted funding 
increased. All of the Law Centres studied as part of this project evinced 
commitment to this value, and in each location there were examples of on-going 
legal education activities. For example, in 2014, Coventry Law Centre held 25 road 
shows attended by 400 people to prepare disabled people for Work Capability 
Assessments (Coventry Law Centre, 2014:14) and addressed meetings of local 
General Practitioners to help them to better understand their role in enabling 
victims of domestic violence to access legal aid. ABLC contributed to local radio 
and news outlets, providing information and advice on a variety of issues. Kirklees 
Law Centre worked with their Local Healthwatch to help them to understand the 
law in relation to a decision by NHS England not to provide an alternative vaccine 
for individuals who were unable to accept porcine products on religious and cultural 
grounds. However, the funding models considered did not directly support these 
activities. Further research is required to: i.) identify best practice in public legal 
education; ii.) develop standardised measures to assess improved legal knowledge 
and iii.) identify funding models capable of supporting this activity.  
  
8.3 Conclusion   
The cuts to legal aid introduced by LASPO have created a hostile funding 
environment that poses an existential threat to the network of UK Law Centres. 
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The magnitude of the impact of these cuts is a reflection of the extent of Law 
Centres’ reliance on the legal aid scheme for funding in recent years. This thesis has 
argued that the increasing conditionality of this form of funding impeded the ability 
of Law Centres to deliver the values that are constitutive of their distinctiveness. As 
such, the withdrawal of this form of funding creates an opportunity for Law 
Centres to consider which funding models are best suited to support them to 
deliver their values. Each of the funding models presented above has strengths and 
weaknesses, and they should not be considered mutually exclusive, indeed, one of 
the lessons that might be drawn from the case studies is the importance of 
developing a diversified funding base. Each case study demonstrates the impact of 
funding on the ability to deliver values, and the role of local factors such as local 
authority support on the ability of Law Centres to experiment with different 
models.   
 
The circumstances described by the authors of “Justice for All” in 1968 as evidence 
of the imperative to create a network of Law Centres resonate strongly with those 
of today. The need for a robust network of organisations that work to improve the 
position of those who are economically marginalised and under-represented within 
the extant legal framework is as pressing today as it has ever been. The proliferation 
of law, expansion of administrative decision-making and under-investment in public 
legal education has created an environment where many individuals are vulnerable 
in the context of being able to secure just outcomes in relation to their justiciable 
problems. In this context, the need for strong, sustainable organisations with the 
ability to deliver the values of the ideal type Law Centre described at Chapter 3 
could not be greater.  In considering their options for future funding, it is vital that 
Law Centres reflect on and adhere to their values, mission and purpose, in order 
that a distinctive movement emerges from this historical moment.  
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APPENDIX A: ADVERT FOR PHD STUDENTSHIP 
03/12/2017 PhD - legal advice services  
 
ESRC Collaborative Studentship Investigating Cuts and 
Changes to Legal Advice Services  
Overview  
This ESRC-Funded Collaborative PhD will examine the impact of the imminent cuts to legal advice 
services, particularly on the most vulnerable and disadvantaged. It will examine the different models that are 
being developed to deal with these cuts by particular legal services providers – with a focus on Law Centres.  
The project is a collaboration between the Centre for Human Rights in Practice in the School of Law at the 
University of Warwick, the Law Centres Federation and Coventry Law Centre. It will involve working 
closely with these institutions. The academic supervisor will be Dr. James Harrison.  
Background  
The Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Bill (currently passing through Parliament) will 
introduce up to £350 million of cuts to funding in legal aid services in April 2013. The Bill is likely to cut 
funding for advice on debt, employment, housing, family, immigration, welfare bene ts and some other 
areas. It will also impact who can get legal aid, by asking people on low incomes to pay more towards their 
legal advice and by reducing the lowest fees for civil advice. Many legal service providers, such as Law 
Centres, are also facing cuts to other sources of funding (e.g. from local authorities).  
This PhD will help to address the need for research which examines the actual impact of these cuts to legal 
advice services, particularly on the most vulnerable and disadvantaged. It will examine how legal advice 
providers are responding to these cuts to funding and the different models that are being developed to deal 
with these changes.  
The PhD will build upon the expertise developed by the Centre for Human Rights in Practice in research 
which uses the norms and standards of human rights and equality law in order to analysis the impacts of 
policies and practices – click here for a full list of projects and publications.  
Particularly relevant to the current project is the work of the Centre on the human rights and equality 
impacts of the public spending cuts on women in Coventry, which includes analysis of the potential impacts 
of cuts to legal advice services. Click here for more information on these projects. It is expected that the 
current PhD project will build on the methodologies and approaches used in that work.  
The Subject of the PhD Research  
This PhD will focus on the issues of housing, welfare bene ts and debt advice (social welfare law). These are 
often legal issues which the poorest and most vulnerable individuals face at the same time and so they 
naturally t together within the same research project.  
The PhD research will investigate the impacts of cuts in these areas and different models for dealing with 
them. The PhD research will focus upon the impact of cuts on legal advice services provided by Law 
Centres. Law Centres focus on providing legal services to people who may be marginalised in society or 
who are experiencing discrimination. They also work closely with local agencies and organisations who 
provide other advice and assistance to vulnerable individuals (e.g. homelessness organisations, disability 
support groups etc.). They are therefore in a unique position to both understand the more complex impacts 
of cuts to legal advice funding and to develop models for reducing the impact on the most vulnerable and 
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disadvantaged individuals.  
Tel: +44 (0)24 7652 3075  Email: law@warwick.ac.uk  School of Law, University of Warwick, Coventry CV4 
7AL, United Kingdom  
Page contact: James Harrison  Last revised: Mon 11 Feb 2013  Powered by Sitebuilder | © MMXVII | Terms | Privacy | 
Cookies | Accessibility  
https://warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/law/research/centres/chrp-old/projects/spendingcuts/legaladviceservices/ 1/1  
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APPENDIX B: QUESTIONNAIRE FOR LAW CENTRE STAFF  
 
1.  Would you be willing for me to contact you to follow up on the answers that you 
have given? If so please provide contact details:  
Name and law 
centre 
 
Email  
Telephone   
 
2. What areas of law do you currently provide advice and representation in?  
Debt and money  Welfare Benefits  
Housing  Family  
Community care  Employment and discrimination   
Immigration   Mental health  
Public law  Education  
 
3. How many staff do you employ at your law centre at each of the following levels? 
Qualified solicitor  
Trainee solicitor  
Specialist advisor  
Law graduate  
Legal executive  
OISC accredited advisor  
General advisor  
Volunteer   
 
4. How many of the following impacts do you predict your law centre to experience as a 
result of the cuts? (tick as appropriate) 
Staff redundancies  
Reduction in areas of advice offered  
Reduced hours of opening  
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Reduced time to spend with clients  
Reduced ability to offer representation in areas where 
this is still available 
 
 
5. At present, what do you consider to be the most important aspect of the work that 
you do? (please tick all that apply) 
Ability to spend time with clients assessing the totality of their 
problems and providing support 
 
Ability to act on behalf of clients to challenge decisions that are 
unjust  
 
Providing advice to clients on the problems they are facing  
Helping clients to navigate complex bureaucratic processes  
Ability to provide advice that is free at the point of delivery   
Ability to influencing the outcome in court cases  
Being able to provide face to face advice  
Being able to improve outcomes for individuals through working 
with the other agencies that engage with them 
 
Encouraging client engagement with other agencies/bodies e.g. 
social services, benefits office, housing association, local council etc. 
 
 
6. What aspect(s) of your work have I missed in the table above?  
 
 
 
 
 
 
7. How will the funding cuts impact on your work? 
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8. What models are you considering for sustaining the activities of the law centre beyond 
April 2013? (Tick as appropriate) 
Setting up a separate charging arm  
Charging for advice  
Seeking support from your local authority  
Bidding for money from other sources e.g. lottery,   
Other  
 
If other please specify: 
 
 
9. Do you have any other comments? 
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APPENDIX D: INTERVIEWS CONDUCTED AND INTERVIEWEE 
ROLES 
Expert Interviewees  
 Name  Role  Coded in 
text as  
1 Lord Carter of 
Coles  
Presided over the Carter Review of Legal Aid: 
“Legal Aid: A market based approach to reform” 
in 2007  
Interview 
with Lord 
Carter 
2 Steve Hynes  Former Director of the Law Centres Federation 
2002-2007 
 
Interview 
with SH 
3 David Gilmore  Director of DG Legal, management consultancy 
specialising in the legal aid funded legal services 
sector. David also founded and regularly 
contributes to LegalVoice, a not-for-profit online 
magazine for legal professionals 
Interview 
with DG 
 
Avon and Bristol Law Centre: Interviewee Roles  
 Role  Coded in text as  Notes  
1 Law Centre Chief Executive  ABLC CE  Leadership Team 
2 Law Centre Contracts Manager ABLC CM  Leadership Team  
3 Senior Solicitor (and Employment and 
Discrimination Lead)  
ABLC SS Leadership Team  
4 Immigration Team Leader  ABLC ITL Leadership Team  
5 Immigration Adviser ABLC IA  
6 Immigration Trainee Solicitor ABLC ITS   
7 Welfare Benefits Caseworker 1 ABLC WBCW1  
8 Welfare Benefits Caseworker 2 ABLC WBCW2  
9 Housing Team Leader ABLCE HTL   
10 Mental Health Solicitor  ABLC MHS Leadership Team 
11 Community Care Solicitor  ABLC CCS  
12 ASTF Project Lead 1 ABLC ASTF 1  
13 ASTF Project Lead 2  ABLC ASTF 2  
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Kirklees Law Centre and Kirklees CAB Interviewee Roles 
 Role  Coded in text as Notes 
1 Law Centre Chief Executive  KCALC CE Leadership 
Team 
2 Citizens Advice Bureau Chief Executive  KCAB CE Leadership 
Team  
3 Senior Solicitor Welfare Benefits KCALC JP Leadership 
Team  
4 Immigration Team Leader  KCALC ITL  
5 Immigration Adviser KCALC IA  
6 Employment Supervisor KCALC ES  
7 Community Care Team Leader KCALC CCTL  
8 Community Care NQS KCALC CCNQS  
 
Coventry Law Centre Interviewee Roles  
 Role  Coded in text 
as 
Notes  
1 Law Centre Chief Executive  CLC CE Leadership 
Team 
2 Law Centre Senior Solicitor/Employment and 
Discrimination Specialist  
CLC SS Leadership 
Team  
3 Law Centre Welfare Benefits Solicitor  CLC WBS  
4 Law Centre Family Solicitor CLC FS  
5 Law Centre Immigration Supervisor  CLC IS  
6 Law Centre Housing Solicitor  CLC HS  
7 Law Centre Trainee Solicitor CLC TS  
8 Troubled Families Embedded Adviser  CLC TFT EA  
9 Troubled Families Key Worker Coventry City 
Council  
TFT Key 
Worker 1 
 
10 Troubled Families Key Worker Coventry City 
Council 
TFT Key 
Worker 2 
 
11 Troubled Families Key Worker Coventry City 
Council 
TFT Key 
Worker 3 
 
12 Troubled Families Key Worker Coventry City TFT Key  
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Council Worker 4 
13 Troubled Families Key Worker Coventry City 
Council 
TFT Key 
Worker 5 
 
14 Troubled Families Key Worker Coventry City 
Council 
TFT Key 
Worker 6  
 
 
Warwickshire Priority Families Interviewees 
 Role  Coded in text as Notes  
1 Priority Families Key Worker Warwickshire 
County Council  
Priority Families 
Key Worker 1 
 
2 Priority Families Key Worker Warwickshire 
County Council 
Priority Families 
Key Worker 2 
 
3 Priority Families Key Worker Warwickshire 
County Council 
Priority Families 
Key Worker 3 
 
4 Priority Families Key Worker Warwickshire 
County Council 
Priority Families 
Key Worker 4  
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APPENDIX E: DETAILED DATA COLLECTION STRATEGY  
Case Study 1- Charging for Advice  
Email agreement to participate in the study was secured from management at the 
Law Centre in April 2014. Staffing changes at management level whilst the Chief 
Executive was on maternity leave delayed the process of gaining access. An initial 
one-day visit was undertaken in May 2014 during which a range of interviews with 
senior law centre staff were undertaken. The visit also provided an opportunity to 
collect documents relevant to the Law Centre’s history and the model they were 
adopting in response to LASPO. It also provided an opportunity to build 
relationships that would be critical to gaining access for the mainstage fieldwork. 
The focus of the initial interviews was to explore the impact of LASPO and the 
rationale for the approach they had chosen in responding to the cuts, as well as to 
develop rapport with Law Centre staff. The following day a telephone interview 
with the Chief Executive of the Law Centre was conducted, where it was agreed 
that the Law Centre would participate in the research. The charging pilot was at a 
fairly nascent stage at this point, so it was decided to postpone the fieldwork until 
the charging pilot was operational. A further follow-up visit to meet with the Chief 
Executive of the Law Centre in person and to understand the progress that had 
been made in developing the charging pilot was conducted in July 2014. Following 
this conversation, it was agreed that the mainstage fieldwork, consisting of 3-4 
weeks spent at the Law Centre, would take place in September 2014. In September 
2014 I was based at the Law Centre for three weeks. During this time I conducted 
semi-structured interviews with all staff working at the Law Centre, reviewed case 
file data and documents relating to the charging pilot, sat in on external meetings 
between the Law Centre staff and other advice agencies in the area, and observed 
procedures for managing casework. Subsequent to the mainstage fieldwork, it was 
decided to supplement the data with an interview conducted with a expert 
informant who had extensive experience of working with not-for-profit advice 
organisations to develop new income streams. The expert informant had written 
guidance on developing fee-charging models as a not-for-profit in response to 
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LASPO, and was therefore in a position to contextualise the findings emerging 
from the case study.  
 
Detailed Data Collection Strategy – Case Study 2- Merging to Survive 
In January 2014 I contacted the Chief Executive of the Law Centre by email to 
secure agreement to participate in the study. An initial one-day visit was conducted 
in February 2014- the main activity conducted at this point was an extended 
interview with the Chief Executive and tour of the Law Centre premises. As in Case 
Study 1 above, the aim of this visit was to gather contextual and background 
information, understand the strategies being considered for responding to the cuts 
introduced by LASPO, to access documentary evidence and build rapport with Law 
Centre staff. At the first visit, the merger with the CAB had not yet taken place- this 
was finalised in April 2014. A second visit was arranged and conducted in August 
2014, on this visit a further interview was conducted with the Law Centre Chief 
Executive, relevant documents were collected and a strategy for identifying and 
interviewing key informants outside of the Law Centre was agreed. The visit also 
provided an opportunity to confirm the dates of the mainstage fieldwork, which was 
scheduled to be conducted in November 2014.  In November 2014 I was based at 
the Law Centre for a period of three weeks. During this time I interviewed all Law 
Centre staff, reviewed case files and spoke with volunteers at the Centre. During 
this period I also interviewed the outgoing Chief Executive of the combined 
CAB/Law Centre who, prior to the merger had been Chief Executive of the CAB 
and instrumental in pioneering and concluding the merger. I also interviewed senior 
staff at other agencies who had longstanding working relationships with the Law 
Centre both prior to and after the merger (see Appendix D for interview guides and 
interviewee roles).  
 
Case Study 3- Expanding the funding base for Law Centres through project 
funding 
The data collection strategy for understanding the funding model adopted in Case 
Study 3 differed considerably from that used in the other two case studies. Data 
collected and presented in case study three is derived from an evaluation of a 
project embedding a Law Centre worker in the Troubled Families Team at 
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Coventry City Council. This project had been cited by the Chief Executive of the 
Law Centre as emblematic of the wider strategy: expanding their funding base 
through applying for project funding. This evaluation was conducted on behalf of 
the Law Centre and funded by The Baring Foundation. The evaluation was 
designed to draw together lessons from the project regarding the impact of the 
provision of the Law Centres services on the operation of the Troubled Families 
Team, with a particular focus on the potential cost-savings delivered by the project. 
As such, the strategy involved interviewing the staff at a comparator Troubled 
Families Team who did not have access to the dedicated, embedded legal advice 
service provided by the project.  
In November 2013 interviews were carried out with the Chief Executive of the Law 
Centre and with the Embedded Advisor currently in post at Coventry Law Centre, 
to strengthen existing understanding about the way in which the intervention 
operates, and to illuminate areas of potential importance to the study. The data 
collected as part of this interview was used to develop the set of questions posed to 
the Troubled Families Key Workers.  
In December 2013 interviews were conducted with eight Key Workers from 
Coventry City Council’s Children and Families First Service. Of these, six were 
Troubled Families Key workers, two, although classed as CFF workers, had 
received assistance from the Embedded Advisor in resolving civil law issues 
experienced by their clients. To ensure transparency, where their responses have 
been included in the analysis, a note has been made. A copy of the questions posed 
to all interviewees is available below at Appendix D. There were a number of 
difficulties in negotiating access to Warwickshire County Council’s Troubled 
Families Team, which delayed the progress of the research significantly. In May 
2014, I was granted access to interview four Key Workers; the questions posed to 
these workers are listed below at Appendix D. A further interview was conducted 
with the Chief Executive of the Law Centre in order to explore the relationship 
between this project and the wider funding strategy adopted.  
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APPENDIX F: RATIONALE FOR REFLEXIVITY: RESEARCHER-
AS-INSTRUMENT STATEMENT  
 
1. Experience with the topic  or  populat ion o f  interes t   
My first experience of the role and value of expert legal advice came from my 
voluntary work with the homeless and vulnerably housed. From 2003-2008 I 
volunteered at two drop-in centres: Fireside Charity  (now SIFA Fireside, based in 
Birmingham) and Wintercomfort (based in Cambridge). The client group served by 
these Centres experienced multiple and complex legal need, and part of my role 
involved referring clients to local advice agencies for legal advice. In 2008 I worked 
in early resolution patient complaints for Birmingham and Solihull Mental Health 
Trust, where many of the patients reported experiencing issues with debt, securing 
welfare benefits and housing as well as issues with understanding and challenging 
decisions made in relation to their care. In 2010 I volunteered with the Dudley 
Commission for Racial Equality, I worked as a mentor for individuals who had 
recently been granted indefinite leave to remain in the UK. I was paired with a 
gentleman from Zimbabwe, and through him became involved in the wider 
Zimbabwean community. I assisted in organising the launch event for the 
Zimbabwe Community Group in Coventry, whose remit included providing peer 
support for individuals with irregular immigration status. In these roles I gained an 
appreciation of the value of timely legal advice, and the impact that the provision of 
expert legal advice and support could have on individuals material circumstances 
and wellbeing.  My empathy for the client group served by Law Centres, and 
concern with how they would fare if the availability of free legal advice declined, 
was a key factor in motivating my application for the PhD studentship. Immediately 
prior to accepting the PhD studentship I worked as a research assistant on the Legal 
Education and Training Review, a national review of legal education and training. In 
this role I interviewed Young Legal Aid Lawyers and also members of Legal Action 
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Group. I have never practiced as a lawyer (although I did study law as part of my 
undergraduate degree).  
 
 
2. Training and exper ience  in qual i tat ive  methods  
In 2009-2010 I undertook an LLM in Socio-Legal Studies at the University of 
Warwick, graduating with distinction. As part of this course I undertook an ESRC 
accredited module:  Qualitative Methods in Social Research. Through my study of 
Qualitative Methods in Social Research I acquired an understanding of the role and 
importance of research design within the context of the qualitative research process 
and the ability to conceptualise and operationalise qualitative research questions. I 
was also able to build upon my existing skills in applying a range of qualitative 
research techniques, including interviews (structured, semi- structured and 
unstructured), participant action research and discourse analysis. I acquired a 
working knowledge of the synergies between qualitative and quantitative research 
methods, for example the manner in which qualitative data can be used to inform 
the design of questionnaires for use in gathering pertinent quantitative data. I also 
developed skills in applying computer technology (“NVIVO”) to the analysis of 
qualitative data securing. I secured a distinction for this course. Prior to undertaking 
the PhD, I worked as a Research Assistant on a National Institute for Health 
Research funded project researching the potential for networked communication 
technologies to be used to support young people living with chronic conditions. In 
this role I designed and conducted qualitative research with patients and expert 
informants.  
 
3. Assumptions,  expec tat ions and biases  brought to the invest igat ion  
I am sympathetic to the mission and values espoused by the founders of the Law 
Centres movement. My previous experiences meant that I approached the research 
with an underlying assumption that the provision of free legal advice and 
representation constitutes a public good, and with the expectation that the 
reduction in public funding for this advice would impact negatively on vulnerable 
people.  
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4. How re f l exive processes  af f e c t ed the analys is   
I met regularly with my supervisor throughout the PhD process, speaking at least 
every two weeks during the fieldwork phase. I transcribed all of my interviews 
verbatim, and kept a record of my observations throughout the fieldwork process. 
Using NVIVO to code the material upon which my analysis is based means that my 
coding is transparent, and can easily be viewed by external observers who might 
wish to check for bias. I discussed my findings extensively with my academic 
supervisor, who helped me to reflect critically on my conclusions.  
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